For more than a millennium the great Mesoamerican city of Teotihuacn (c. 150 b.c.a.d. 750) has been imagined and reimagined by a host of subsequent cultures including our own. Mesoamerica's Classic Heritage engages the subject of the unity and diversity of pre-Hispanic Mesoamerica by focusing on the classic heritage of this ancient city. This new volume is the product of several years of research by members of Princeton University's Moses Mesoamerican Archive and Research Project and Mexico's Proyecto Teotihuacn. Offering a variety of disciplinary perspectives--including the history of religions, anthropology, archaeology, and art history - and a wealth of new data, Mesoamerica's Classic Heritage examines Teotihuacn's rippling influence across Mesoamerican time and space, including important patterns of continuity and change, and its relationships, both historical and symbolic, with Tenochtitlan, Cholula, and various Mayan communities.

Latin American and Latinx Philosophy: A Collaborative Introduction is a beginner’s guide to canonical texts in Latin American and Latinx philosophy, providing the non-specialist with necessary historical and philosophical context, and demonstrating their contemporary relevance. It is written in jargon-free prose for students and professors who are interested in the subject, but who don’t know where to begin. Each of the twelve chapters, written by a leading scholar in the field, examines influential texts that are readily available in English and introduces the reader to a period, topic, movement, or school that taken together provide a broad overview of the history, nature, scope, and value of Latin American and Latinx philosophy. Although this volume is primarily intended for the reader without a background in the Latin American and Latinx tradition, specialists will also benefit from its many novelties, including an introduction to Aztec ethics; a critique of “the Latino threat” narrative; the legacy of Latin American philosophy in the Chicano movement; an overview of Mexican existentialism, Liberation philosophy, and Latin American and Latinx feminisms; a philosophical critique of indigenism; a study of Latinx contributions to the philosophy of immigration; and an examination of the intersection of race and gender in Latinx identity.

Publisher's note: For at least two millennia before the advent of the Spaniards in 1519, there was a flourishing civilization in central Mexico. During that long span of time a cultural evolution took place which saw a high development of the arts and literature, the formulation of complex religious doctrines, systems of education, and diverse political and social organization.The rich documentation concerning these people, commonly called Aztecs, includes, in addition to a few codices written before the Conquest, thousands of folios in the Nahuatl or Aztec language written by natives after the Conquest. Adapting the Latin alphabet, which they had been taught by the missionary friars, to their native tongue, they recorded poems, chronicles, and traditions.

The fundamental concepts of ancient Mexico presented and examined in this book have been taken from more than ninety original Aztec documents. They concern the origin of the universe and of life, conjectures on the mystery of God, the possibility of comprehending things beyond the realm of experience, life after death, and the meaning of education, history, and art. The philosophy of the Nahuatl wise men, which probably stemmed from the ancient doctrines and traditions of the Teotihuacans and Toltecs, quite often reveals profound intuition and in some instances is remarkably “modern.”

This English edition is not a direct translation of the original Spanish, but an adaptation and rewriting of the text for the English-speaking reader.

This book investigates some of the central topics of metaphysics in the philosophical thought of the Maya people of Mesoamerica, particularly from the Preclassic through Postclassic periods. This book covers the topics of time, change, identity, and truth, through comparative investigation integrating Maya texts and practices — such as Classic Period stelae, Postclassic Codices, and Colonial-era texts such as the î and the books of Chilam Balam — and early Chinese philosophy.

Adapted from prologue. “Since its rediscovery in the mid-nineteenth century the codex Cantares Mexicanos has come to be recognized as the chief source of Aztec poetry and one of the monuments of American Indian literature (…) Over the years a tradition has gradually been established that views the Cantares as a poet’s miscellany, studded with lyrics composed by famous kings (…) [Bierhorst’s edition] breaks with this tradition (…) The findings [of the present study] in brief are these: The ninety-one songs in the Cantares, without exception, belong to a single genre, which flourishes during the third quarter of the sixteenth century. Netotiliztli (or dance associated with worldly entertainment) is the native name that appears to have been applied to the genre in its entirety. But for lack of certainty on this point, and for the sake of convenience, I have chosen to designate it by the term “ghost songs.” (…) the Aztec ghost song may be described as a musical performance in which warrior-singers summon the ghosts of ancestors in order to swell their ranks and overwhelm their enemies. (…) The Cantares itself (…) is limited to songs belonging to the city-state of Mexico, or to Mexico and its close ally, Azcapotzalco (…) Although it is possible that a few of the songs in the Cantares manuscripts were composed before the Conquest, by far the greater number belong to the post-Conquest period.”

Publisher's note: For at least two millennia before the advent of the Spaniards in 1519, there was a flourishing civilization in central Mexico. During that long span of time a cultural evolution took place which saw a high development of the arts and literature, the formulation of complex religious doctrines, systems of education, and diverse political and social organization. The rich documentation concerning these people, commonly called Aztecs, includes, in addition to a few codices written before the Conquest, thousands of folios in the Nahuatl or Aztec language written by natives after the Conquest. Adapting the Latin alphabet, which they had been taught by the missionary friars, to their native tongue, they recorded poems, chronicles, and traditions.

The fundamental concepts of ancient Mexico presented and examined in this book have been taken from more than ninety original Aztec documents. They concern the origin of the universe and of life, conjectures on the mystery of God, the possibility of comprehending things beyond the realm of experience, life after death, and the meaning of education, history, and art. The philosophy of the Nahuatl wise men, which probably stemmed from the ancient doctrines and traditions of the Teotihuacans and Toltecs, quite often reveals profound intuition and in some instances is remarkably “modern.”

This English edition is not a direct translation of the original Spanish, but an adaptation and rewriting of the text for the English-speaking reader.

Aztec psychological thought is described in this paper. The Pre-Columbian world of the Aztecs was characterized by Spanish chroniclers as being as sophisticated in the sciences and medicine as anything found in Europe at the time of the conquest of Mexico. This knowledge included a belief structure about the development of personality and the way in which Aztec society socialized the person. Concepts of psychological equilibrium and well-being are also found within Aztec medicine. Psychological dysfunctions were identified by Aztec healers and "talking" therapies not unlike today's psychotherapeutic techniques could be found.

