1. Ray writes: “Bioethics, however, so far has shown only a minimal commitment to Black racial justice” (p. 38). Why do you think that is?
2. How does the lens of Black bioethics help us explain Black women’s higher maternal mortality rates in the United States?
3. Ray deploys the principles of autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence, and justice in a Black bioethics framework. But she is also explicit that “There are… other ways of doing bioethics” (p. 38). How might Black bioethics help us, if at all, understand other ways of approaching bioethical issues?
4. Ray raises the possibility of medical reparations for Black patients. What kind of reparations, if any, might be appropriate and why? Do you think they should be implemented?
5. Ray’s discussion focuses on a particular case: Black women in the United States. To what extent does her argument about Black bioethics generalize to other contexts?
6. What, if anything, can we learn from Ray’s paper about bioethics and non-Black marginalized groups?

1. Ray writes: “Bioethics, however, so far has shown only a minimal commitment to Black racial justice” (p. 38). Why do you think that is?
2. How does the lens of Black bioethics help us explain Black women’s higher maternal mortality rates in the United States?
3. Ray deploys the principles of autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence, and justice in a Black bioethics framework. But she is also explicit that “There are… other ways of doing bioethics” (p. 38). How might Black bioethics help us, if at all, understand other ways of approaching bioethical issues?
4. Ray raises the possibility of medical reparations for Black patients. What kind of reparations, if any, might be appropriate and why? Do you think they should be implemented?
5. Ray’s discussion focuses on a particular case: Black women in the United States. To what extent does her argument about Black bioethics generalize to other contexts?
6. What, if anything, can we learn from Ray’s paper about bioethics and non-Black marginalized groups?

1. How do you understand intersectionality? How, if at all, does that differ from Wilson et al.’s understanding?
2. What are we supposed to learn about intersectionality in clinical medicine from the two cases, i.e. History of Trauma and Chronic Pain? What are the similarities and differences between the two cases when it comes to applying intersectionality in clinical contexts?
3. Why do Wilson et al. say that “an intersectional framework to clinical practice does not call for simple concordance of physician-patient race and gender” (p. 12)?
4. Wilson et al. argue that “clinicians can be as knowledgeable about the impact of social policies on their patients as they are about [medical issues]” (p. 14). Is it feasible to expect physicians and other healthcare providers to be knowledge about socio-historical contexts and structures, in addition to having medical expertise?
5. Which of the three objections that Wilson et al. consider do you find most compelling? Do they address it adequately?
6. How might you put Wilson et al.’s paper in conversation with Ray’s? Are Black bioethics and intersectionality in clinical medicine compatible? If so, how? If not, under which circumstances is each approach to be preferred?

1. How do you understand intersectionality? How, if at all, does that differ from Wilson et al.’s understanding?
2. What are we supposed to learn about intersectionality in clinical medicine from the two cases, i.e. History of Trauma and Chronic Pain? What are the similarities and differences between the two cases when it comes to applying intersectionality in clinical contexts?
3. Why do Wilson et al. say that “an intersectional framework to clinical practice does not call for simple concordance of physician-patient race and gender” (p. 12)?
4. Wilson et al. argue that “clinicians can be as knowledgeable about the impact of social policies on their patients as they are about [medical issues]” (p. 14). Is it feasible to expect physicians and other healthcare providers to be knowledge about socio-historical contexts and structures, in addition to having medical expertise?
5. Which of the three objections that Wilson et al. consider do you find most compelling? Do they address it adequately?
6. How might you put Wilson et al.’s paper in conversation with Ray’s? Are Black bioethics and intersectionality in clinical medicine compatible? If so, how? If not, under which circumstances is each approach to be preferred?

1. How does Yearby distinguish between biological and social race?
2. How does Yearby argue that using racial categories in medicine leads to racial health disparities?
3. Do you agree with Yearby that “the root cause of poor health outcomes for all groups… is racism” (p. 21)?
4. How, if at all, does Yearby’s discussion of morality in childbirth affect your understanding of Ray’s argument?
5. What does Yearby mean by “the corruption of knowledge production” (pp. 22–23)? How does she argue that racism plays a role in this process?
6. Yearby argues that race-based medicine with respect to breast cancer “not only reifies the racist belief that Whites are superior, but also prevents women of all races from equal to treatment” (p. 24). Is her argument a good one? How might it extend beyond breast cancer?
7. Like the other authors in this section, Yearby focuses on the medical system in the U.S. To what extent do Yearby’s arguments apply to other medical systems, for instance those with state-provided medical access as in the U.K.?

1. How does Yearby distinguish between biological and social race?
2. How does Yearby argue that using racial categories in medicine leads to racial health disparities?
3. Do you agree with Yearby that “the root cause of poor health outcomes for all groups… is racism” (p. 21)?
4. How, if at all, does Yearby’s discussion of morality in childbirth affect your understanding of Ray’s argument?
5. What does Yearby mean by “the corruption of knowledge production” (pp. 22–23)? How does she argue that racism plays a role in this process?
6. Yearby argues that race-based medicine with respect to breast cancer “not only reifies the racist belief that Whites are superior, but also prevents women of all races from equal to treatment” (p. 24). Is her argument a good one? How might it extend beyond breast cancer?
7. Like the other authors in this section, Yearby focuses on the medical system in the U.S. To what extent do Yearby’s arguments apply to other medical systems, for instance those with state-provided medical access as in the U.K.?

1. How does Taylor cast doubt on the idea of animal advocacy as giving “voice to the voiceless”? Do you agree with her?
2. What is the argument from marginal cases?
3. Why, according to Taylor, is there a “danger” in the argument from marginal cases?
4. How does Taylor argue for the conclusion that to “compare animals to intellectually disabled people… harms both populations”?
5. What does Taylor mean when, in the final paragraph, she claims that “We need to crip animal ethics”? Do you agree?
6. How might Taylor’s article have implications for bioethical issues beyond animal ethics?

1. How does Taylor cast doubt on the idea of animal advocacy as giving “voice to the voiceless”? Do you agree with her?
2. What is the argument from marginal cases?
3. Why, according to Taylor, is there a “danger” in the argument from marginal cases?
4. How does Taylor argue for the conclusion that to “compare animals to intellectually disabled people… harms both populations”?
5. What does Taylor mean when, in the final paragraph, she claims that “We need to crip animal ethics”? Do you agree?
6. How might Taylor’s article have implications for bioethical issues beyond animal ethics?

1. How does willful hermeneutical ignorance differ from hermeneutical injustice?
2. What is the “double bind” of epistemic exploitation (p. 717)?
3. What is the “standard view of disability” and why is not a “value-free starting assumption”, according to Wieseler (pp. 719–720)?
4. How does Wieseler draw on the notions of epistemic exploitation, epistemic imperialism, and willful hermeneutical ignorance to critique Singer (a stand in for philosophical bioethicists more generally) on his approach to disability?
5. What are “crip skills” and what is their significance for bioethics and epistemic resistance (p. 726)?
6. As well as arguing that assuming that disabled people have a low quality of life is ableist, Wieseler claims that quality of life should not be conflated with value of life. What is valuable about lives other than their subjective quality?
7. What points of harmony and friction are there between Wieseler’s piece and Taylor’s?

1. How does willful hermeneutical ignorance differ from hermeneutical injustice?
2. What is the “double bind” of epistemic exploitation (p. 717)?
3. What is the “standard view of disability” and why is not a “value-free starting assumption”, according to Wieseler (pp. 719–720)?
4. How does Wieseler draw on the notions of epistemic exploitation, epistemic imperialism, and willful hermeneutical ignorance to critique Singer (a stand in for philosophical bioethicists more generally) on his approach to disability?
5. What are “crip skills” and what is their significance for bioethics and epistemic resistance (p. 726)?
6. As well as arguing that assuming that disabled people have a low quality of life is ableist, Wieseler claims that quality of life should not be conflated with value of life. What is valuable about lives other than their subjective quality?
7. What points of harmony and friction are there between Wieseler’s piece and Taylor’s?

1. What is the so-called “disability paradox” and what are Stramondo’s reservations about that term (p. 202)?
2. What is wrong, according to Stramondo, with the University of Washington’s invocation of “health” in their triage protocol?
3. Stramondo writes: “I would argue that any triage protocol is unjustly discriminatory against disabled people insofar as it deprioritizes them due to a belief that their lives are of less value because they are of less quality” (p. 204). How is Stramondo’s argument affected, if at all, by Wieseler’s injunction to separate quality of life from value of life?
4. Why is individual assessment, rather than assessment based on group membership, of likelihood of survival important?
5. What is the distinction that Stramondo draws between inefficiency and waste? How does the distinction allow him to argue for accepting the likelihood-of-survival criterion while rejecting the level-of-resource intensity criterion? How does the distinction play a role in bioethical issues beyond triage?
6. What is the “powerful paradigm shift” Stramondo interprets Shelley Tremain as calling for (p. 206)? What does Stramondo suggest that bioethicists do in response? Is he right?
7. Taking Stramondo’s points into consideration, what do you think a just, and in particular an anti-ableist, triage protocol would involve?

