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Siegel, Susanna. The Contents of Perception
2010, Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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Added by: Giada FratantonioSummary: In this article, the author provides a great overview on the topic of perceptual content, by addressing the following main issues: i) what are perceptual experiences? ii) what can constitute the content of our experience? iii) what is the relation between the content and our experience? iv) in virtue of what experiences have content?Comment: Great article to be used as background/overview reading for undergraduate course on the philosophy of perception.
Siegel, Susanna. Affordances and the Contents of Perception
2014, in Brogaard, Berit (ed.) Does Perception have Content, OUP
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Added by: Giada FratantonioSummary: The author questions the centrality of representation in perceptual experience that comes from a specific class of experience, namely, those experiences of the environment that compels you to act in a certain way.Comment: This could work as secondary reading for a postgraduate course on philosophy of perception.
Siegel, Susanna. Do Visual Experiences have contents?
2010, in Nanay, Bence (eds.) Perceiving the World, Oxford University Press
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Added by: Giada FratantonioAbstract: This paper argues that despite the differences between perception and belief, perception involves states that are importantly similar to beliefs: conscious visual experiences. According to the Content View, these experiences have contents in the form of accuracy conditions. The paper develops and defends the Content View, discusses its significance, and argues that contrary to what is often supposed, the Content View is compatible with Naive Realist disjunctivism.Comment: This can be used as background reading for a course on epistemology of perception, insofar as the author presents clearly the Content View and its main implications (a useful overview especially in section 1).
Shellenberg, Susanna. Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence
, in Symposium withcomments by Matt McGrath, Ram Neta, and Adam Pautz, Philosophical Studies
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Added by: Giada FratantonioSummary: In this paper, the author presents the so-called capacity view, namely, the view that "that perceptual states are systematically linked to what they are of in the good case, that is, the case of a successful perception, and thereby provide evidence for what they are of in the good case". The author discusses the main committments of the view and the implications it has when it comes to the justification of our beliefs and the transparency of our mental states.Comment: Good as further reading for a postgraduate course on epistemology of percpetion.
Siegel, Susanna. The Content of Visual Experience
2010, Oxford University Press
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Added by: Giada FratantonioAbstract: properties. The book starts by analyzing the notion of the contents of experience, and by arguing that theorists of all stripes should accept that experiences have contents. It then introduces a method for discovering the contents of experience: the method of phenomenal contrast. This method relies only minimally on introspection, and allows rigorous support for claims about experience. It then applies the method to make the case that we are conscious of many kind properties, of all sorts of causal properties, and of many other complex properties. The book goes on to use the method to help analyze difficult questions about our consciousness of objects and their role in the contents of experience, and to reconceptualize the distinction between perception and sensation. The book's results are important for many areas of philosophy, including the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. They are also important for the psychology and cognitive neuroscience of vision.Comment: Good as further reading for a postgraduate course on epistemology of percpetion.
Ryan, Sharon. Wisdom
1996, Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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Added by: Giada FratantonioIntroduction: What is wisdom? Philosophers, psychologists, spiritual leaders, poets, novelists, life coaches, and a variety of other important thinkers have tried to understand the concept of wisdom. This entry will provide a brief and general overview, and analysis of, several philosophical views on the topic of wisdom. It is not intended to capture the many interesting and important approaches to wisdom found in other fields of inquiry. Moreover, this entry will focus on several major ideas in the Western philosophical tradition. In particular, it will focus on five general approaches to understanding what it takes to be wise: (1) wisdom as epistemic humility, (2) wisdom as epistemic accuracy, (3) wisdom as knowledge, (4) a hybrid theory of wisdom, and (5) wisdom as rationality.Comment: Excellent entry on the epistemology of wisdom. Essential as background reading.
Macdonald, Cynthia. Externalism and first-person authority
1995, Synthese 104 (1):99-122.
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Added by: Giada FratantonioAbstract: In this paper, the author explores the relation between content externalism, i.e., the idea that the content of our thought is determines by factors of the environment, and first-person authority, i.e., the idea that subjects are authoritive with respect to the content of their own intentional states. The author develps an account of first-person authoritive that results being compatible with externalism.Comment: It is good as a further reading on the topic of content/semantic externalism.
Jackson Balcerak, Magdalena. Justification by Imagination
2018, In Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Perceptual Imagination and Perceptual Memory. Oxford University Press. pp. 209-226
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Added by: Giada FratantonioSummary: The author argues that experience constraints the nature of imagination in such a way that this results having a justificatory role.Comment: Good to use as further reading in a course on the topic of the epistemology of imagination.
Hoagland, Sarah Lucia. Denying Relationality: Epistemology and Ethics and Ignorance
2007,
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Added by: Giada FratantonioSummary: In this chapter, the author argues that epistemological and ethical practices of ignorance are strategic and involve a strategic denial of relationality, namely, of the way in which subjects are formed through relation with each other.Comment: Good as a further reading for a course on epistemology of ignorance.
Jacskon Balcerak, Magdalena. On the Epistemic Value of Imagining, Supposing and Conceiving
2016, In Amy Kind & Peter Kun (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2016)
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Added by: Giada FratantonioAbstract:
Abstract. Philosophers frequently invoke our ability to imagine, conceive or suppose various thing in order to explain how we achieve our cognitive goals when we make decisions about future actions, when we perform thought experiments, and when we engage in games of pretense. But what is the relationship between imaginings, conceivings, and supposings? And what exactly are the epistemic roles they play in the cognitive projects in which they are involved? This chapter provides answers to these questions by first bringing out a contrast between what we do when we imagine and what we do when we suppose, and then by showing how to fit conceivings into the emerging systematic picture of the ways we use different forms of hypothetical thinking to acquire knowledge.Comment: Good resource as further reading in an undergraduate course on epistemology of imagination, or as core reading in a graduate class on a similar topic.