Publisher’s note: “Two of the world’s leading scholars of the Aztec language and culture have translated Sahagún’s monumental and encyclopedic study of native life in Mexico at the time of the Spanish Conquest. This immense undertaking is the first complete translation into any language of Sahagún’s Nahuatl text, and represents one of the most distinguished contributions in the fields of anthropology, ethnography, and linguistics.

Written between 1540 and 1585, the Florentine Codex (so named because the manuscript has been part of the Laurentian Library’s collections since at least 1791) is the most authoritative statement we have of the Aztecs’ lifeways and traditions—a rich and intimate yet panoramic view of a doomed people.

The Florentine Codex is divided by subject area into twelve books and includes over 2,000 illustrations drawn by Nahua artists in the sixteenth century.”

For the ancient Mexicas, the composition of the human body was similar to that of the cosmos, with both being composed of dense and light substances. The light substance of the human body was divine in nature and formed the different souls of each human being. Some souls were indispensable for human existence while others were unnecessary and often harmful. The dense part of the human body functioned through its union with the souls. Like the different souls, the dense parts of the human body also had specific functions dedicated to different activities. For example, human thought derived primarily from the heart. Souls could be damaged, which could cause them to malfunction and lead to illness and possibly death in the human being. As the souls were divine, each was a conscious being with its own personality; thus there could be disagreements between them. Disharmony could also lead to illness.

-Yolia is one of the principal indigenous terms present in Christian Nahua terminology in the first decades of European contact. It is employed for “soul” or “spirit” and often forms a doublet with ánima in Nahuatl texts of an ecclesiastical, devotional, or secular nature. the term -Yolia/teyolia has also lived a rich and fascinating life in scholarly literature. Its etymology (“the means for one’s living”) is strikingly similar to that of the Spanish word “ánima”, or “soul.” Taking into account the possibility that attestations of the seemingly pre-Hispanic -Yolia can be identified in some of the written sources, we have reviewed historical, linguistic, and anthropological evidence concerning this term in order to revisit the Nahua concept of the “soul.” we also scrutinize the very origin of -Yolia in academic discourse. this analysis, based on broader historical and linguistic evidence referring to both pre-Conquest beliefs and Christianization in sixteenth-century central Mexico, is the point of departure for proposing and substantiating an alternative hypothesis about the origin of -yolia. Our precise focus has been to trace and pinpoint a pervasive Christian influence, manifest both in indigenous Colonial texts and conceptual frameworks of modern scholars interpreting them. we conclude that -Yolia is a neologism created in the early Colonial period.

Summary: The Mapa de Cuauhtinchan II is a historical-cartographical document from the early colonial period from the state of Puebla, which is likely a copy of an older document from the early post-classic period. This document was declared a historical monument on June 24th, 1963, by the Mexican National Institute of Anthropology and History. The number 2 was assigned to distinguish it from other maps [found in Cuauhtinchan]. To this day, there are four maps registered in this town that pertained to the sixteenth century. Together they constitute a set of sources intimately related in virtue of its pictographic style, as well as of its historic and cartographic content. The Mapa de Cuauhtinchan II is considered one among the historical-cartographical documents that served to state arguments and justifications in defense of political and territorial rights of the ethnic groups who authored them. Along with the oral tradition, they conform Mesoamerican historiography. The historical information they provide refers to the Chichimeca groups of people that left Chicomoztoc in the twelfth century as a response to the calling of the Tolteca-Chichimeca people to conquer the allies of the Olmeca Xicallanca people in Cholula, Puebla.

Translated from Mesoamerican Research Foundation (n.d.), Mapa de Cuauhtínchan II, available at http://mesoamerica.info/mapa-de-cuautinchan-II.

The cultural construction of experience and perception has been a topic of interest among scholars working in Mesoamerica for decades. Archaeological remains, art, ancient and historic textual sources, and ethnographic observations complement and inform one another in those investigations, many of which stress the particular conceptions of bodies, sensorial hierarchies, and lived experiences across the culturally and linguistically connected region extending geographically from northern Mexico to Costa Rica. This chapter provides an overview of sensorial studies in Mesoamerica that highlights the rich and diverse evidence available. It emphasizes a diachronic, comparative approach, common in Mesoamericanist archaeology, which forces scholars to go beyond the identification of specific stimuli on discrete senses and enables them to study contexts of heightened synaesthetic experience, as well as those contexts’ affective and symbolic meanings. Finally, I suggest possibilities for considering an archaeology of the senses that extends beyond the limits of a singular human body in order to more fully embrace the conceptual nature of ancient Mesoamerican experience.

In this chapter, Laack analyzes a migration account visually depicted in the Mexican early colonial pictorial manuscript known as the Mapa de Cuauhtinchan No. 2. This pictographic map tells the story of a group of Aztecs leaving their primordial home, changing their social, cultural, and religious identity through migration and the passing of ordeals, and finally settling in the town of Cuauhtinchan. It is painted in the style of Aztec pictography, which used visual imagery to convey thoughts and meanings in contrast to alphabetical scripts using abstract signs for linguistic sounds. Drawing on the theories of embodied metaphors and embodied meaning by philosopher Mark L. Johnson and cognitive linguist George P. Lakoff, I argue that Aztec pictography offers efficient and effective means to communicate embodied metaphors on a visual level and evokes complex layers of embodied meaning. In doing so, I intend to change perspective on the narrative powers of religious stories by transcending textual patterns of analysis and theory building and opening up to non-linguistic modes of experience and their influence on narrative structures and strategies.

The ancient Maya and other Mesoamerican peoples showed an intense interest in invoking the senses, especially hearing, sight, and smell. The senses were flagged by graphic devices of synaesthetic or cross-sensory intent; writing and speech scrolls triggered sound, sightlines the acts and consequences of seeing, and flowery ornament indicated both scent and soul essence. As conceived anciently, the senses were projective and procreative, involving the notion of unity and shared essence in material and incorporeal realms. Among the Maya, spaces could be injected with moral and hierarchical valuation through visual fields known as y-ichnal. The inner mind extended to encompass outer worlds, in strong parallel to concepts of monism. From such evidence arises the possibility of reconstructing the phenomenology of ancient Mesoamericans.