1. What is the so-called “disability paradox” and what are Stramondo’s reservations about that term (p. 202)?
2. What is wrong, according to Stramondo, with the University of Washington’s invocation of “health” in their triage protocol?
3. Stramondo writes: “I would argue that any triage protocol is unjustly discriminatory against disabled people insofar as it deprioritizes them due to a belief that their lives are of less value because they are of less quality” (p. 204). How is Stramondo’s argument affected, if at all, by Wieseler’s injunction to separate quality of life from value of life?
4. Why is individual assessment, rather than assessment based on group membership, of likelihood of survival important?
5. What is the distinction that Stramondo draws between inefficiency and waste? How does the distinction allow him to argue for accepting the likelihood-of-survival criterion while rejecting the level-of-resource intensity criterion? How does the distinction play a role in bioethical issues beyond triage?
6. What is the “powerful paradigm shift” Stramondo interprets Shelley Tremain as calling for (p. 206)? What does Stramondo suggest that bioethicists do in response? Is he right?
7. Taking Stramondo’s points into consideration, what do you think a just, and in particular an anti-ableist, triage protocol would involve?

1. How do Peter and Liaschenko define moral distress? Is their definition a good one? Why or why not?
2. What is a moral identity and why is it important in thinking about moral distress?
3. Peter and Liaschenko write that “the identity of ‘nurse’ is a social construction” (p. 339). What do they mean by that? Are they right?
4. How does foregrounding relationships shed light on moral distress?
5. How does gender play a role in the moral distress of hospital nurses?
6. What recommendations do Peter and Liaschenko make for alleviating the problem of moral distress? Are likely to work? What other recommendations might be implemented?
7. Peter and Liaschenko focus on the moral distress of hospital nurses, but recognize that moral distress is a broader issue. What are some examples of moral distress beyond hospital nursing, or even beyond the context of healthcare?

1. How do Peter and Liaschenko define moral distress? Is their definition a good one? Why or why not?
2. What is a moral identity and why is it important in thinking about moral distress?
3. Peter and Liaschenko write that “the identity of ‘nurse’ is a social construction” (p. 339). What do they mean by that? Are they right?
4. How does foregrounding relationships shed light on moral distress?
5. How does gender play a role in the moral distress of hospital nurses?
6. What recommendations do Peter and Liaschenko make for alleviating the problem of moral distress? Are likely to work? What other recommendations might be implemented?
7. Peter and Liaschenko focus on the moral distress of hospital nurses, but recognize that moral distress is a broader issue. What are some examples of moral distress beyond hospital nursing, or even beyond the context of healthcare?

1. An important part of Ashley’s argument is their own experience in accessing HRT and other transition-related healthcare, as well the experiences of the trans community. Appeals to anecdotal, and especially personal, evidence mark a departure from the how bioethics is normally practised. What are the advantages and disadvantages of Ashley’s approach?
2. How can the concepts of epistemic exploitation, epistemic imperialism and willful hermeneutical ignorance (explained in Wieseler’s paper) augment Ashley’s argument that trans people are subject to injustice when “physicians deny the authority trans people have over their own mental experiences” (p. 481)?
3. “Medically transitioning is not all about gender dysphoria”, Ashley writes (p. 481). What do they mean? How do they argue that gender dysphoria assessments problematize and pathologize trans experience?
4. How does Ashley argue that assessment and referral requirements either assume that trans people are mentally ill or involve double standards?
5. In general, how should we think about the limits of informed consent? That is, what are the circumstances in which someone requesting medical treatment is not sufficient for providing that treatment? It might be helpful to think both about the circumstances of the person making the request and about the thing they’re requesting.

1. An important part of Ashley’s argument is their own experience in accessing HRT and other transition-related healthcare, as well the experiences of the trans community. Appeals to anecdotal, and especially personal, evidence mark a departure from the how bioethics is normally practised. What are the advantages and disadvantages of Ashley’s approach?
2. How can the concepts of epistemic exploitation, epistemic imperialism and willful hermeneutical ignorance (explained in Wieseler’s paper) augment Ashley’s argument that trans people are subject to injustice when “physicians deny the authority trans people have over their own mental experiences” (p. 481)?
3. “Medically transitioning is not all about gender dysphoria”, Ashley writes (p. 481). What do they mean? How do they argue that gender dysphoria assessments problematize and pathologize trans experience?
4. How does Ashley argue that assessment and referral requirements either assume that trans people are mentally ill or involve double standards?
5. In general, how should we think about the limits of informed consent? That is, what are the circumstances in which someone requesting medical treatment is not sufficient for providing that treatment? It might be helpful to think both about the circumstances of the person making the request and about the thing they’re requesting.

1. Priest argues that psychological harm is not less important than physical harm. How does she argue for this claim? Is she correct?
2. Priest argues that the state should intervene and offer PBT to trans youth with unsupportive parents. What is her argument exactly? Is it a good one?
3. How does Priest address the objection that some studies suggest “many transgender children do not go on to become transgender adults” and so shouldn’t be given PBT (p. 49)?
4. Why does Priest not base her argument on the “mature minor doctrine” (p. 52)?
5. What is the special role of schools in providing PBT, according to Priest?
6. Priest considers several objections to her argument, especially in the section beginning on p 54. Are her replies convincing? Are there any other objections that she doesn’t address? How might you reply on her behalf?
7. Although Priest is not committed to the idea that PBT should only be provided to trans youth when they give properly informed consent, it’s worth considering informed consent in children and adolescents as an issue in itself. If children can’t give properly informed consent to PBT, why not? Are there things they can give properly informed consent to? If so, why is PBT different?

1. Priest argues that psychological harm is not less important than physical harm. How does she argue for this claim? Is she correct?
2. Priest argues that the state should intervene and offer PBT to trans youth with unsupportive parents. What is her argument exactly? Is it a good one?
3. How does Priest address the objection that some studies suggest “many transgender children do not go on to become transgender adults” and so shouldn’t be given PBT (p. 49)?
4. Why does Priest not base her argument on the “mature minor doctrine” (p. 52)?
5. What is the special role of schools in providing PBT, according to Priest?
6. Priest considers several objections to her argument, especially in the section beginning on p 54. Are her replies convincing? Are there any other objections that she doesn’t address? How might you reply on her behalf?
7. Although Priest is not committed to the idea that PBT should only be provided to trans youth when they give properly informed consent, it’s worth considering informed consent in children and adolescents as an issue in itself. If children can’t give properly informed consent to PBT, why not? Are there things they can give properly informed consent to? If so, why is PBT different?

Publisher's Note: This classic work, first published in France in 1955, profoundly influenced the generation of scholars and activists at the forefront of liberation struggles in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Nearly twenty years later, when published for the first time in English, Discourse on Colonialism inspired a new generation engaged in the Civil Rights, Black Power, and anti-war movements and has sold more than 75,000 copies to date.

Aimé Césaire eloquently describes the brutal impact of capitalism and colonialism on both the colonizer and colonized, exposing the contradictions and hypocrisy implicit in western notions of "progress" and "civilization" upon encountering the "savage," "uncultured," or "primitive." Here, Césaire reaffirms African values, identity, and culture, and their relevance, reminding us that "the relationship between consciousness and reality are extremely complex. . . . It is equally necessary to decolonize our minds, our inner life, at the same time that we decolonize society."

1. Throughout Discourse on Colonialism, Césaire uses images of decay to describe European or Western civilisation. In the sections you are reading, he talks about it as a “stricken” and “dying” civilisation (p.31) and likens every act of brutality perpetuated by Europeans to a “gangrene” that spreads throughout Western civilisation as a whole. What do you think Césaire means by this image? What effect does it have on the reader?
2. Césaire writes: “The colonialists may kill in Indochina, torture in Madagascar, and imprison in Black Africa, crack down in the West Indies. Henceforth the colonised know that they have an advantage over them. They know their temporary ‘masters’ are lying” (p.32). Why does Césaire suggest the colonialists are lying? Why does this give the colonised an “advantage over [the colonisers]”?
3. What connections does Césaire draw between Nazism and colonialism? Why does he suggest that every “humanistic … Christian bourgeois of the twentieth century … has a Hitler inside him” (p.36)?
4. What implications follow from Césaire’s claim that “no one colonises innocently” (p.39)? How might this change the way we examine the legacy of colonial practices today?
5. What is the “boomerang effect of colonisation” (p.41) that Césaire diagnoses?
6. What does Césaire mean by the phrase “Colonialism = thingification”? How does this relate to his discussion of the psychological effects of colonialism on both the coloniser and the colonised?
7. What values does Césaire suggest we can find in pre-colonial non-European civilizations? What role do you think these values play in his wider argument?
8. On the one hand, Césaire explicitly details the destructive power of Western colonialism, such that entire cultures and civilisations have been eradicated as a result of its On the other, Césaire defends the values of pre-colonial non-European civilisations (see p.44-46). Do you think this points to a tension within Césaire’s argument? If so, how might we resolve it? If not, why not?

