Eberl, Markus. ‘To Put in Order’: Classic Maya Concepts of Time and Space
2015, In The Measure and Meaning of Time in the Americas, A. Aveni (ed.). Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection
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Added by: M. Jimena Clavel Vázquez and Andrés Hernández VillarrealAbstract:
Summary adapted from the introduction: The ancient Maya shouldered the burden of time. J. Eric S. Thompson (1950) opens his Maya Hieroglyphic Writing: An Introduction with a collage of god-numbers who carry time units with their mecapal, or head strap. This iconic image has defined our understanding of classic Maya time as cyclical. (…) In the following, I shift the perspective from the “burden of time” to “burdened with time” in order to move from an abstract understanding of time to a study of its practice and bodily experience. I adapt Edmund Husserl’s work to develop a cognitive model of time that I apply to classic Maya culture.
Comment: available in this Blueprint
Eckel, Malcolm David. Is There a Buddhist Philosophy of Nature?
1997, in Duncan Ryuken Williams Mary Evelyn Tucker (ed.), Buddhism and Ecology: The Interconnection of Dharma and Deeds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for the Study of World Religions
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Added by: Kas BernaysAbstract:
One of the most common and enduring stereotypes in environmental literature is the idea that Eastern religions promote a sense of harmony between human beings and nature. On the other side of the stereotype stand the religions of the West, promoting the separation of human beings and nature and encouraging acts of domination, exploitation, and control. Roderick Nash gave classic expression to this contrast when he said: “Ancient Eastern cultures are the source of respect for and religious veneration of the natural world” and “In the Far East the man—nature relationship was marked by respect, bordering on love, absent in the West.” Y. Murota drew a similar contrast between Japanese attitudes toward nature and the attitudes he felt are operative in the West: “the Japanese view of nature is quite different from that of Westerners... For the Japanese nature is an all-pervasive force... Nature is at once a blessing and a friend to the Japanese people... People in Western cultures, on the other hand, view nature as an object and, often, as an entity set in opposition to mankind.”Comment (from this Blueprint): A critical consideration of Western environmentalist appropriations of Buddhism.
Eckert, Maureen. De-centering and Genderqueering Val Plumwood’s Feminist Logic
2024, In R. Cook and A. Yap (eds.), Feminist Philosophy and Formal Logic. University of Minnesota Press
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Added by: Franci Mangraviti and Viviane FairbankAbstract:
The strongest and, until recently, least-explored approach to feminist logic holds that some formal logics have structural features that perpetuate sexism and oppression, whereas other logics are helpful for resisting and opposing these social phenomena. Our choice of logics may not be purely formal on this view: for example, some logics are preferrable to others on the grounds of feminist commitments. This strong account of feminist logic was first articulated by Val Plumwood. We will critically engage salient features of her view, especially her critique of classical logic and the centering and dominating functions she believes classical negation has. We will see that her understanding of classical negation captures neither the development of Intersectional Feminism, nor the position the concept of centering holds in transformative justice. However, Plumwood's critique of classical negation does lead us to a deeper insight regarding which logics to apply in social justice contexts. Robin Dembroff's analysis of genderqueer as a critical gender kind helps us delineate a non-classical context in which a four-valued logic, such as FDE, can structurally account for the critical feature of this gender kind in a way classical logic cannot. We will also observe how four-valued logics precisely capture the destabilization of, and resistance to, the exclusive and exhaustive gender binary categories Dembroff describes.Comment: available in this Blueprint
Eckert, Maureen, Donahue, Charlie. Towards a Feminist Logic: Val Plumwood’s Legacy and Beyond
2020, In Dominic Hyde (ed.), Noneist Explorations II: The Sylvan Jungle - Volume 3 (Synthese Library, 432). Dordrecht: pp. 424-448
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
Val Plumwood’s 1993 paper, “The politics of reason: towards a feminist logic” (hence- forth POR) attempted to set the stage for what she hoped would begin serious feminist exploration into formal logic – not merely its historical abuses, but, more importantly, its potential uses. This work offers us: (1) a case for there being feminist logic; and (2) a sketch of what it should resemble. The former goal of Plumwood’s paper encourages feminist theorists to reject anti-logic feminist views. The paper’s latter aim is even more challenging. Plumwood’s critique of classical negation (and classical logic) as a logic of domination asks us to recognize that particular logical systems are weapons of oppression. Against anti-logic feminist theorists, Plumwood argues that there are other logics besides classical logic, such as relevant logics, which are suited for feminist theorizing. Some logics may oppress while others may liberate. We provide details about the sources and context for her rejection of classical logic and motivation for promoting relevant logics as feminist.