Adapted from the preface: The Popol Vuh tells the story of the emergence of light in the darkness, from primordial glimmers to brilliant dawns, and from rain¬ storms as black as night to days so clear the very ends of the earth can be seen. A revised edition of this translation of the Popol Vuh has become necessary because the world of Mayan studies is itself a constantly brightening one. Advances in the understanding of Mayan languages, literature, art, history, politics, and astronomy have required changes in the introduction, notes, commentaries, glossary, and illustrations. There are also changes in the translation itself, some of them subtle refinements and others that readers of the previous edition may find surprising. And finally, an index has been added.”

Publisher’s note: For the Classic Maya, who flourished in and around the Yucatan peninsula in the first millennium AD, artistic materials were endowed with an internal life. Far from being inert substances, jade, flint, obsidian, and wood held a vital essence, agency, and even personality. To work with these materials was to coax their life into full expression and to engage in witty play. Writing, too, could shift from hieroglyphic signs into vibrant glyphs that sprouted torsos, hands, and feet. Appearing to sing, grapple, and feed, they effectively blurred the distinction between text and image.In this first full study of the nature of Maya materials and animism, renowned Mayanist scholar Stephen Houston provides startling insights into a Pre-Columbian worldview that dramatically contrasts with western perspectives. Illustrated with more than one hundred photographs, images, and drawings, this beautifully written book reveals the Maya quest for transcendence in the face of inevitable death and decay.”

The ancient Maya, through their shamans, kings, warriors, and scribes, created a legacy of power and enduring beauty. The landmark publication of A Forest of Kings presented the first accessible, dramatic history of this great civilization, written by experts in the translation of glyphs. Now, in Maya Cosmos, Freidel, Schele, and Parker examine Maya mythology and religion, unraveling the question of how these extraordinary people, five million strong, have managed to preserve their most sacred beliefs into modern times. In Maya Cosmos, the authors draw upon translations of sacred texts and histories spanning thousands of years to tell us a story of the Maya, not in our words but in theirs.

Publisher’s note: Examining a wide range of archaeological data, and using it to explore issues such as the sexual body, mind/body dualism, body modification, and magical practices, Lynn Meskell and Rosemary Joyce offer a new approach to the Ancient Egyptian and Mayan understanding of embodiment. Drawing on insights from feminist theory, art history, phenomenology, anthropology and psychoanalysis, the book takes bodily materiality as a crucial starting point to the understanding and formation of self in any society, and sheds new light on Ancient Egyptian and Maya cultures.

The book shows how a comparative project can open up new lines of inquiry by raising questions about accepted assumptions as the authors draw attention to the long-term histories and specificities of embodiment, and make the case for the importance of ancient materials for contemporary theorization of the body. For students new to the subject, and scholars already familiar with it, this will offer fresh and exciting insights into these ancient cultures.

Publisher’s note: This book investigates some of the central topics of metaphysics in the philosophical thought of the Maya people of Mesoamerica, particularly from the Preclassic through Postclassic periods. This book covers the topics of time, change, identity, and truth, through comparative investigation integrating Maya texts and practices — such as Classic Period stelae, Postclassic Codices, and Colonial-era texts such as the Popol Vuh and the books of Chilam Balam — and early Chinese philosophy.

Adapted from the preface: The Popol Vuh tells the story of the emergence of light in the darkness, from primordial glimmers to brilliant dawns, and from rainstorms as black as night to days so clear the very ends of the earth can be seen. A revised edition of this translation of the Popol Vuh has become necessary because the world of Mayan studies is itself a constantly brightening one. Advances in the understanding of Mayan languages, literature, art, history, politics, and astronomy have required changes in the introduction, notes, commentaries, glossary, and illustrations. There are also changes in the translation itself, some of them subtle refinements and others that readers of the previous edition may find surprising. And finally, an index has been added.

In this paper, Vogt describes the notion of the soul of the people from Zinacateco, Mexico, by drawing on Tzotzil concepts. He specifically focuses on two notions that can be assoacied with the soul, namely ch’ulel and chanul. He briefly discusses the social relevance of these notions.

For the Maya reality is a unified whole within which every entity shares in the same fundamental animating principle. This is a relational ontology whereby no phenomenon is self-contained but emerges from relations with others, including humans and non-humans, in various fi elds of action. Th is ontology correlates with a more encompassing “process metaphysic” in which reality is in constant flux, continually “becoming.” The process metaphysic envisioned by philosopher Alfred North Whitehead provides a technical language for analyzing the composition and extension of Maya persons, using the model of personhood developed by anthropologist Marcel Mauss. In life individual Maya persons assembled divergent components endowed by their maternal and paternal ancestors, which were subsequently disassembled upon their deaths. They also assembled non-corporeal components–souls and names–that linked them to existences beyond the physical boundaries and timelines of their bodies. Aspects of personhood were also shared by objects worn or manipulated by humans. Persons were thus extended in space and in time, outliving individual human beings. Maya belief and practice reveals the fundamental process known as k’ex, “replacement” or “substitution,” accounts for much of the flux and duration of the universe as a Maya-specific mode of “becoming.”

Publisher’s note: The title of Edmonson's work refers to the Mayan custom of first predicting their history and then living it, and it may be that no other peoples have ever gone so far in this direction. The Book of Chilam Balam was a sacred text prepared by generations of Mayan priests to record the past and to predict the future. The official prophet of each twenty-year rule was the Chilam Balam, or Spokesman of the Jaguar—the Jaguar being the supreme authority charged with converting the prophet's words into fact.

This is a literal but poetic translation of one of fourteen known manuscripts in Yucatecan Maya on ritual and history. It pictures a world of all but incredible numerological order, slowly yielding to Christianity and Spanish political pressure but never surrendering. In fact, it demonstrates the surprising truth of a secret Mayan government during the Spanish rule, which continued to collect tribute in the names of the ruined Classic cities and preserved the essence of the Mayan calendar as a legacy for the tradition's modern inheritors.