1. Throughout Discourse on Colonialism, Césaire uses images of decay to describe European or Western civilisation. In the sections you are reading, he talks about it as a “stricken” and “dying” civilisation (p.31) and likens every act of brutality perpetuated by Europeans to a “gangrene” that spreads throughout Western civilisation as a whole. What do you think Césaire means by this image? What effect does it have on the reader?
2. Césaire writes: “The colonialists may kill in Indochina, torture in Madagascar, and imprison in Black Africa, crack down in the West Indies. Henceforth the colonised know that they have an advantage over them. They know their temporary ‘masters’ are lying” (p.32). Why does Césaire suggest the colonialists are lying? Why does this give the colonised an “advantage over [the colonisers]”?
3. What connections does Césaire draw between Nazism and colonialism? Why does he suggest that every “humanistic … Christian bourgeois of the twentieth century … has a Hitler inside him” (p.36)?
4. What implications follow from Césaire’s claim that “no one colonises innocently” (p.39)? How might this change the way we examine the legacy of colonial practices today?
5. What is the “boomerang effect of colonisation” (p.41) that Césaire diagnoses?
6. What does Césaire mean by the phrase “Colonialism = thingification”? How does this relate to his discussion of the psychological effects of colonialism on both the coloniser and the colonised?
7. What values does Césaire suggest we can find in pre-colonial non-European civilizations? What role do you think these values play in his wider argument?
8. On the one hand, Césaire explicitly details the destructive power of Western colonialism, such that entire cultures and civilisations have been eradicated as a result of its On the other, Césaire defends the values of pre-colonial non-European civilisations (see p.44-46). Do you think this points to a tension within Césaire’s argument? If so, how might we resolve it? If not, why not?

A national bestseller when it first appeared in 1963, The Fire Next Time galvanized the nation and gave passionate voice to the emerging civil rights movement. At once a powerful evocation of James Baldwin’s early life in Harlem and a disturbing examination of the consequences of racial injustice, the book is an intensely personal and provocative document. It consists of two “letters,” written on the occasion of the centennial of the Emancipation Proclamation, that exhort Americans, both black and white, to attack the terrible legacy of racism. Described by The New York Times Book Review as “sermon, ultimatum, confession, deposition, testament, and chronicle…all presented in searing, brilliant prose,” The Fire Next Time stands as a classic of our literature.

1. With respect to the religious journey of Baldwin:
   • What made him enter the ‘church racket’ (p.6) and get indoctrinated in Christianity?
   • What was his subsequent understanding of the historical role that Christianity played ‘in the realm of power and in the realm of morals’?
2. “The white God has not delivered them; perhaps the Black God ” (p.12). How would one describe Baldwin’s conception of God?
3. “…this leads, imperceptibly but inevitably, to a state of mind in which, having long ago learned to expect the worst, one finds it very easy to believe the worst”
   • Why does Baldwin consider not being able to believe ‘the humanity of white people is more real to them than their colour’ to be worst? What do we understand about Baldwin’s idea of love for people?
4. What was the initial impression Baldwin had of Elijah? Did the impression change? If yes then what was the revised impression of Elijah that Baldwin had?
5. “…the Negro has been formed by this nation…and does not belong to any other — not to Africa, and certainly not to Islam.” (p. 16)
   • Why does the identity of the Black Americans not belong to Africa and Islam?
   • Why does Baldwin claim that only a radical change in the constitution of American social and political structure can bring a real change in the life of a Black American? Do you believe that radical change in the social-political structure has occurred?
6. What is the definition of ‘tokenism’ (p.18) that we get in the text? What are its material causes and consequences?
   • Against the idea of tokenism, how does Baldwin envisage freedom?
7. “…a vast amount of the white anguish is rooted in the white man’s equally profound need to be seen as he is, to be released from the tyranny of his mirror.” (p.19)
   • What, according to the text, was Baldwin’s diagnosis of the problem in America? What does the idea of the mirror evoke?
   • “To create one nation has proved to be a hideously difficult task; there is certainly no need now to create two, one black and one ’ (p. 20) How does Baldwin envision the creation of a new America?

1. With respect to the religious journey of Baldwin:
   • What made him enter the ‘church racket’ (p.6) and get indoctrinated in Christianity?
   • What was his subsequent understanding of the historical role that Christianity played ‘in the realm of power and in the realm of morals’?
2. “The white God has not delivered them; perhaps the Black God ” (p.12). How would one describe Baldwin’s conception of God?
3. “…this leads, imperceptibly but inevitably, to a state of mind in which, having long ago learned to expect the worst, one finds it very easy to believe the worst”
   • Why does Baldwin consider not being able to believe ‘the humanity of white people is more real to them than their colour’ to be worst? What do we understand about Baldwin’s idea of love for people?
4. What was the initial impression Baldwin had of Elijah? Did the impression change? If yes then what was the revised impression of Elijah that Baldwin had?
5. “…the Negro has been formed by this nation…and does not belong to any other — not to Africa, and certainly not to Islam.” (p. 16)
   • Why does the identity of the Black Americans not belong to Africa and Islam?
   • Why does Baldwin claim that only a radical change in the constitution of American social and political structure can bring a real change in the life of a Black American? Do you believe that radical change in the social-political structure has occurred?
6. What is the definition of ‘tokenism’ (p.18) that we get in the text? What are its material causes and consequences?
   • Against the idea of tokenism, how does Baldwin envisage freedom?
7. “…a vast amount of the white anguish is rooted in the white man’s equally profound need to be seen as he is, to be released from the tyranny of his mirror.” (p.19)
   • What, according to the text, was Baldwin’s diagnosis of the problem in America? What does the idea of the mirror evoke?
   • “To create one nation has proved to be a hideously difficult task; there is certainly no need now to create two, one black and one ’ (p. 20) How does Baldwin envision the creation of a new America?

More than three decades after its first publication, Edward Said's groundbreaking critique of the West's historical, cultural, and political perceptions of the East has become a modern classic.
In this wide-ranging, intellectually vigorous study, Said traces the origins of "orientalism" to the centuries-long period during which Europe dominated the Middle and Near East and, from its position of power, defined "the orient" simply as "other than" the occident. This entrenched view continues to dominate western ideas and, because it does not allow the East to represent itself, prevents true understanding. Essential, and still eye-opening, Orientalism remains one of the most important books written about our divided world.

1. What is the relationship between Orientalism and imperialism?
2. What does Said mean when he says ‘producing the Orient, politically, sociologically, militarily…’ (p.3)?
3. What is the Gramscian distinction between civil and political society? Express your views on whether you find the distinction helpful. How does the concept of ‘hegemony’ figure in the discourse? Why is it an important tool to understand the cultural life of the West?
4. “Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors.” Discuss the relationship between the overarching ideology of Orientalism and the contribution of individual works. What position does Said take in the debate? Do you agree with his position? Give reasons for your answer.
5. What is Said’s opinion on the ‘liberal consensus’ (p.10) about true, ‘non-political’ knowledge? Can there be non-political, pure knowledge in human sciences? State reasons for your agreement/disagreement.
6. What does Said mean when he says orientalism is ‘premised on exteriority’ (p.20)? How does the Orient rest on representation? In relation to this discuss briefly the politics of ‘representation’. (Discussion in greater detail available in chapter 1)
7. What special significance does ‘Islamic Orient’ add to the study of Orientalism, given contemporary geopolitics?

1. What is the relationship between Orientalism and imperialism?
2. What does Said mean when he says ‘producing the Orient, politically, sociologically, militarily…’ (p.3)?
3. What is the Gramscian distinction between civil and political society? Express your views on whether you find the distinction helpful. How does the concept of ‘hegemony’ figure in the discourse? Why is it an important tool to understand the cultural life of the West?
4. “Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors.” Discuss the relationship between the overarching ideology of Orientalism and the contribution of individual works. What position does Said take in the debate? Do you agree with his position? Give reasons for your answer.
5. What is Said’s opinion on the ‘liberal consensus’ (p.10) about true, ‘non-political’ knowledge? Can there be non-political, pure knowledge in human sciences? State reasons for your agreement/disagreement.
6. What does Said mean when he says orientalism is ‘premised on exteriority’ (p.20)? How does the Orient rest on representation? In relation to this discuss briefly the politics of ‘representation’. (Discussion in greater detail available in chapter 1)
7. What special significance does ‘Islamic Orient’ add to the study of Orientalism, given contemporary geopolitics?

What can philosophy contribute to African culture? What can it draw from it? Could there be a truly African philosophy that goes beyond traditional folk thought? Kwasi Wiredu tries in these essays to define and demonstrate a role for contemporary African philosophers which is distinctive but by no means parochial. He shows how they can assimilate the advances of analytical philosophy and apply them to the general social and intellectual changes associated with 'modernisation' and the transition to new national identities. But we see too how they can exploit traditional resources and test the assumptions of Western philosophy against the intimations of their own language and culture. The volume as a whole presents some of the best non-technical work of a distinguished African philosopher, of importance equally to professional philosophers and to those with a more general interest in contemporary African thought and culture.

