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Added by: Tomasz Zyglewicz, Shannon Brick, Michael GreerAbstract: The first major anthology to trace the development of Black Feminist thought in the United States, Words of Fire is Beverly Guy-Sheftall’s comprehensive collection of writings by more than sixty Black women. From the pioneering work of abolitionist Maria Miller Stewart and anti-lynching crusader Ida Wells-Barnett to the writings of feminist critics Michele Wallace and bell hooks, Black women have been writing about the multiple jeopardies—racism, sexism, and classism—that have made it imperative to forge a brand of feminism uniquely their own. In the words of Audre Lorde, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house”—Words of Fire provides the tools to dismantle the interlocking systems that oppress us and to rebuild from their ashes a society of true freedom.Comment (from this Blueprint): This 1900 essay is seminal in feminist theory and black studies. Wells paves the way, appealing to empirical evidence, for theorizing on the role that white women's sexuality plays in black people's oppression in the US context. This is part of her broader argument for why lynching should be considered a moral catastrophe in the US.Werhane, Patricia H.. Evaluating the Classificatory Process1979, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 37: 352–54.
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Added by: Simon FoktContent: In this short discussion paper, Werhane challenges the distinction between the classificatory and evaluative senses of ‘art’ defended by George Dickie. Many of the criteria which matter in the selective classificatory process are evaluative in nature, and thus even institutional classification of art depends on evaluation. This means that sometimes people whom institutionalists would interpret as using ‘art’ in the evaluative sense (e.g. in saying: ‘this is not art!’), should rather be seen as using it in the classificatory sense, evaluating the classificatory process (e.g. meaning: ‘the process which led to classifying this as art is wrong, because this should not be classified as art’).Comment: Despite its focus on the institutional definitions of art, this paper can have a wider application to the general discussion on the possibility and appropriateness of separating the classificatory and evaluative uses of the concept ‘art’. This makes it particularly well suited as a further reading in teaching on the proceduralist-functionalist debate (or, since it is very short, an extra required reading).West, Shearer. What is a Portrait?2004, In: Portraiture, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 21-41.
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Added by: Hans MaesSummary: Explores three fundamental claims: (1) portraits can be placed on a continuum between the specificity of likeness and the generality of type; (2) all portraits represent something about the body and face, on the one hand, and the soul, character, or virtues of the sitter, on the other; (3) all portraits involve a series of negotiations – often between artist and sitter, but sometimes there is also a patron who is not included in the portrait. NB: In the Introduction preceding this chapter West also questions the cliché that portraits are an invention of the Renaissance and an exclusively Western phenomenon.Comment: This text offers a great introduction to the topic of portraiture and an overview of the subject. It can also be useful in a wider context of depiction and representation.
Artworks to use with this text:
Jan Van Eyck, Madonna With Chancellor Rolin (1433) vs Rogier van der Weyden, The Donor, Chancellor Rolin, Kneeling in Prayer; from the reverse of Last Judgment Polyptych (1445)
A comparison of these two paintings reveals how likenesses are always mediated by the varying functions of portraits and the distinct styles of the artists.
Angelica Kauffmann, Portrait of J.W. Goethe (1787-8)
For women artists such as Kauffmann the control of the gaze during sessions with male sitters could be socially uncomfortable but empowering. This text offers a great introduction to the topic of portraiture and an overview of the subject. It can also be useful in a wider context of depiction and representation.
Artworks to use with this text:
Jan Van Eyck, Madonna With Chancellor Rolin (1433) vs Rogier van der Weyden, The Donor, Chancellor Rolin, Kneeling in Prayer; from the reverse of Last Judgment Polyptych (1445)
A comparison of these two paintings reveals how likenesses are always mediated by the varying functions of portraits and the distinct styles of the artists.
Angelica Kauffmann, Portrait of J.W. Goethe (1787-8)
For women artists such as Kauffmann the control of the gaze during sessions with male sitters could be socially uncomfortable but empowering.