The history of the Yucatecan Maya from the seventh to the nineteenth century is revealed. And this is history as the Maya saw it—of a people concerned with lords and priests, with the cosmology which justified their rule, and with the civil war which they perceived as the real dimension of the colonial period.

A work of both history and literature, the Tizimin presents a great deal of Mayan thought, some of which has been suspected but not previously documented. Edmonson's skillful reordering of the text not only makes perfect historical sense but also resolves the long-standing problem of correlating the two colonial Mayan calendars. The book includes both interpretative and literal translations, as well as the Maya parallel couplets and extensive annotations on each page. The beauty of the sacred text is illuminated by the literal translation, while both versions unveil the magnificent historical, philosophical, and social traditions of the most sophisticated native culture in the New World.

The prophetic history of the Tizimin creates a portrait of the continuity and vitality, of the ancient past and the foreordained future of the Maya.

Summary adapted from the introduction: The ancient Maya shouldered the burden of time. J. Eric S. Thompson (1950) opens his Maya Hieroglyphic Writing: An Introduction with a collage of god-numbers who carry time units with their mecapal, or head strap. This iconic image has defined our understanding of classic Maya time as cyclical. (…) In the following, I shift the perspective from the “burden of time” to “burdened with time” in order to move from an abstract understanding of time to a study of its practice and bodily experience. I adapt Edmund Husserl’s work to develop a cognitive model of time that I apply to classic Maya culture.

Publisher’s note: This book investigates some of the central topics of metaphysics in the philosophical thought of the Maya people of Mesoamerica, particularly from the Preclassic through Postclassic periods. This book covers the topics of time, change, identity, and truth, through comparative investigation integrating Maya texts and practices — such as Classic Period stelae, Postclassic Codices, and Colonial-era texts such as the Popol Vuh and the books of Chilam Balam — and early Chinese philosophy.

1. How does racial hierarchy function in different Latin American contexts, according to Quijano?
2. How does whiteness function in different Latin American contexts
3. How does racial hierarchy in Latin America compare to the Anglo-American context?
4. Might mestizaje be better understood not in a strict racial sense, as mere racial mixing, but in a cultural sense, as a transculturation characteristic of Latin American identities?
5. Would a cultural understanding of mestizaje avoid the risks of homogenization under whiteness?
6. Given Quijano’s analysis of the coloniality of power, how might cultural appropriation look like in Latin American contexts?

1. How does racial hierarchy function in different Latin American contexts, according to Quijano?
2. How does whiteness function in different Latin American contexts
3. How does racial hierarchy in Latin America compare to the Anglo-American context?
4. Might mestizaje be better understood not in a strict racial sense, as mere racial mixing, but in a cultural sense, as a transculturation characteristic of Latin American identities?
5. Would a cultural understanding of mestizaje avoid the risks of homogenization under whiteness?
6. Given Quijano’s analysis of the coloniality of power, how might cultural appropriation look like in Latin American contexts?

1. How is taste racialized in Vasconcelos’ ideal of mestizo culture
2. Vasconcelos’ mestizaje assumes racial essentialism. Can mestizaje avoid being construed on racial essentialism?
3. Can a reading of Vasconcelos’ mestizaje as cultural integration avoid the issues?
4. How might Vasconcelos’ understanding of mestizaje and race hinder, rather than promote, racial justice?
5. Vasconcelos partly aims at unifying Latin American identity. Is it unproblematic to talk about a Latin American culture characterized by mestizaje?
   

1. How is taste racialized in Vasconcelos’ ideal of mestizo culture
2. Vasconcelos’ mestizaje assumes racial essentialism. Can mestizaje avoid being construed on racial essentialism?
3. Can a reading of Vasconcelos’ mestizaje as cultural integration avoid the issues?
4. How might Vasconcelos’ understanding of mestizaje and race hinder, rather than promote, racial justice?
5. Vasconcelos partly aims at unifying Latin American identity. Is it unproblematic to talk about a Latin American culture characterized by mestizaje?
   

1. The dialectical process described by Villoro centres the mestizo. What does this mean for Indigenous identities?
2. What role do aesthetic practices play in the presumed revalorization of Indigenous identities by Indigenismo?
3. What do Indigenista aesthetic practices look like?
4. Should integration be the aim of multicultural States?
5. Is integration consistent with anti-racist commitments that seek to achieve justice for Indigenous peoples?
6. If integration of Indigenous peoples cannot be done without marginalizing them, how can mestizos construct their identity? What alternatives are there?
7. Could an understanding of mestizo identity as being in-between rather than as including and overcoming Indigenous identities avoid the issues? Mexican existentialist Emilio Uranga, for example, uses the Nahuatl concept of Nepantla to designate the sense of being in-between characteristic of mestizo identities.
   

1. The dialectical process described by Villoro centres the mestizo. What does this mean for Indigenous identities?
2. What role do aesthetic practices play in the presumed revalorization of Indigenous identities by Indigenismo?
3. What do Indigenista aesthetic practices look like?
4. Should integration be the aim of multicultural States?
5. Is integration consistent with anti-racist commitments that seek to achieve justice for Indigenous peoples?
6. If integration of Indigenous peoples cannot be done without marginalizing them, how can mestizos construct their identity? What alternatives are there?
7. Could an understanding of mestizo identity as being in-between rather than as including and overcoming Indigenous identities avoid the issues? Mexican existentialist Emilio Uranga, for example, uses the Nahuatl concept of Nepantla to designate the sense of being in-between characteristic of mestizo identities.
   

1. How does Castellanos’ Indigenismo fit within the dialectical process identified by Villoro?
2. What characterises the in-betweenness of mestizas in Castellanos’ Indigenismo?
3. Does the emphasis on solitude in Tarica’s analysis of Castellano’s protagonist avoid the problems of certain versions of Indigenismo?
4. What can this analysis illuminate about the situation of mestizas, and women more generally, in the coloniality of power?
5. What can this analysis illuminate about the situation of Indigenous women in particular in Latin American societies?

