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Added by: Alison StoneAbstract: Hegel's criticism of morality, or Moralität, has had a decisive influence in the reception of his thought. By general acknowledgment, while his writings support a broadly neo-Aristotelian ethics of self-actualization, his views on moral philosophy are exhausted by his criticisms of Kant, whom he treats as paradigmatic exponent of the standpoint of morality. The aim of this chapter is to correct this received view and show that Hegel offers a positive conception of moral willing. The main argument is presented in two parts: (a) an interpretation of the 'Morality' section of the Philosophy of Right that shows Hegel defending a guise of the good version of willing; and (b) an examination of problems raised by this view of willing, some of which are anticipated by Hegel in in his treatment of the 'Idea of the Good' in the Logic, and of the interpretative options available to deal with these problems.
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Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the "external" parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered in the internal stages of science: choice of methodology, characterization of data, and interpretation of results.
Comment: A good challenge to the "value-free" status of science, interrogating some of the assumptions about scientific methodology. Uses real-world examples effectively. Suitable for undergraduate teaching.
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Added by: Nick NovelliAbstract: Shows that virtue ethics can specify right action and defends the view that the sort of practical guidance it provides accommodates several conditions of adequacy that any normative ethics should meet. It is argued that (1) it generates an account of moral education, (2) it incorporates the view that moral wisdom cannot simply be acquired from textbooks, and (3) it can resolve resolvable dilemmas or moral conflicts but is not committed in advance to there being no such things as irresolvable dilemmas. Introduction: A common belief concerning virtue ethics is that it does not tell us what we should do. This belief is sometimes manifested merely in the expressed assumption that virtue ethics, in being ‘agent-centred’ rather than ‘act-centred’, is concerned with Being rather than Doing, with good (and bad) character rather than right (and wrong) action, with the question ‘What sort of person should I be?’ rather than the question ‘What should I do?’ On this assumption, ‘virtue ethics’ so-called does not figure as a normative rival to utilitarian and deontological ethics. Anyone who wants to espouse virtue ethics as a rival to deontological or utilitarian ethics will find this common belief voiced against her as an objection: ‘Virtue ethics does not, because it cannot, tell us what we should do. Hence it cannot be a normative rival to deontology and utilitarianism.’ This paper is devoted to defending virtue ethics against this objection.
Comment: This is an easy-to-understand, concise argument in favour of the viability of virtue ethics. It is a useful illustration of the practical application of Aristotelian moral theory and would aid students understanding of that type of view and its implications if assigned as a supplement. Easy to understand even for those relatively unfamiliar with the issues, it is suitable as part of a first introduction to virtue ethics for undergraduates.
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Added by: Sara Peppe, Contributed by: Jonathan EgidPublisher’s Note:
The second Hatata, has been written by Walda Heywat a discipule of Zera Yacob. This treatise is in line with traditional views and takes into account themes such as marriage and abortion. Similarly to the tretaise of Zera Yacob, this Hatata stresses the idea that wife and husband are one flesh with husband that must sexually satisfy theur wives and wives that need to treat their husband well. Other themes treated are what is to be considered as morally correct and in line with the prescriptions of God.
Comment: This treatise is linked to the other Hatata written by Zera Yacob being Walda Heywat a student of Zera Yacob. Covering themes such as abortion, marriage, religion and morality this text represents a way to develop further knowledge of the Ethiopian philosophy in the 1600s. Also, it shows how some philosophical ideas developed from Zera Yacob to Walda Heywat.
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Added by: Sara Peppe, Contributed by: Jonathan EgidPublisher’s Note:
In the name of God who alone is just. I shall describe the life, the wisdom and the investigation of Zera Yacob who said: “Come and listen, all you who fear God, while I tell you what he has done for me.” Behold, I begin. In the name of God, who is the creator of all things, the beginning and the end, the possessor of all, the source of all life and of all wisdom, I shall write of some of the things that I have encountered during my long life. Let my soul be blessed in the sight of God and let the meek rejoice. I sought God and he answered me. And now you approach him and he will enlighten you; let not your face be ashamed. Join me in proclaiming the greatness of God and together let us extol his name.
Comment: This is a treatise that covers several philosophical themes such as the morality of actions, the proof of the existence of God and a critique of religious beliefs as presented in the religious systems of the modern era. This text provides good basis for a developing knowlege of Ethiopian Philosophy, it can be viewed as a starting point in the field.
Comment: A useful account of Hegel's position in moral philosophy focusing on his relation to Kant. Could be used on an ethics course when covering Hegel, either as supplementary to a reading from Hegel or as primary reading introducing a further reading by Hegel the following week.