1. How does the comparison between African philosophy and African versions of other disciplines, such as engineering, illuminate the problem Wiredu is grappling with?
2. What is the difference between the universalist and nationalist conceptions of African philosophy? What, for Wiredu, are the limitations of the nationalist conception?
3. Why does Wiredu suggest that traditional African philosophies are “pre-scientific”? Is this a distinct problem for African philosophy? Does the pre-scientific nature of traditional African philosophy mean that it should not be made the subject of further study?
4. What is Wiredu’s conception of philosophy in a technical sense? Why does Wiredu think that this conception of philosophy is useful for contemporary African society?Can philosophy, in Wiredu’s sense, be universal and, if so, in what ways?
   • Similarly, how are cultural considerations relevant for philosophical thinking? In answering this question, refer to Wiredu’s comments about the relationship between language and philosophy.
   • What implications do you think follow from this relationship between language and philosophy?
5. What is the definition of African philosophy Wiredu offers at the end of Chapter 2? Why does he suggest that this project is “urgent”?
6. What are the criticisms Wiredu advances against Western anthropologists who focus on the “pre-scientific characteristics of African traditional thought” (p.39)? What are the problematic consequences of such thinking for the perception of Africans by the West, as well as the self-image of Africans themselves? Can you draw any connections between Wiredu’s remarks here and the effects of colonialism discussed by Césaire?
7. How does Wiredu’s contrast between African and Western traditions of thought serve to undermine the binary opposition between a rational modern West and an irrational superstitious Africa?
8. How do you interpret Wiredu’s conception of development as a “continuing world- historical process” (p.43) in which all peoples are engaged? What are the advantages of conceptualising development in this way?
9. Towards the end of Chapter 3, Wiredu seems to suggest that a written tradition is necessary for possessing a philosophical heritage. Do you think this is fair or it does it unfairly marginalise oral traditions of philosophy as being ‘folk wisdom’?

1. How does the comparison between African philosophy and African versions of other disciplines, such as engineering, illuminate the problem Wiredu is grappling with?
2. What is the difference between the universalist and nationalist conceptions of African philosophy? What, for Wiredu, are the limitations of the nationalist conception?
3. Why does Wiredu suggest that traditional African philosophies are “pre-scientific”? Is this a distinct problem for African philosophy? Does the pre-scientific nature of traditional African philosophy mean that it should not be made the subject of further study?
4. What is Wiredu’s conception of philosophy in a technical sense? Why does Wiredu think that this conception of philosophy is useful for contemporary African society?Can philosophy, in Wiredu’s sense, be universal and, if so, in what ways?
   • Similarly, how are cultural considerations relevant for philosophical thinking? In answering this question, refer to Wiredu’s comments about the relationship between language and philosophy.
   • What implications do you think follow from this relationship between language and philosophy?
5. What is the definition of African philosophy Wiredu offers at the end of Chapter 2? Why does he suggest that this project is “urgent”?
6. What are the criticisms Wiredu advances against Western anthropologists who focus on the “pre-scientific characteristics of African traditional thought” (p.39)? What are the problematic consequences of such thinking for the perception of Africans by the West, as well as the self-image of Africans themselves? Can you draw any connections between Wiredu’s remarks here and the effects of colonialism discussed by Césaire?
7. How does Wiredu’s contrast between African and Western traditions of thought serve to undermine the binary opposition between a rational modern West and an irrational superstitious Africa?
8. How do you interpret Wiredu’s conception of development as a “continuing world- historical process” (p.43) in which all peoples are engaged? What are the advantages of conceptualising development in this way?
9. Towards the end of Chapter 3, Wiredu seems to suggest that a written tradition is necessary for possessing a philosophical heritage. Do you think this is fair or it does it unfairly marginalise oral traditions of philosophy as being ‘folk wisdom’?

1. What are the four different uses of the term ‘imperialism’ that Smith distinguishes between? What is the main difference between the fourth use of imperialism and the first three? Why is this significant?
2. What are the two main strands of critique offered by indigenous scholarship on imperialism and colonialism? Why do discussions of globalisation and post-colonialism pose new challenges for the ways indigenous communities “think and talk about imperialism” (p.24)?
3. How does Smith conceptualise the struggle to assert and claim humanity? What do you think Smith means by her suggestion that, for indigenous peoples, fragmentation is not “a phenomenon of postmodernism” but rather “the consequence of imperialism (p.28)”? What connections can you draw betweenthe ideas articulated in this section and the writings of Césaire?
4. What are the 9 interconnected ideas that Smith suggests are central to Western conceptions of history? What is the critique of this kind of history raised by post-colonial and indigenous theorists alike? Do you find her critique convincing? If so, why? If not, why not?
5. If history in its modern/Western construction is predicated on a sense of Otherness that marginalises indigenous peoples, how and why is history important for decolonisation? In answering this question, think about how Smith conceptualises the relationship between history and power, as well as what Smith means by “coming to know the past” (p.34) and what this entails for decolonisation efforts.
6. On page 36, Smith writes “Writing can also be dangerous because we reinforce and maintain a style of discourse which is never innocent”. What are some of the dangers she talks about, and how have indigenous and post-colonial theorists attempted to resist and push back?
7. In drawing on the work of Cherryl Smith and Edward Said, Linda Tuhiwai Smith highlights the importance of “‘writing back’ and simultaneously writing to ourselves” (p.37). How do you interpret this idea and what implications do you think it has for both writing and interpreting academic texts? Does it make you rethink the assumptions in your writing? Or does it reinforce concerns you may already have?
8. How and why is theory important for indigenous communities? What kind of theory development is necessary for indigenous communities, and what does this process entail?

1. What are the four different uses of the term ‘imperialism’ that Smith distinguishes between? What is the main difference between the fourth use of imperialism and the first three? Why is this significant?
2. What are the two main strands of critique offered by indigenous scholarship on imperialism and colonialism? Why do discussions of globalisation and post-colonialism pose new challenges for the ways indigenous communities “think and talk about imperialism” (p.24)?
3. How does Smith conceptualise the struggle to assert and claim humanity? What do you think Smith means by her suggestion that, for indigenous peoples, fragmentation is not “a phenomenon of postmodernism” but rather “the consequence of imperialism (p.28)”? What connections can you draw betweenthe ideas articulated in this section and the writings of Césaire?
4. What are the 9 interconnected ideas that Smith suggests are central to Western conceptions of history? What is the critique of this kind of history raised by post-colonial and indigenous theorists alike? Do you find her critique convincing? If so, why? If not, why not?
5. If history in its modern/Western construction is predicated on a sense of Otherness that marginalises indigenous peoples, how and why is history important for decolonisation? In answering this question, think about how Smith conceptualises the relationship between history and power, as well as what Smith means by “coming to know the past” (p.34) and what this entails for decolonisation efforts.
6. On page 36, Smith writes “Writing can also be dangerous because we reinforce and maintain a style of discourse which is never innocent”. What are some of the dangers she talks about, and how have indigenous and post-colonial theorists attempted to resist and push back?
7. In drawing on the work of Cherryl Smith and Edward Said, Linda Tuhiwai Smith highlights the importance of “‘writing back’ and simultaneously writing to ourselves” (p.37). How do you interpret this idea and what implications do you think it has for both writing and interpreting academic texts? Does it make you rethink the assumptions in your writing? Or does it reinforce concerns you may already have?
8. How and why is theory important for indigenous communities? What kind of theory development is necessary for indigenous communities, and what does this process entail?

1. What is understood by ‘Europe’? Is it a geographical identity or a historical and ideological category?
2. Why does the author think that European thought is both ‘indispensable and inadequate’ for understanding political modernity in a non-European country like India?
3. What is the meaning of historicism implied in the text? How did it turn into a political prescription to non-European peoples?
   • What was the response of the anticolonial movements to such an idea?
   • With respect to India, what could be considered as a national gesture of rejecting Mill’s historicist prescription? What tension did the Indian political modernity run into for making that gesture? (pp. 6-11)
4. How does subaltern historiography extend the meaning of ‘political’ by critiquing the standard binaries of ‘political’ and ‘pre-political’? Discuss with reference to the debate between Eric Hobsbawm and Ranajit Guha. (pp.12-15)
   • How does the binary division of political and pre-political lead us to a ‘stagist’ reading of history, and to the assumption that capitalism brings with it bourgeois power relations?
5. What are two strands of modern European social science?
   • How does a Marxist reading of history ‘occlude’ questions pertaining to belonging and diversity, thus producing an insufficient tool to read history? (p.18)
   • Was Marx himself clear about questions pertaining to History 2? (Discussions in greater detail available in chapter 2)

1. What is understood by ‘Europe’? Is it a geographical identity or a historical and ideological category?
2. Why does the author think that European thought is both ‘indispensable and inadequate’ for understanding political modernity in a non-European country like India?
3. What is the meaning of historicism implied in the text? How did it turn into a political prescription to non-European peoples?
   • What was the response of the anticolonial movements to such an idea?
   • With respect to India, what could be considered as a national gesture of rejecting Mill’s historicist prescription? What tension did the Indian political modernity run into for making that gesture? (pp. 6-11)
4. How does subaltern historiography extend the meaning of ‘political’ by critiquing the standard binaries of ‘political’ and ‘pre-political’? Discuss with reference to the debate between Eric Hobsbawm and Ranajit Guha. (pp.12-15)
   • How does the binary division of political and pre-political lead us to a ‘stagist’ reading of history, and to the assumption that capitalism brings with it bourgeois power relations?
5. What are two strands of modern European social science?
   • How does a Marxist reading of history ‘occlude’ questions pertaining to belonging and diversity, thus producing an insufficient tool to read history? (p.18)
   • Was Marx himself clear about questions pertaining to History 2? (Discussions in greater detail available in chapter 2)

Sylvia Wynter is a radical Jamaican theorist influenced, among others, by Frantz Fanon. This well known interview is often considered to be the best introduction to her thinking about the question of human in the aftermath of 1492 and the consequent racialisation of humanity.
Wynter rethinks dominant concepts of being human, arguing that they are based on a colonial and racialized model that divides the world into asymmetric categories such as "the selected and the dysselected", center and periphery, or colonizers and colonized. Against this Wynter proposes a new humanism. According to Katherine McKittrick Wynter develops a "counterhumanism", that breaks from the classification of humans in static, asymmetric categories.