1. How does Castellanos’ Indigenismo fit within the dialectical process identified by Villoro?
2. What characterises the in-betweenness of mestizas in Castellanos’ Indigenismo?
3. Does the emphasis on solitude in Tarica’s analysis of Castellano’s protagonist avoid the problems of certain versions of Indigenismo?
4. What can this analysis illuminate about the situation of mestizas, and women more generally, in the coloniality of power?
5. What can this analysis illuminate about the situation of Indigenous women in particular in Latin American societies?

1. In what sense are aesthetics and politics interlinked in Mariátegui’s criticism of literature?
2. What is his criticism of critical hegemony behind the Latin American literary canon?
3. How might the process of formation of Peruvian literature relate to Villoro’s description of the three moments of Indigenismo in Mexico?
4. How is the white-Eurocentric mestizaje reflected in the different periods of Peruvian literature identified by Mariátegui?
5. In what sense does César Vallejo embody “genuine Americanism”, according to Mariátegui?
6. How does Mariátegui understand Indigenismo?
7. How might Quijano’s coloniality of power explain Mariátegui’s anti-Black attitudes?

1. In what sense are aesthetics and politics interlinked in Mariátegui’s criticism of literature?
2. What is his criticism of critical hegemony behind the Latin American literary canon?
3. How might the process of formation of Peruvian literature relate to Villoro’s description of the three moments of Indigenismo in Mexico?
4. How is the white-Eurocentric mestizaje reflected in the different periods of Peruvian literature identified by Mariátegui?
5. In what sense does César Vallejo embody “genuine Americanism”, according to Mariátegui?
6. How does Mariátegui understand Indigenismo?
7. How might Quijano’s coloniality of power explain Mariátegui’s anti-Black attitudes?

1. How can Quijano’s coloniality of power help explain the lack of recognition of Afro-Latin communities as distinct cultural groups?
2. What role does the lack of recognition of Black aesthetics in Latin America play in this erasure?
3. If Latin American aesthetic practices have recognizable roots in the African diaspora, what has driven the difference in the role Blackness and Indigenous identities play in the constitution of mestizo identity?
4. How does the lack of recognition of Black aesthetics in Latin America contribute to the invisibility of Afro-Latin communities both in Latin American countries and in Latinx communities in the U.S.?
5. Given the cultural diversity of the African diaspora, how should we interpret this call for recognition of distinct Afro-Latin groups? Should it be interpreted as a call for recognizing a pan-Afro-Latin identity, similar to some understandings of mestizo identity (like Vasconcelos’)?

1. How can Quijano’s coloniality of power help explain the lack of recognition of Afro-Latin communities as distinct cultural groups?
2. What role does the lack of recognition of Black aesthetics in Latin America play in this erasure?
3. If Latin American aesthetic practices have recognizable roots in the African diaspora, what has driven the difference in the role Blackness and Indigenous identities play in the constitution of mestizo identity?
4. How does the lack of recognition of Black aesthetics in Latin America contribute to the invisibility of Afro-Latin communities both in Latin American countries and in Latinx communities in the U.S.?
5. Given the cultural diversity of the African diaspora, how should we interpret this call for recognition of distinct Afro-Latin groups? Should it be interpreted as a call for recognizing a pan-Afro-Latin identity, similar to some understandings of mestizo identity (like Vasconcelos’)?

1. In what sense do we find in negrista poetry anti-Black attitudes? How have they evolved?
2. Does the representation of Afro-Latin women involve racist attitudes directed specifically at Black women? Has this representation evolved in Latin American poetry?
3. Contrast representations of Indigenous peoples in Indigenismo with representations of Afro-Latin communities in mestizo identity. What is the difference?
4. Mestizo identity is characterised as displaced insofar as it emerges in between Spanish and Indigenous cultures. Is Afro-Latin identity also characteristically displaced in the same way?
5. Isn’t there a tension between Hooker’s claim that Afro-Latin communities are not recognised as distinct cultural groups, and the exoticization of Afro-Latin communities in/through art as examined by Carter? How can these claims be consistent?

1. In what sense do we find in negrista poetry anti-Black attitudes? How have they evolved?
2. Does the representation of Afro-Latin women involve racist attitudes directed specifically at Black women? Has this representation evolved in Latin American poetry?
3. Contrast representations of Indigenous peoples in Indigenismo with representations of Afro-Latin communities in mestizo identity. What is the difference?
4. Mestizo identity is characterised as displaced insofar as it emerges in between Spanish and Indigenous cultures. Is Afro-Latin identity also characteristically displaced in the same way?
5. Isn’t there a tension between Hooker’s claim that Afro-Latin communities are not recognised as distinct cultural groups, and the exoticization of Afro-Latin communities in/through art as examined by Carter? How can these claims be consistent?

1. How might we analyse the erasure of Latin America’s third root in light of the coloniality of power?
2. How do issues related to the African diaspora in Latin America relate to issues that emerge from Indigenismo?
3. How can mestizo culture acknowledge its African heritage without engaging in appropriation that contributes to the marginalization of Afro-Latin communities?
4. Could Vasconcelos’ cosmic race be rehabilitated to counteract a notion of mestizaje that leaves out the contributions of the African diaspora to analyse mestizo identity merely in light of Spanish and Indigenous cultures?
5. How does the notion of mestizaje look like once Afro-Latin cultures are acknowledged?
6. Should we speak of mestizo consciousness as being in-between three different identities?
7. What would that mean for Afro-Latin identities?

1. How might we analyse the erasure of Latin America’s third root in light of the coloniality of power?
2. How do issues related to the African diaspora in Latin America relate to issues that emerge from Indigenismo?
3. How can mestizo culture acknowledge its African heritage without engaging in appropriation that contributes to the marginalization of Afro-Latin communities?
4. Could Vasconcelos’ cosmic race be rehabilitated to counteract a notion of mestizaje that leaves out the contributions of the African diaspora to analyse mestizo identity merely in light of Spanish and Indigenous cultures?
5. How does the notion of mestizaje look like once Afro-Latin cultures are acknowledged?
6. Should we speak of mestizo consciousness as being in-between three different identities?
7. What would that mean for Afro-Latin identities?