West, Shearer. Gender and Portraiture2004, In: Portraiture, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 144-161.-
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Added by: Hans MaesSummary: The gender of both artist and sitter needs to be taken into account when considering the history of portraiture. Explores how and why women were often portrayed in certain roles (as goddesses, historical or religious figures, allegorical embodiments of abstract notions). Discusses why many women artists before the 20th century were portraitists and considers a few examples. Also highlights changing notions of masculinity in portraiture.Comment: Useful in aesthetics classes discussing portraiture, depiction and representation, as well as philosophy of gender classes discussing representations of women.
Artworks to use with this text:
Lotte Laserstein, Self-Portrait with Cat (1928) vs Otto Dix, Portrait of the Journalist Sylvia von Harden (1926)
Both portraits were painted in 1920s Germany by artists linked to the New Objectivity art movement. Still, there is a notable difference between the 'objective' view of the male artist and the subjective self-image of the woman artist.
Elizabeth Siddal, Self-Portrait (1854)
There's a marked contrast between the unhappiness and fatigue visible in this self-portrait and the beauty and eroticism in Dante Gabriel Rossetti's Beata Beatrix (c.1862) in which he transfers the ideal qualities of Dante's Beatrice into the real portrait of Siddal.
Artemisia Gentileschi, Self-Portrait as "La Pittura" (c. 1630)
It could be said that the artist is complicit in the tendency of portraitists to generalize their women subjects as she embodied herself as the allegory of Painting. Nevertheless, Artemisia does not show herself in an idealized way and by self-consciously manipulating a set of conventions makes a unique contribution to the corpus of self-portraiture. Useful in aesthetics classes discussing portraiture, depiction and representation, as well as philosophy of gender classes discussing representations of women.
Artworks to use with this text:
Lotte Laserstein, Self-Portrait with Cat (1928) vs Otto Dix, Portrait of the Journalist Sylvia von Harden (1926)
Both portraits were painted in 1920s Germany by artists linked to the New Objectivity art movement. Still, there is a notable difference between the 'objective' view of the male artist and the subjective self-image of the woman artist.
Elizabeth Siddal, Self-Portrait (1854)
There's a marked contrast between the unhappiness and fatigue visible in this self-portrait and the beauty and eroticism in Dante Gabriel Rossetti's Beata Beatrix (c.1862) in which he transfers the ideal qualities of Dante's Beatrice into the real portrait of Siddal.
Artemisia Gentileschi, Self-Portrait as "La Pittura" (c. 1630)
It could be said that the artist is complicit in the tendency of portraitists to generalize their women subjects as she embodied herself as the allegory of Painting. Nevertheless, Artemisia does not show herself in an idealized way and by self-consciously manipulating a set of conventions makes a unique contribution to the corpus of self-portraiture.
West, Shearer. The Functions of Portraiture2004, In: Portraiture, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 43-69.-
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Added by: Hans MaesSummary: Posits that aesthetic value has only rarely been the primary inspiration in the commissioning, display, and reception of portraits. Discusses the different functions that portraits and portrait collections have fulfilled. Includes sections on the portrait as biography, the portrait as document, the portrait as proxy and gift, the portrait as commemoration and memorial, the portrait as political tool.Comment: A central text for classes on portraiture. Very useful in any classes focusing on non-aesthetic function of art.
Artworks to use with this text:
Anonymous, after an engraving by Simon Van de Passe, Pocahontas (after 1616)
Words painted on a portrait were often important in establishing the authenticity of the likeness, but in this case that claim is misleading, as this portrait was a third-hand image. Moreover, Pocahantos is depicted as white, described as a Christian convert, and principally identified as the wife of John Rolfe.
Jean-Étienne Liotard, Portrait of Maria Frederike van Reede-Athlone at 7 years of age (1755-6)
Because pastel portraits rendered the person both lifelike and seemingly touchable, they potentially had an erotic and fetishistic quality and were collected obsessively. A central text for classes on portraiture. Very useful in any classes focusing on non-aesthetic function of art.