1. At the bottom of page 174, Wynter says “I am suggesting that from the very origin of the modern world, of the Western world system, there were never simply ‘men’ and ‘women’. Rather there was, on the one hand Man, as invented in the sixteenth century by Europe, as Foucault notes, and then, on the other hand, Man’s human Others”. What do you think she means by this? What is the significance of this construction for Wynter’s argument?
2. In a similar vein, Wynter suggests that “at the beginning of the modern world, the only women were White and Western” (p.174). Why do you think Wynter specifically talks about the construction of women? What does this add to her analysis of the inherently exclusive conception of Man constructed by Western Europe in the modern period?
3. What is the dilemma that Wynter talks about confronting on page 175? How does ‘appreciating the West’s intellectual breakthroughs’ help to “transform their world”?
4. What is the relationship between “ethnoastronomies” and the ways in which old civilisations were ordered?
5. Wynter states that “Copernicus’s breakthrough could only have been made in the wake of the earlier humanists’ invention of a revalorized natural Man in the place of Christianity’s fallen creature” (p.176). What do you think Wynter means by this? How does a “revalorized natural Man” enable the scientific revolution driven by Copernicus? Why is this significant for the construction of human Others as the opposite of the West’s ‘rational Man’? Finally, how and why does this characterisation become “purely secular” (p.177) and biological?
6. Thinking back to Chakrabarty’s and Smith’s critiques of Western historicism, why does Wynter prefer to use the term “desupernaturalizing” or “de-godding” rather than “secular” to characterise the rising biological conception of Man?
7. Wynter argues that, in a medieval scholastic order of knowledge, “a lay intellectual … had to think in paradigms which served to confirm the hegemony of the church over the lay world” (p.178). What does this mean?
   • From this idea, Wynter draws on the writings of AiméCésaire and Jean-François Lyotard to suggest that the Human Other is conceptualised as “the name of what is evil”. How does this occur and why is this significant for Wynter’s argument?
   • How is the above related to Wynter’s suggestion that the current dominant paradigm of Man enabled the white Western world to see non-whites as racially inferior?
8. Does the change in the dominant conception of Man go directly from a theocentric religious conception to a biocentric one? Or is there a stage in between? If so, what is the in-between stage and how does it conceptualise the Human Other?
9. How does Wynter conceive the relationship between race and gender? How and why does Wynter see gender as an “emancipatory opening”? How do you think Wynter understands gender and how does it relate to her wider argument?

1. At the bottom of page 174, Wynter says “I am suggesting that from the very origin of the modern world, of the Western world system, there were never simply ‘men’ and ‘women’. Rather there was, on the one hand Man, as invented in the sixteenth century by Europe, as Foucault notes, and then, on the other hand, Man’s human Others”. What do you think she means by this? What is the significance of this construction for Wynter’s argument?
2. In a similar vein, Wynter suggests that “at the beginning of the modern world, the only women were White and Western” (p.174). Why do you think Wynter specifically talks about the construction of women? What does this add to her analysis of the inherently exclusive conception of Man constructed by Western Europe in the modern period?
3. What is the dilemma that Wynter talks about confronting on page 175? How does ‘appreciating the West’s intellectual breakthroughs’ help to “transform their world”?
4. What is the relationship between “ethnoastronomies” and the ways in which old civilisations were ordered?
5. Wynter states that “Copernicus’s breakthrough could only have been made in the wake of the earlier humanists’ invention of a revalorized natural Man in the place of Christianity’s fallen creature” (p.176). What do you think Wynter means by this? How does a “revalorized natural Man” enable the scientific revolution driven by Copernicus? Why is this significant for the construction of human Others as the opposite of the West’s ‘rational Man’? Finally, how and why does this characterisation become “purely secular” (p.177) and biological?
6. Thinking back to Chakrabarty’s and Smith’s critiques of Western historicism, why does Wynter prefer to use the term “desupernaturalizing” or “de-godding” rather than “secular” to characterise the rising biological conception of Man?
7. Wynter argues that, in a medieval scholastic order of knowledge, “a lay intellectual … had to think in paradigms which served to confirm the hegemony of the church over the lay world” (p.178). What does this mean?
   • From this idea, Wynter draws on the writings of AiméCésaire and Jean-François Lyotard to suggest that the Human Other is conceptualised as “the name of what is evil”. How does this occur and why is this significant for Wynter’s argument?
   • How is the above related to Wynter’s suggestion that the current dominant paradigm of Man enabled the white Western world to see non-whites as racially inferior?
8. Does the change in the dominant conception of Man go directly from a theocentric religious conception to a biocentric one? Or is there a stage in between? If so, what is the in-between stage and how does it conceptualise the Human Other?
9. How does Wynter conceive the relationship between race and gender? How and why does Wynter see gender as an “emancipatory opening”? How do you think Wynter understands gender and how does it relate to her wider argument?

Centering his analysis in the dynamic forces of modern East Asian history, Kuan-Hsing Chen recasts cultural studies as a politically urgent global endeavor. He argues that the intellectual and subjective work of decolonization begun across East Asia after the Second World War was stalled by the cold war. At the same time, the work of deimperialization became impossible to imagine in imperial centers such as Japan and the United States. Chen contends that it is now necessary to resume those tasks, and that decolonization, deimperialization, and an intellectual undoing of the cold war must proceed simultaneously. Combining postcolonial studies, globalization studies, and the emerging field of “Asian studies in Asia,” he insists that those on both sides of the imperial divide must assess the conduct, motives, and consequences of imperial histories.

Chen is one of the most important intellectuals working in East Asia today; his writing has been influential in Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and mainland China for the past fifteen years. As a founding member of the Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Society and its journal, he has helped to initiate change in the dynamics and intellectual orientation of the region, building a network that has facilitated inter-Asian connections. Asia as Method encapsulates Chen’s vision and activities within the increasingly “inter-referencing” East Asian intellectual community and charts necessary new directions for cultural studies.

1. What is the potential of Asia as method? From the remarks Chen makes at the start of the chapter, what do you think Asia as method entails?
2. What are some of the problems associated with both the idea of Asia as method and the Inter-Asia project that inspired it?
3. Why does Chen suggest that “due to historical constraints and current local differences, the general mood does not justify using Asia” as an “emotional signifier to call for regional integration and solidarity” (p.213)?
4. What is the relationship between “anxiety over the meaning of Asia” and the “politics of representation” (p.215)? What are the implications of this relationship for Asia as method? Why is this significant for Chen’s argument?
5. What does Chen mean by an “imaginary West” and what role has it played in Asian nationalist discourses? Thinking back to some of the earlier readings, what is the relationship between the West and forms of knowledge production? Why is this a problem for Chen?
6. What are the four strategies of “dealing with the West” Chen considers and how does he critique each of them? Thinking back to your reading of Dipesh Chakrabarty, are you convinced by Chen’s critique? If so, why? If not, why not?
7. Chen diagnoses a particular “predicament of postcolonial discourse” (p.222). What do you think Chen means by this? How does he attempt to move beyond it?
8. What are the similarities between Partha Chatterjee’s writings and Chen’s experiences in Taiwan? What is Chen’s idea of “shifting [the] points of reference” (p.225) and how does this inform his engagement with Chatterjee? How does shifting the points of reference collapse the “division between researcher and native informant” (p.227)?
9. Are you convinced that Asia as method can meaningfully “deal with the West”? Do you think it entails similar ideas in other parts of the world, such as Africa as method or Latin America as method? If so, what implications follow for political philosophy and/or political science?