1. By displacing Vasconcelos’ ideal of mestizaje from the Latin American context that is constituted by the coloniality of power, and by using it to analyse the situation of Latinx populations in USA, can Anzaldúa overcome the criticisms faced by Vasconcelos’ cosmic race?
2. Can Anzaldúa’s nueva mestiza preserve a distinction between mestizo, Indigenous, and Afro Latin identities? Should it?
3. How does Anzaldúa’s intersectional analysis of mestiza culture relate to Castellanos’ protagonist who is doubly displaced?
4. Given that Anzaldúa’s nueva mestiza is not only in-between in the sense of not being Indigenous, nor Black, nor white, but in the sense of being Mexican-American, should we identify in the nueva mestiza a third displacement?
5. Given the different dimensions of displacement of mestizas in the U.S. context and in the Latin American context, should we treat them as a different kind of mestizo consciousness?
6. What can they illuminate about each other?

1. By displacing Vasconcelos’ ideal of mestizaje from the Latin American context that is constituted by the coloniality of power, and by using it to analyse the situation of Latinx populations in USA, can Anzaldúa overcome the criticisms faced by Vasconcelos’ cosmic race?
2. Can Anzaldúa’s nueva mestiza preserve a distinction between mestizo, Indigenous, and Afro Latin identities? Should it?
3. How does Anzaldúa’s intersectional analysis of mestiza culture relate to Castellanos’ protagonist who is doubly displaced?
4. Given that Anzaldúa’s nueva mestiza is not only in-between in the sense of not being Indigenous, nor Black, nor white, but in the sense of being Mexican-American, should we identify in the nueva mestiza a third displacement?
5. Given the different dimensions of displacement of mestizas in the U.S. context and in the Latin American context, should we treat them as a different kind of mestizo consciousness?
6. What can they illuminate about each other?

1. How might the Chicana/o movement’s emphasis on mestizaje contribute to the invisibility of Afro-Latinxs in the U.S.?
2. Chicana artists and writers posit mestiza consciousness in opposition to a dominant culture: white Americans. This might be helpful when examining Latinx identities in the U.S. But how can their analysis translate to Latin American societies in which mestizaje was partly conceived (either implicitly or explicitly) as being at the service of whiteness and as helping sustain the coloniality of power?
3. Can Chicana’s nueva mestiza help rehabilitate mestizaje in a way that serves Indigenous and Afro-Latin communities?
4. Why does Pérez place special attention to the spiritual dimension of the work by Chicana writers and artists?
5. Does this emphasis on spirituality risk appropriating Indigenous cultures by non-Indigenous Mexican-Americans?
6. How can it avoid falling trap to the excesses of Indigenismo?

1. How might the Chicana/o movement’s emphasis on mestizaje contribute to the invisibility of Afro-Latinxs in the U.S.?
2. Chicana artists and writers posit mestiza consciousness in opposition to a dominant culture: white Americans. This might be helpful when examining Latinx identities in the U.S. But how can their analysis translate to Latin American societies in which mestizaje was partly conceived (either implicitly or explicitly) as being at the service of whiteness and as helping sustain the coloniality of power?
3. Can Chicana’s nueva mestiza help rehabilitate mestizaje in a way that serves Indigenous and Afro-Latin communities?
4. Why does Pérez place special attention to the spiritual dimension of the work by Chicana writers and artists?
5. Does this emphasis on spirituality risk appropriating Indigenous cultures by non-Indigenous Mexican-Americans?
6. How can it avoid falling trap to the excesses of Indigenismo?

Publisher's Note: This classic work, first published in France in 1955, profoundly influenced the generation of scholars and activists at the forefront of liberation struggles in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Nearly twenty years later, when published for the first time in English, Discourse on Colonialism inspired a new generation engaged in the Civil Rights, Black Power, and anti-war movements and has sold more than 75,000 copies to date.

Aimé Césaire eloquently describes the brutal impact of capitalism and colonialism on both the colonizer and colonized, exposing the contradictions and hypocrisy implicit in western notions of "progress" and "civilization" upon encountering the "savage," "uncultured," or "primitive." Here, Césaire reaffirms African values, identity, and culture, and their relevance, reminding us that "the relationship between consciousness and reality are extremely complex. . . . It is equally necessary to decolonize our minds, our inner life, at the same time that we decolonize society."

1. Throughout Discourse on Colonialism, Césaire uses images of decay to describe European or Western civilisation. In the sections you are reading, he talks about it as a “stricken” and “dying” civilisation (p.31) and likens every act of brutality perpetuated by Europeans to a “gangrene” that spreads throughout Western civilisation as a whole. What do you think Césaire means by this image? What effect does it have on the reader?
2. Césaire writes: “The colonialists may kill in Indochina, torture in Madagascar, and imprison in Black Africa, crack down in the West Indies. Henceforth the colonised know that they have an advantage over them. They know their temporary ‘masters’ are lying” (p.32). Why does Césaire suggest the colonialists are lying? Why does this give the colonised an “advantage over [the colonisers]”?
3. What connections does Césaire draw between Nazism and colonialism? Why does he suggest that every “humanistic … Christian bourgeois of the twentieth century … has a Hitler inside him” (p.36)?
4. What implications follow from Césaire’s claim that “no one colonises innocently” (p.39)? How might this change the way we examine the legacy of colonial practices today?
5. What is the “boomerang effect of colonisation” (p.41) that Césaire diagnoses?
6. What does Césaire mean by the phrase “Colonialism = thingification”? How does this relate to his discussion of the psychological effects of colonialism on both the coloniser and the colonised?
7. What values does Césaire suggest we can find in pre-colonial non-European civilizations? What role do you think these values play in his wider argument?
8. On the one hand, Césaire explicitly details the destructive power of Western colonialism, such that entire cultures and civilisations have been eradicated as a result of its On the other, Césaire defends the values of pre-colonial non-European civilisations (see p.44-46). Do you think this points to a tension within Césaire’s argument? If so, how might we resolve it? If not, why not?