Comment (from this Blueprint): This is an ideal companion piece to Plumwood's paper: it provides an accessible summary, and discusses both objections to the paper and possible responses.
Edet, Mesembe Ita. Women in the History of African Philosophy and the Imperative of ‘Her-Storical’ Perspective in the Contemporary African Philosophy
2018, in Chimakonam, J. and du Toit, L. (eds.), African Philosophy and the Epistemic Marginalization of Women. London, New York: Routledge
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Added by: Björn Freter & Marc GwodogAbstract:
The points this chapter labors to make are straight and simple. First, the documented reflections of women in contemporary African philosophy, of individuals such as Sophie Oluwole, Anke Graness, Wangari Maathai, Nkiru Nzegwu, Ebunoluwa Oduwole, Betty Wambui, Gail Presbey, and Louise du Toit, are impossible to deny or to ignore; the heritage they (and other female thinkers on the African condition, too numerous to do justice to here) have bequeathed to African philosophy and the world deserves the recognition denied it for so long, and current African philosophical historiography must remediate this epistemic injustice. Furthermore, I maintain that concepts are crucial in philosophical discourse, and this work has thrown up fresh concepts and keywords such as ‘his-story’, ‘her-story’, ‘her-storycide’, ‘her-storicity’, and ‘Afro-herstoricism’. These concepts are pregnant with implications, consequences, and creative possibilities for African philosophy and her place in the philosophical world. These concepts encapsulate the idea that women’s lives, experiences, deeds, contributions, voices, perceptions, representations, struggles, problems, expectations and participation in human affairs have been too long neglected or undervalued in standard historical narratives, and that serious cognizance must be taken of the creative works that women have produced in the development of knowledge and how these have affected the philosophic temper. Contemporary African philosophy cannot run away from honoring its ‘debts and duties’ to women in African philosophy.Comment (from this Blueprint): Introducing the problem of women's marginalization in African philosophy via a rich historical exposition and explanation of new concepts such as his-story, her-story, her-storycide, her-storicity, and Afro-herstoricism.
Edgington, Dorothy. On Conditionals
1995, Mind 104(414): 235-329.
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Added by: Emily Paul, Contributed by: Helen De CruzSummary: Examines the theory of conditionals and whether it's possible to have a unified theory of them.Comment: Great core text as there are many important discussion points here, and Edginton uses lots of helpful examples. Could set students the task of coming up with their own conditionals, and analysing these in the would/will sense. This definitely requires a background in beginner's logic.
Edgington, Dorothy. Indicative Conditionals
2001, In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
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Added by: Franci MangravitiAbstract:
The chapter is an introduction to logical treatments of indicative conditionals, comparing truth-functional, non-truth-functional, and suppositional approaches. Some of the topics discussed are truth conditions, conditional belief, assertability, and issues with compounds of conditionals.
Comment: This page can be used in a course focused on the philosophy of conditionals, as an introduction/overview of the basic logical issues; or in any logic course wishing to spend more time on this particular notion.
Egan, Frances. Representationalism
2012, In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, OUP, 250-272.
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Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: Representationalism, in its most widely accepted form, is the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are to be understood as representational capacities. This chapter distinguishes several distinct theses that go by the name "representationalism," focusing on the view that is most prevalent in cogntive science. It also discusses some objections to the view and attempts to clarify the role that representational content plays in cognitive models that make use of the notion of representation.Comment: A very good overview of representationalism. Suitable for a preliminary introduction to the topic.
Egan, Frances. Computational models: a modest role for content
2010, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41(3): 253-259.
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Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a cognitive process.Comment: Good paper about the relation of representation and content to computation. Best suited to higher-level courses on the subject.
Egan, Frances. Folk psychology and cognitive architecture
1995, Philosophy of Science 62(2): 179-96.
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Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: It has recently been argued that the success of the connectionist program in cognitive science would threaten folk psychology. I articulate and defend a "minimalist" construal of folk psychology that comports well with empirical evidence on the folk understanding of belief and is compatible with even the most radical developments in cognitive science.Comment: A good defense of folk psychology. Would be a good inclusion in a course on philosophy of mind/philosophy of cognitive science to show that scepticism need not be taken to extremes.
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