1. What is the potential of Asia as method? From the remarks Chen makes at the start of the chapter, what do you think Asia as method entails?
2. What are some of the problems associated with both the idea of Asia as method and the Inter-Asia project that inspired it?
3. Why does Chen suggest that “due to historical constraints and current local differences, the general mood does not justify using Asia” as an “emotional signifier to call for regional integration and solidarity” (p.213)?
4. What is the relationship between “anxiety over the meaning of Asia” and the “politics of representation” (p.215)? What are the implications of this relationship for Asia as method? Why is this significant for Chen’s argument?
5. What does Chen mean by an “imaginary West” and what role has it played in Asian nationalist discourses? Thinking back to some of the earlier readings, what is the relationship between the West and forms of knowledge production? Why is this a problem for Chen?
6. What are the four strategies of “dealing with the West” Chen considers and how does he critique each of them? Thinking back to your reading of Dipesh Chakrabarty, are you convinced by Chen’s critique? If so, why? If not, why not?
7. Chen diagnoses a particular “predicament of postcolonial discourse” (p.222). What do you think Chen means by this? How does he attempt to move beyond it?
8. What are the similarities between Partha Chatterjee’s writings and Chen’s experiences in Taiwan? What is Chen’s idea of “shifting [the] points of reference” (p.225) and how does this inform his engagement with Chatterjee? How does shifting the points of reference collapse the “division between researcher and native informant” (p.227)?
9. Are you convinced that Asia as method can meaningfully “deal with the West”? Do you think it entails similar ideas in other parts of the world, such as Africa as method or Latin America as method? If so, what implications follow for political philosophy and/or political science?

Decolonizing Universalism develops a genuinely anti-imperialist feminism. Against relativism/universalism debates that ask feminists to either reject normativity or reduce feminism to a Western conceit, Khader's nonideal universalism rediscovers the normative core of feminism in opposition to sexist oppression and reimagines the role of moral ideals in transnational feminist praxis.

1. The terms ‘Western’ and ‘Northern’ appear frequently in the text. (a) Do the words refer to the same idea? If not, then what is the difference? (pp. 16-17; pp.18-19)
   • Why does the author levy the charge of ethnocentrism against what they call ‘Western’ universalism?
   • What position does the author take against that brand of universalism? Is it relativism or is it any other conception of universalism?
2. “Anti- imperialist feminisms, in my view, contain substantive normative claims.” (p.3)
   • What is the substantive normative claim of the anti-imperialist feminism?
   • How is this normative claim different from that of the Enlightenment liberalist/ universalist claim of normativity?
3. “…according to the Enlightenment liberal retelling of history, moral progress means the erosion of community and tradition that the West has ostensibly already achieved.” (p.5)
   • Do Chakrabarty’s ideas of ‘historicism’ and the ‘imaginary waiting room of history’ shed some light on this understanding of history?
4. What are the ‘specific values’ that the author wishes to examine in the book? Discuss in brief how the author engages with the values. (pp. 7-10) State your views about the discussions. (Discussions in greater detail are available in chapters – 2, 3, 4)
5. With respect to feminist solidarity and praxis:
   • How does the author qualify the notion of ‘positive ideals’?
   • How must we understand the goods of human rights, and generally the universal indicators of advantage and disadvantage? (pp. 11-12)
6. The stated feminist position challenges the conventions and methodology of Anglo- American political philosophy in three distinct and important ways. Discuss briefly each of them and register your own response to those.
7. How does the stated feminist position interact with the notion of intersectionality of oppression? Do you agree that the expressed position is compatible with the intersectionality thesis or is the latter at odds with the former?

1. The terms ‘Western’ and ‘Northern’ appear frequently in the text. (a) Do the words refer to the same idea? If not, then what is the difference? (pp. 16-17; pp.18-19)
   • Why does the author levy the charge of ethnocentrism against what they call ‘Western’ universalism?
   • What position does the author take against that brand of universalism? Is it relativism or is it any other conception of universalism?
2. “Anti- imperialist feminisms, in my view, contain substantive normative claims.” (p.3)
   • What is the substantive normative claim of the anti-imperialist feminism?
   • How is this normative claim different from that of the Enlightenment liberalist/ universalist claim of normativity?
3. “…according to the Enlightenment liberal retelling of history, moral progress means the erosion of community and tradition that the West has ostensibly already achieved.” (p.5)
   • Do Chakrabarty’s ideas of ‘historicism’ and the ‘imaginary waiting room of history’ shed some light on this understanding of history?
4. What are the ‘specific values’ that the author wishes to examine in the book? Discuss in brief how the author engages with the values. (pp. 7-10) State your views about the discussions. (Discussions in greater detail are available in chapters – 2, 3, 4)
5. With respect to feminist solidarity and praxis:
   • How does the author qualify the notion of ‘positive ideals’?
   • How must we understand the goods of human rights, and generally the universal indicators of advantage and disadvantage? (pp. 11-12)
6. The stated feminist position challenges the conventions and methodology of Anglo- American political philosophy in three distinct and important ways. Discuss briefly each of them and register your own response to those.
7. How does the stated feminist position interact with the notion of intersectionality of oppression? Do you agree that the expressed position is compatible with the intersectionality thesis or is the latter at odds with the former?

The paper begins from a working definition of caste as a contentious form of social belonging and a consideration of casteism as a form of inferiorization. It takes anti-casteism as an ideological critique aimed at unmasking the unethical operations of caste, drawing upon B. R. Ambedkar’s notion of caste as ‘graded inequality’. The politico-legal context of the unfinished trajectory of instituting protection against caste discrimination in Britain provides the backdrop for thinking through the philosophical foundations of anti-casteism. The peculiar religio-discursive aspect of ‘emergent vulnerability’ is noted, which explains the recent introduction of the trope of ‘institutional casteism’ used as a shield by deniers of caste against accusations of casteism. The language of protest historically introduced by anti-racists is thus usurped and inverted in a simulated language of anti-colonialism. It is suggested that the stymieing of the UK legislation on caste is an effect of collective hypocrisies, the refusal to acknowledge caste privilege, and the continuity of an agonistic intellectual inheritance, exemplified in the deep differences between Ambedkar and Gandhi in the Indian nationalist discourse on caste. The paper argues that for a modern anti-casteism to develop, at stake is the possibility of an ethical social solidarity. Following Ambedkar, this expansive solidarity can only be found through our willingness to subject received opinions and traditions to critical scrutiny. Since opposed groups ‘make sense’ of their worlds in ways that might generate collective hypocrisies of denial of caste effects, anti-casteism must be geared to expose the lie that caste as the system of graded inequality is benign and seamlessly self-perpetuating, when it is everywhere enforced through penalties for transgression of local caste norms with the complicity of the privileged castes. The ideal for modern anti-casteism is Maitri formed through praxis, eschewing birth-ascribed caste status and loyalties.

1. What is caste? Is a perfect definition possible? If not, what are ways to identify caste and the practice of casteism or caste discrimination? Does the notion of caste interact with the notion of class? If so, how?
2. What is the connection between Colonialism and Casteism? Take into consideration viewpoints of deniers of caste discrimination as well as that of anti-casteists.
3. Discuss the nature of relationship between the supposedly ‘amoral’ capitalist market and caste norms. Has the market been able to dissolve caste or is it entrenching caste divisions?
4. What do we understand about Gandhi’s idea of caste and casteism?
   • What contradiction does Gandhi run into while describing the caste system?
5. What is the notion of morality, inspired from Buddhism, that Ambedkar endorses?
   • What is ‘anti-social morality’ and how is it different from the morality that Ambedkar propounds?
   • Express your opinions on the two conceptions of morality.
6. How does caste and casteism figure in the rubric of Britain’s ‘multi-ethnic’ politics and specifically in its legal discourse?

1. What is caste? Is a perfect definition possible? If not, what are ways to identify caste and the practice of casteism or caste discrimination? Does the notion of caste interact with the notion of class? If so, how?
2. What is the connection between Colonialism and Casteism? Take into consideration viewpoints of deniers of caste discrimination as well as that of anti-casteists.
3. Discuss the nature of relationship between the supposedly ‘amoral’ capitalist market and caste norms. Has the market been able to dissolve caste or is it entrenching caste divisions?
4. What do we understand about Gandhi’s idea of caste and casteism?
   • What contradiction does Gandhi run into while describing the caste system?
5. What is the notion of morality, inspired from Buddhism, that Ambedkar endorses?
   • What is ‘anti-social morality’ and how is it different from the morality that Ambedkar propounds?
   • Express your opinions on the two conceptions of morality.
6. How does caste and casteism figure in the rubric of Britain’s ‘multi-ethnic’ politics and specifically in its legal discourse?

From: Sophie Oluwole: Celebrating the Radical Spirit of African Philosophy, By Tunji Olaopa

In Philosophy and Oral Tradition (1997), Sophie Oluwole urges us to return to Africa’s oral tradition as the source of excavating an authentic foundation of Africa’s intellectual culture which the West has tried so hard to undermine and destroy. One argument that underlies the relevance of Africa’s oral tradition is that the traditional and cultural practices of the past must have been guided by some form of logic and rational principles which not only predate the Western scientific canon, but which cannot also be subsumed totally under it. 