Artworks to use with this text:
Anonymous, after an engraving by Simon Van de Passe, Pocahontas (after 1616)
Words painted on a portrait were often important in establishing the authenticity of the likeness, but in this case that claim is misleading, as this portrait was a third-hand image. Moreover, Pocahantos is depicted as white, described as a Christian convert, and principally identified as the wife of John Rolfe.
Jean-Étienne Liotard, Portrait of Maria Frederike van Reede-Athlone at 7 years of age (1755-6)
Because pastel portraits rendered the person both lifelike and seemingly touchable, they potentially had an erotic and fetishistic quality and were collected obsessively.
Wetzel, Linda. The Trouble With Nominalism2000, Philosophical Studies 98(3): 361-370.-
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Added by: Jamie CollinSummary: Wetzel raises an important but underdiscussed argument for Platonism. We quantify over types (contrast with tokens) in sentences that we take to be true. This means we are, prima facie, committed to the existence of types. Wetzel considers various 'nominalization' strategies to get rid of type discourse and finds them all wanting. As a result, argues Wetzel, nominalism is untenable.Comment: This would be useful in a course on metaphysics, ontology, or any course in which the debate between nominalists and platonists is an issue. The paper is short, clear, and relatively untechnical. It raises an important dispute in metaphysics which has not received as much attention as it deserves.Wetzel, Linda. Types and Tokens2006, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E.N. Zalta. Online: Stanford University.
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Added by: Jamie CollinAbstract: The distinction between a type and its tokens is a useful metaphysical distinction. In §1 it is explained what it is, and what it is not. Its importance and wide applicability in linguistics, philosophy, science and everyday life are briefly surveyed in §2. Whether types are universals is discussed in §3. §4 discusses some other suggestions for what types are, both generally and specifically. Is a type the sets of its tokens? What exactly is a word, a symphony, a species? §5 asks what a token is. §6 considers the relation between types and their tokens. Do the type and all its tokens share the same properties? Must all the tokens be alike in some or all respects? §7 explains some problems for the view that types exist, and some problems for the view that they don't. §8 elucidates a distinction often confused with the type-token distinction, that between a type (or token) and an occurrence of it. It also discusses some problems that occurrences might be thought to give rise to, and one way to resolve them.Comment: Would be useful in advanced undergraduate or postgraduate courses on metaphysics or philosophy of language. Though Wetzel's goal is, ultimately, to address metaphysical questions about the existence of types, the type/token distinction crops up in many areas of philosophy, and this would be an excellent reference point for explaining what the distinction amounts to. Though the entry is on the less-discussed topic of types, it is also relevant to the more-discussed topic of universals. This would be very suitable for an undergraduate course in metaphysics or philosophical logic. It would also work well at the beginning of a masters course in metaphysics or philosophical logic. This is a particularly good alternative to Wetzel's book "Types and Tokens" if that is unavailable at your institution.Wetzel, Linda. Types and Tokens: On Abstract Objects2009, MIT Press.
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Added by: Jamie CollinPublisher's Note: There is a widely recognized but infrequently discussed distinction between the spatiotemporal furniture of the world (tokens) and the types of which they are instances. Words come in both types and tokens - for example, there is only one word type 'the' but there are numerous tokens of it on this page - as do symphonies, bears, chess games, and many other types of things. In this book, Linda Wetzel examines the distinction between types and tokens and argues that types exist (as abstract objects, since they lack a unique spatiotemporal location). Wetzel demonstrates the ubiquity of references to (and quantifications over) types in science and ordinary language; types have to be reckoned with, and cannot simply be swept under the rug. Wetzel argues that there are such things as types by undermining the epistemological arguments against abstract objects and offering extended original arguments demonstrating the failure of nominalistic attempts to paraphrase away such references to (and quantifications over) types. She then focuses on the relation between types and their tokens, especially for words, showing for the first time that there is nothing that all tokens of a type need have in common other than being tokens of that type. Finally, she considers an often-overlooked problem for realism having to do with types occurring in other types (such as words in a sentence) and proposes an important and original solution, extending her discussion from words and expressions to other types that structurally involve other types (flags and stars and stripes; molecules and atoms; sonatas and notes).Comment: The book, or extracts from the book, could be used in advanced undergraduate or postgraduate courses on metaphysics, nominalism or philosophy of language. Chapter 2 of the book provides a clear account of the ways Quine and Frege thought about ontological commitment and language. Chapters 3-5 are also useful for students who want to understand nominalism better, though more recent nominalist strategies, such as the kinds of fictionalism developed by Mark Balaguer and Mary Leng, are not addressed.Wiesler, Christine. Epistemic Oppression and Ableism in Bioethics2020, Hypatia. 35: 714–732.