1. Throughout Discourse on Colonialism, Césaire uses images of decay to describe European or Western civilisation. In the sections you are reading, he talks about it as a “stricken” and “dying” civilisation (p.31) and likens every act of brutality perpetuated by Europeans to a “gangrene” that spreads throughout Western civilisation as a whole. What do you think Césaire means by this image? What effect does it have on the reader?
2. Césaire writes: “The colonialists may kill in Indochina, torture in Madagascar, and imprison in Black Africa, crack down in the West Indies. Henceforth the colonised know that they have an advantage over them. They know their temporary ‘masters’ are lying” (p.32). Why does Césaire suggest the colonialists are lying? Why does this give the colonised an “advantage over [the colonisers]”?
3. What connections does Césaire draw between Nazism and colonialism? Why does he suggest that every “humanistic … Christian bourgeois of the twentieth century … has a Hitler inside him” (p.36)?
4. What implications follow from Césaire’s claim that “no one colonises innocently” (p.39)? How might this change the way we examine the legacy of colonial practices today?
5. What is the “boomerang effect of colonisation” (p.41) that Césaire diagnoses?
6. What does Césaire mean by the phrase “Colonialism = thingification”? How does this relate to his discussion of the psychological effects of colonialism on both the coloniser and the colonised?
7. What values does Césaire suggest we can find in pre-colonial non-European civilizations? What role do you think these values play in his wider argument?
8. On the one hand, Césaire explicitly details the destructive power of Western colonialism, such that entire cultures and civilisations have been eradicated as a result of its On the other, Césaire defends the values of pre-colonial non-European civilisations (see p.44-46). Do you think this points to a tension within Césaire’s argument? If so, how might we resolve it? If not, why not?

A national bestseller when it first appeared in 1963, The Fire Next Time galvanized the nation and gave passionate voice to the emerging civil rights movement. At once a powerful evocation of James Baldwin’s early life in Harlem and a disturbing examination of the consequences of racial injustice, the book is an intensely personal and provocative document. It consists of two “letters,” written on the occasion of the centennial of the Emancipation Proclamation, that exhort Americans, both black and white, to attack the terrible legacy of racism. Described by The New York Times Book Review as “sermon, ultimatum, confession, deposition, testament, and chronicle…all presented in searing, brilliant prose,” The Fire Next Time stands as a classic of our literature.

1. With respect to the religious journey of Baldwin:
   • What made him enter the ‘church racket’ (p.6) and get indoctrinated in Christianity?
   • What was his subsequent understanding of the historical role that Christianity played ‘in the realm of power and in the realm of morals’?
2. “The white God has not delivered them; perhaps the Black God ” (p.12). How would one describe Baldwin’s conception of God?
3. “…this leads, imperceptibly but inevitably, to a state of mind in which, having long ago learned to expect the worst, one finds it very easy to believe the worst”
   • Why does Baldwin consider not being able to believe ‘the humanity of white people is more real to them than their colour’ to be worst? What do we understand about Baldwin’s idea of love for people?
4. What was the initial impression Baldwin had of Elijah? Did the impression change? If yes then what was the revised impression of Elijah that Baldwin had?
5. “…the Negro has been formed by this nation…and does not belong to any other — not to Africa, and certainly not to Islam.” (p. 16)
   • Why does the identity of the Black Americans not belong to Africa and Islam?
   • Why does Baldwin claim that only a radical change in the constitution of American social and political structure can bring a real change in the life of a Black American? Do you believe that radical change in the social-political structure has occurred?
6. What is the definition of ‘tokenism’ (p.18) that we get in the text? What are its material causes and consequences?
   • Against the idea of tokenism, how does Baldwin envisage freedom?
7. “…a vast amount of the white anguish is rooted in the white man’s equally profound need to be seen as he is, to be released from the tyranny of his mirror.” (p.19)
   • What, according to the text, was Baldwin’s diagnosis of the problem in America? What does the idea of the mirror evoke?
   • “To create one nation has proved to be a hideously difficult task; there is certainly no need now to create two, one black and one ’ (p. 20) How does Baldwin envision the creation of a new America?

1. With respect to the religious journey of Baldwin:
   • What made him enter the ‘church racket’ (p.6) and get indoctrinated in Christianity?
   • What was his subsequent understanding of the historical role that Christianity played ‘in the realm of power and in the realm of morals’?
2. “The white God has not delivered them; perhaps the Black God ” (p.12). How would one describe Baldwin’s conception of God?
3. “…this leads, imperceptibly but inevitably, to a state of mind in which, having long ago learned to expect the worst, one finds it very easy to believe the worst”
   • Why does Baldwin consider not being able to believe ‘the humanity of white people is more real to them than their colour’ to be worst? What do we understand about Baldwin’s idea of love for people?
4. What was the initial impression Baldwin had of Elijah? Did the impression change? If yes then what was the revised impression of Elijah that Baldwin had?
5. “…the Negro has been formed by this nation…and does not belong to any other — not to Africa, and certainly not to Islam.” (p. 16)
   • Why does the identity of the Black Americans not belong to Africa and Islam?
   • Why does Baldwin claim that only a radical change in the constitution of American social and political structure can bring a real change in the life of a Black American? Do you believe that radical change in the social-political structure has occurred?
6. What is the definition of ‘tokenism’ (p.18) that we get in the text? What are its material causes and consequences?
   • Against the idea of tokenism, how does Baldwin envisage freedom?
7. “…a vast amount of the white anguish is rooted in the white man’s equally profound need to be seen as he is, to be released from the tyranny of his mirror.” (p.19)
   • What, according to the text, was Baldwin’s diagnosis of the problem in America? What does the idea of the mirror evoke?
   • “To create one nation has proved to be a hideously difficult task; there is certainly no need now to create two, one black and one ’ (p. 20) How does Baldwin envision the creation of a new America?