1. How does racial hierarchy function in different Latin American contexts, according to Quijano?
2. How does whiteness function in different Latin American contexts
3. How does racial hierarchy in Latin America compare to the Anglo-American context?
4. Might mestizaje be better understood not in a strict racial sense, as mere racial mixing, but in a cultural sense, as a transculturation characteristic of Latin American identities?
5. Would a cultural understanding of mestizaje avoid the risks of homogenization under whiteness?
6. Given Quijano’s analysis of the coloniality of power, how might cultural appropriation look like in Latin American contexts?

1. How does racial hierarchy function in different Latin American contexts, according to Quijano?
2. How does whiteness function in different Latin American contexts
3. How does racial hierarchy in Latin America compare to the Anglo-American context?
4. Might mestizaje be better understood not in a strict racial sense, as mere racial mixing, but in a cultural sense, as a transculturation characteristic of Latin American identities?
5. Would a cultural understanding of mestizaje avoid the risks of homogenization under whiteness?
6. Given Quijano’s analysis of the coloniality of power, how might cultural appropriation look like in Latin American contexts?

1. How is taste racialized in Vasconcelos’ ideal of mestizo culture
2. Vasconcelos’ mestizaje assumes racial essentialism. Can mestizaje avoid being construed on racial essentialism?
3. Can a reading of Vasconcelos’ mestizaje as cultural integration avoid the issues?
4. How might Vasconcelos’ understanding of mestizaje and race hinder, rather than promote, racial justice?
5. Vasconcelos partly aims at unifying Latin American identity. Is it unproblematic to talk about a Latin American culture characterized by mestizaje?
   

1. How is taste racialized in Vasconcelos’ ideal of mestizo culture
2. Vasconcelos’ mestizaje assumes racial essentialism. Can mestizaje avoid being construed on racial essentialism?
3. Can a reading of Vasconcelos’ mestizaje as cultural integration avoid the issues?
4. How might Vasconcelos’ understanding of mestizaje and race hinder, rather than promote, racial justice?
5. Vasconcelos partly aims at unifying Latin American identity. Is it unproblematic to talk about a Latin American culture characterized by mestizaje?
   

1. The dialectical process described by Villoro centres the mestizo. What does this mean for Indigenous identities?
2. What role do aesthetic practices play in the presumed revalorization of Indigenous identities by Indigenismo?
3. What do Indigenista aesthetic practices look like?
4. Should integration be the aim of multicultural States?
5. Is integration consistent with anti-racist commitments that seek to achieve justice for Indigenous peoples?
6. If integration of Indigenous peoples cannot be done without marginalizing them, how can mestizos construct their identity? What alternatives are there?
7. Could an understanding of mestizo identity as being in-between rather than as including and overcoming Indigenous identities avoid the issues? Mexican existentialist Emilio Uranga, for example, uses the Nahuatl concept of Nepantla to designate the sense of being in-between characteristic of mestizo identities.
   

1. The dialectical process described by Villoro centres the mestizo. What does this mean for Indigenous identities?
2. What role do aesthetic practices play in the presumed revalorization of Indigenous identities by Indigenismo?
3. What do Indigenista aesthetic practices look like?
4. Should integration be the aim of multicultural States?
5. Is integration consistent with anti-racist commitments that seek to achieve justice for Indigenous peoples?
6. If integration of Indigenous peoples cannot be done without marginalizing them, how can mestizos construct their identity? What alternatives are there?
7. Could an understanding of mestizo identity as being in-between rather than as including and overcoming Indigenous identities avoid the issues? Mexican existentialist Emilio Uranga, for example, uses the Nahuatl concept of Nepantla to designate the sense of being in-between characteristic of mestizo identities.
   

1. How does Castellanos’ Indigenismo fit within the dialectical process identified by Villoro?
2. What characterises the in-betweenness of mestizas in Castellanos’ Indigenismo?
3. Does the emphasis on solitude in Tarica’s analysis of Castellano’s protagonist avoid the problems of certain versions of Indigenismo?
4. What can this analysis illuminate about the situation of mestizas, and women more generally, in the coloniality of power?
5. What can this analysis illuminate about the situation of Indigenous women in particular in Latin American societies?

1. How does Castellanos’ Indigenismo fit within the dialectical process identified by Villoro?
2. What characterises the in-betweenness of mestizas in Castellanos’ Indigenismo?
3. Does the emphasis on solitude in Tarica’s analysis of Castellano’s protagonist avoid the problems of certain versions of Indigenismo?
4. What can this analysis illuminate about the situation of mestizas, and women more generally, in the coloniality of power?
5. What can this analysis illuminate about the situation of Indigenous women in particular in Latin American societies?

1. In what sense are aesthetics and politics interlinked in Mariátegui’s criticism of literature?
2. What is his criticism of critical hegemony behind the Latin American literary canon?
3. How might the process of formation of Peruvian literature relate to Villoro’s description of the three moments of Indigenismo in Mexico?
4. How is the white-Eurocentric mestizaje reflected in the different periods of Peruvian literature identified by Mariátegui?
5. In what sense does César Vallejo embody “genuine Americanism”, according to Mariátegui?
6. How does Mariátegui understand Indigenismo?
7. How might Quijano’s coloniality of power explain Mariátegui’s anti-Black attitudes?

1. In what sense are aesthetics and politics interlinked in Mariátegui’s criticism of literature?
2. What is his criticism of critical hegemony behind the Latin American literary canon?
3. How might the process of formation of Peruvian literature relate to Villoro’s description of the three moments of Indigenismo in Mexico?
4. How is the white-Eurocentric mestizaje reflected in the different periods of Peruvian literature identified by Mariátegui?
5. In what sense does César Vallejo embody “genuine Americanism”, according to Mariátegui?
6. How does Mariátegui understand Indigenismo?
7. How might Quijano’s coloniality of power explain Mariátegui’s anti-Black attitudes?

1. How can Quijano’s coloniality of power help explain the lack of recognition of Afro-Latin communities as distinct cultural groups?
2. What role does the lack of recognition of Black aesthetics in Latin America play in this erasure?
3. If Latin American aesthetic practices have recognizable roots in the African diaspora, what has driven the difference in the role Blackness and Indigenous identities play in the constitution of mestizo identity?
4. How does the lack of recognition of Black aesthetics in Latin America contribute to the invisibility of Afro-Latin communities both in Latin American countries and in Latinx communities in the U.S.?
5. Given the cultural diversity of the African diaspora, how should we interpret this call for recognition of distinct Afro-Latin groups? Should it be interpreted as a call for recognizing a pan-Afro-Latin identity, similar to some understandings of mestizo identity (like Vasconcelos’)?

1. How can Quijano’s coloniality of power help explain the lack of recognition of Afro-Latin communities as distinct cultural groups?
2. What role does the lack of recognition of Black aesthetics in Latin America play in this erasure?
3. If Latin American aesthetic practices have recognizable roots in the African diaspora, what has driven the difference in the role Blackness and Indigenous identities play in the constitution of mestizo identity?
4. How does the lack of recognition of Black aesthetics in Latin America contribute to the invisibility of Afro-Latin communities both in Latin American countries and in Latinx communities in the U.S.?
5. Given the cultural diversity of the African diaspora, how should we interpret this call for recognition of distinct Afro-Latin groups? Should it be interpreted as a call for recognizing a pan-Afro-Latin identity, similar to some understandings of mestizo identity (like Vasconcelos’)?

1. In what sense do we find in negrista poetry anti-Black attitudes? How have they evolved?
2. Does the representation of Afro-Latin women involve racist attitudes directed specifically at Black women? Has this representation evolved in Latin American poetry?
3. Contrast representations of Indigenous peoples in Indigenismo with representations of Afro-Latin communities in mestizo identity. What is the difference?
4. Mestizo identity is characterised as displaced insofar as it emerges in between Spanish and Indigenous cultures. Is Afro-Latin identity also characteristically displaced in the same way?
5. Isn’t there a tension between Hooker’s claim that Afro-Latin communities are not recognised as distinct cultural groups, and the exoticization of Afro-Latin communities in/through art as examined by Carter? How can these claims be consistent?

1. In what sense do we find in negrista poetry anti-Black attitudes? How have they evolved?
2. Does the representation of Afro-Latin women involve racist attitudes directed specifically at Black women? Has this representation evolved in Latin American poetry?
3. Contrast representations of Indigenous peoples in Indigenismo with representations of Afro-Latin communities in mestizo identity. What is the difference?
4. Mestizo identity is characterised as displaced insofar as it emerges in between Spanish and Indigenous cultures. Is Afro-Latin identity also characteristically displaced in the same way?
5. Isn’t there a tension between Hooker’s claim that Afro-Latin communities are not recognised as distinct cultural groups, and the exoticization of Afro-Latin communities in/through art as examined by Carter? How can these claims be consistent?