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Added by: Chris Blake-TurnerAbstract: Disabled people face obstacles to participation in epistemic communities that would be beneficial for making sense of our experiences and are susceptible to epistemic oppression. Knowledge and skills grounded in disabled people's experiences are treated as unintelligible within an ableist hermeneutic, specifically, the dominant conception of disability as lack. My discussion will focus on a few types of epistemic oppression—willful hermeneutical ignorance, epistemic exploitation, and epistemic imperialism—as they manifest in some bioethicists’ claims about and interactions with disabled people. One of the problems with the epistemic phenomena with which I am concerned is that they direct our skepticism regarding claims and justifications in the wrong direction. When we ought to be asking dominantly situated epistemic agents to justify their knowledge claims, our attention is instead directed toward skepticism regarding the accounts of marginally situated agents who are actually in a better position to know. I conclude by discussing disabled knowers’ responses to epistemic oppression, including articulating the epistemic harm they have undergone as well as ways of creating resistant ways of knowing.Comment (from this Blueprint): Wieseler draws on resources developed by feminists and disability theorists to critique the practice of philosophical bioethics (bioethics done by philosophers). In particular, she argues that philosophical bioethics involves and perpetuates ableism. Among its many problems, this ableism is epistemically fraught. It interferes with disabled people’s ability to participate in various kinds of knowledge production. Wieseler uses a lot of technical terms—like epistemic exploitation, epistemic imperialism, and willful hermeneutical ignorance—but she explains everything clearly and the payoff is worthwhile. Wieseler uses these concepts to develop a powerful and thought-provoking critique of bioethical practice with respect to disability. The concepts are also useful in broader contexts, as we’ll see in section 3.Wikforss, Åsa. Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism2007, Philosophy Compass 3 (1): 158-181.
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Added by: Giada FratantonioAbstract: Externalism is widely endorsed within contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Despite this, it is far from clear how the externalist thesis should be construed and, indeed, why we should accept it. In this entry I distinguish and examine three central types of externalism: what I call foundational externalism, externalist semantics, and psychological externalism. I suggest that the most plausible version of externalism is not in fact a very radical thesis and does not have any terribly interesting implications for philosophy of mind, whereas the more radical and interesting versions of externalism are quite difficult to support.Comment: The author sheds light on what the externalist thesis in philosophy of mind actually refers to. More precisely, the author distinguishes between three varieties of externalism, namely, i) foundational externalism, ii) externalist semantics and iii) psychological externalism. After discussing these three varieties of externalism, the author argues that there is a variety of externalism which is non-radical and does not bring about any disastrous conclusion. The first half of the paper can be very useful as introduction on the topic of externalism in philosophy of mind, insofar as lots of the main argument for externalism are addressed and evaluated. The author sheds light on what the externalist thesis in philosophy of mind actually refers to. More precisely, the author distinguishes between three varieties of externalism, namely, i) foundational externalism, ii) externalist semantics and iii) psychological externalism. After discussing these three varieties of externalism, the author argues that there is a variety of externalism which is non-radical and does not bring about any disastrous conclusion. The first half of the paper can be very useful as introduction on the topic of externalism in philosophy of mind, insofar as lots of the main argument for externalism are addressed and evaluated.Can’t find it?Contribute the texts you think should be here and we’ll add them soon!
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Wells Barnett, Ida. Lynch Law in America
1995, In Words of Fire: An Anthology of African-American Feminist Thought, ed. Beverly Guy-Sheftall. The New Press, pp. 70-76