1. How might we analyse the erasure of Latin America’s third root in light of the coloniality of power?
2. How do issues related to the African diaspora in Latin America relate to issues that emerge from Indigenismo?
3. How can mestizo culture acknowledge its African heritage without engaging in appropriation that contributes to the marginalization of Afro-Latin communities?
4. Could Vasconcelos’ cosmic race be rehabilitated to counteract a notion of mestizaje that leaves out the contributions of the African diaspora to analyse mestizo identity merely in light of Spanish and Indigenous cultures?
5. How does the notion of mestizaje look like once Afro-Latin cultures are acknowledged?
6. Should we speak of mestizo consciousness as being in-between three different identities?
7. What would that mean for Afro-Latin identities?

1. How might we analyse the erasure of Latin America’s third root in light of the coloniality of power?
2. How do issues related to the African diaspora in Latin America relate to issues that emerge from Indigenismo?
3. How can mestizo culture acknowledge its African heritage without engaging in appropriation that contributes to the marginalization of Afro-Latin communities?
4. Could Vasconcelos’ cosmic race be rehabilitated to counteract a notion of mestizaje that leaves out the contributions of the African diaspora to analyse mestizo identity merely in light of Spanish and Indigenous cultures?
5. How does the notion of mestizaje look like once Afro-Latin cultures are acknowledged?
6. Should we speak of mestizo consciousness as being in-between three different identities?
7. What would that mean for Afro-Latin identities?

1. By displacing Vasconcelos’ ideal of mestizaje from the Latin American context that is constituted by the coloniality of power, and by using it to analyse the situation of Latinx populations in USA, can Anzaldúa overcome the criticisms faced by Vasconcelos’ cosmic race?
2. Can Anzaldúa’s nueva mestiza preserve a distinction between mestizo, Indigenous, and Afro Latin identities? Should it?
3. How does Anzaldúa’s intersectional analysis of mestiza culture relate to Castellanos’ protagonist who is doubly displaced?
4. Given that Anzaldúa’s nueva mestiza is not only in-between in the sense of not being Indigenous, nor Black, nor white, but in the sense of being Mexican-American, should we identify in the nueva mestiza a third displacement?
5. Given the different dimensions of displacement of mestizas in the U.S. context and in the Latin American context, should we treat them as a different kind of mestizo consciousness?
6. What can they illuminate about each other?

1. By displacing Vasconcelos’ ideal of mestizaje from the Latin American context that is constituted by the coloniality of power, and by using it to analyse the situation of Latinx populations in USA, can Anzaldúa overcome the criticisms faced by Vasconcelos’ cosmic race?
2. Can Anzaldúa’s nueva mestiza preserve a distinction between mestizo, Indigenous, and Afro Latin identities? Should it?
3. How does Anzaldúa’s intersectional analysis of mestiza culture relate to Castellanos’ protagonist who is doubly displaced?
4. Given that Anzaldúa’s nueva mestiza is not only in-between in the sense of not being Indigenous, nor Black, nor white, but in the sense of being Mexican-American, should we identify in the nueva mestiza a third displacement?
5. Given the different dimensions of displacement of mestizas in the U.S. context and in the Latin American context, should we treat them as a different kind of mestizo consciousness?
6. What can they illuminate about each other?

1. How might the Chicana/o movement’s emphasis on mestizaje contribute to the invisibility of Afro-Latinxs in the U.S.?
2. Chicana artists and writers posit mestiza consciousness in opposition to a dominant culture: white Americans. This might be helpful when examining Latinx identities in the U.S. But how can their analysis translate to Latin American societies in which mestizaje was partly conceived (either implicitly or explicitly) as being at the service of whiteness and as helping sustain the coloniality of power?
3. Can Chicana’s nueva mestiza help rehabilitate mestizaje in a way that serves Indigenous and Afro-Latin communities?
4. Why does Pérez place special attention to the spiritual dimension of the work by Chicana writers and artists?
5. Does this emphasis on spirituality risk appropriating Indigenous cultures by non-Indigenous Mexican-Americans?
6. How can it avoid falling trap to the excesses of Indigenismo?

1. How might the Chicana/o movement’s emphasis on mestizaje contribute to the invisibility of Afro-Latinxs in the U.S.?
2. Chicana artists and writers posit mestiza consciousness in opposition to a dominant culture: white Americans. This might be helpful when examining Latinx identities in the U.S. But how can their analysis translate to Latin American societies in which mestizaje was partly conceived (either implicitly or explicitly) as being at the service of whiteness and as helping sustain the coloniality of power?
3. Can Chicana’s nueva mestiza help rehabilitate mestizaje in a way that serves Indigenous and Afro-Latin communities?
4. Why does Pérez place special attention to the spiritual dimension of the work by Chicana writers and artists?
5. Does this emphasis on spirituality risk appropriating Indigenous cultures by non-Indigenous Mexican-Americans?
6. How can it avoid falling trap to the excesses of Indigenismo?

Abstract: This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge out of a complex dynamic feedback system at the subpersonal level. Moreover reflection on the role of eye movements in visual perception establishes a further sense in which a distinction between sensorimotor behaviour and cognition cannot be sustained. The sensorimotor theory has recently come under critical fire (see e.g. Block, J Philos CII(5):259–272, 2005; Prinz, Psyche, 12(1):1–19, 2006; Aizawa, J Philos CIV(1), 2007) for mistaking a merely causal contribution of action to perception for a constitutive contribution. We further argue that the sensorimotor theory is particularly vulnerable to this objection in a way that Hurley’s active perception theory is not. This presents an additional reason for preferring Hurley’s theory as providing a conceptual framework for the enactive programme.

Historically, almost all psychological theories of emotion have proposed that emotional reactions are constituted by the body in some fashion, but those theories utilized a common metaphor that the body and mind are separate and independent forces in an emotional episode. Current embodiment theories of the mind challenge this assumption, however, by suggesting that the body helps to constitute the mind in shaping an emotional response. We briefly review new theories of embodied cognition in light of accumulating findings from emotion research, to lay the foundation for novel hypotheses about how the conceptual system for emotion is constituted and used. Finally, we discuss how an embodied perspective can help to usher in a paradigm shift in scientific approaches to what emotions are and how they work

From the introduction: This paper seeks to begin to fill a gap that thus exists both in existential phenomenology and feminist theory. It traces in a provisional way some of the basic modalities of feminine body comportment, manner of moving, and relation in space. It brings intelligibility and significance to certain observable and rather ordinary ways in which women in our society typically comport themselves and move differently from the ways that men do. In accordance with the existentialist concern with the situatedness of human experience, I make no claim to the universality of this typicality of the bodily comportment of women and the phenonemological description based on it. The account developed here claims only to describe the modalities of feminine bodily existence for women situated in contemporary advanced industrial, urban, and commercial society. Elements of the account developed here may or may not apply to the situation of woman in other societies and other epoch, but it is not the concern of this paper to determine to which, if any, other social circumstances this account applies.

Locke's Second Treatise of Government (1689) is one of the great classics of political philosophy, widely regarded as the foundational text of modern liberalism. In it Locke insists on majority rule, and regards no government as legitimate unless it has the consent of the people. He sets aside people's ethnicities, religions, and cultures and envisages political societies which command our assent because they meet our elemental needs simply as humans. His work helped to entrench ideas of a social contract, human rights, and protection of property as the guiding principles for just actions and just societies.

Report Summary: Rarely has a Māori river claim been so persistently maintained as that of the Whanganui people. Uniquely in the annals of Māori settlement, the country’s longest navigable river is home to just one iwi, the Atihau-a-Paparangi. It has been described as the aortic artery, the central bloodline of that one heart. The Atihau-a-Paparangi claim to the authority of the river has continued unabated from when it was first put into question. The tribal concern is evidenced by numerous petitions to Parliament from 1887. In addition, legal proceedings were commenced as early as 1938, in the Māori Land Court, on an application for the investigation of the title to the riverbed. From there the action passed to the Māori Appellate Court in 1944, the Māori Land Court again in 1945, the Supreme Court in 1949, to a further petition and the appointment of a Royal Commission in 1950, to a reference to the Court of Appeal in 1953, to a reference to the Māori Appellate Court in 1958 and to a decision of the Court of Appeal in 1962. This may represent one of the longest set of legal proceedings in Māori claims history, yet in all those proceedings, it is claimed, the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi had no direct bearing. Nor did the matter rest there for the court hearings were followed by further petitions and investigations, and in more recent times, Atihau-a-Paparangi were again involved in the Catchment Board inquiry on minimum river flows in 1988 and in the Planning Tribunal and High Court hearings on the same matter in 1989, 1990 and 1992.

Around 1970, the Norwegian government revealed plans for a huge hydroelectric dam on the Alta river, in the far northern county of Troms og Finnmark. This was a shock to the indigenous reindeer herders and fisherfolk who lived and worked around the village of Máze, which was scheduled to be “displaced” by the project: shock that turned to outrage when they realised that the authorities had never once felt any need to consider their rights. At that time, the Sámi, or Lapps, were considered second-class citizens (the term “Lapp” is derogatory), vestiges of an outmoded culture, doomed to wither away as the modern world advanced. And, as with so many other indigenous peoples, they had been mistreated for decades: habitually swindled by corrupt officials, abused and victimised by the justice and education systems, and their cultural traditions condemned as “sorcery”, for which brutal penalties could be exacted.