More than three decades after its first publication, Edward Said's groundbreaking critique of the West's historical, cultural, and political perceptions of the East has become a modern classic.
In this wide-ranging, intellectually vigorous study, Said traces the origins of "orientalism" to the centuries-long period during which Europe dominated the Middle and Near East and, from its position of power, defined "the orient" simply as "other than" the occident. This entrenched view continues to dominate western ideas and, because it does not allow the East to represent itself, prevents true understanding. Essential, and still eye-opening, Orientalism remains one of the most important books written about our divided world.

1. What is the relationship between Orientalism and imperialism?
2. What does Said mean when he says ‘producing the Orient, politically, sociologically, militarily…’ (p.3)?
3. What is the Gramscian distinction between civil and political society? Express your views on whether you find the distinction helpful. How does the concept of ‘hegemony’ figure in the discourse? Why is it an important tool to understand the cultural life of the West?
4. “Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors.” Discuss the relationship between the overarching ideology of Orientalism and the contribution of individual works. What position does Said take in the debate? Do you agree with his position? Give reasons for your answer.
5. What is Said’s opinion on the ‘liberal consensus’ (p.10) about true, ‘non-political’ knowledge? Can there be non-political, pure knowledge in human sciences? State reasons for your agreement/disagreement.
6. What does Said mean when he says orientalism is ‘premised on exteriority’ (p.20)? How does the Orient rest on representation? In relation to this discuss briefly the politics of ‘representation’. (Discussion in greater detail available in chapter 1)
7. What special significance does ‘Islamic Orient’ add to the study of Orientalism, given contemporary geopolitics?

1. What is the relationship between Orientalism and imperialism?
2. What does Said mean when he says ‘producing the Orient, politically, sociologically, militarily…’ (p.3)?
3. What is the Gramscian distinction between civil and political society? Express your views on whether you find the distinction helpful. How does the concept of ‘hegemony’ figure in the discourse? Why is it an important tool to understand the cultural life of the West?
4. “Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors.” Discuss the relationship between the overarching ideology of Orientalism and the contribution of individual works. What position does Said take in the debate? Do you agree with his position? Give reasons for your answer.
5. What is Said’s opinion on the ‘liberal consensus’ (p.10) about true, ‘non-political’ knowledge? Can there be non-political, pure knowledge in human sciences? State reasons for your agreement/disagreement.
6. What does Said mean when he says orientalism is ‘premised on exteriority’ (p.20)? How does the Orient rest on representation? In relation to this discuss briefly the politics of ‘representation’. (Discussion in greater detail available in chapter 1)
7. What special significance does ‘Islamic Orient’ add to the study of Orientalism, given contemporary geopolitics?

What can philosophy contribute to African culture? What can it draw from it? Could there be a truly African philosophy that goes beyond traditional folk thought? Kwasi Wiredu tries in these essays to define and demonstrate a role for contemporary African philosophers which is distinctive but by no means parochial. He shows how they can assimilate the advances of analytical philosophy and apply them to the general social and intellectual changes associated with 'modernisation' and the transition to new national identities. But we see too how they can exploit traditional resources and test the assumptions of Western philosophy against the intimations of their own language and culture. The volume as a whole presents some of the best non-technical work of a distinguished African philosopher, of importance equally to professional philosophers and to those with a more general interest in contemporary African thought and culture.

1. How does the comparison between African philosophy and African versions of other disciplines, such as engineering, illuminate the problem Wiredu is grappling with?
2. What is the difference between the universalist and nationalist conceptions of African philosophy? What, for Wiredu, are the limitations of the nationalist conception?
3. Why does Wiredu suggest that traditional African philosophies are “pre-scientific”? Is this a distinct problem for African philosophy? Does the pre-scientific nature of traditional African philosophy mean that it should not be made the subject of further study?
4. What is Wiredu’s conception of philosophy in a technical sense? Why does Wiredu think that this conception of philosophy is useful for contemporary African society?Can philosophy, in Wiredu’s sense, be universal and, if so, in what ways?
   • Similarly, how are cultural considerations relevant for philosophical thinking? In answering this question, refer to Wiredu’s comments about the relationship between language and philosophy.
   • What implications do you think follow from this relationship between language and philosophy?
5. What is the definition of African philosophy Wiredu offers at the end of Chapter 2? Why does he suggest that this project is “urgent”?
6. What are the criticisms Wiredu advances against Western anthropologists who focus on the “pre-scientific characteristics of African traditional thought” (p.39)? What are the problematic consequences of such thinking for the perception of Africans by the West, as well as the self-image of Africans themselves? Can you draw any connections between Wiredu’s remarks here and the effects of colonialism discussed by Césaire?
7. How does Wiredu’s contrast between African and Western traditions of thought serve to undermine the binary opposition between a rational modern West and an irrational superstitious Africa?
8. How do you interpret Wiredu’s conception of development as a “continuing world- historical process” (p.43) in which all peoples are engaged? What are the advantages of conceptualising development in this way?
9. Towards the end of Chapter 3, Wiredu seems to suggest that a written tradition is necessary for possessing a philosophical heritage. Do you think this is fair or it does it unfairly marginalise oral traditions of philosophy as being ‘folk wisdom’?

1. How does the comparison between African philosophy and African versions of other disciplines, such as engineering, illuminate the problem Wiredu is grappling with?
2. What is the difference between the universalist and nationalist conceptions of African philosophy? What, for Wiredu, are the limitations of the nationalist conception?
3. Why does Wiredu suggest that traditional African philosophies are “pre-scientific”? Is this a distinct problem for African philosophy? Does the pre-scientific nature of traditional African philosophy mean that it should not be made the subject of further study?
4. What is Wiredu’s conception of philosophy in a technical sense? Why does Wiredu think that this conception of philosophy is useful for contemporary African society?Can philosophy, in Wiredu’s sense, be universal and, if so, in what ways?
   • Similarly, how are cultural considerations relevant for philosophical thinking? In answering this question, refer to Wiredu’s comments about the relationship between language and philosophy.
   • What implications do you think follow from this relationship between language and philosophy?
5. What is the definition of African philosophy Wiredu offers at the end of Chapter 2? Why does he suggest that this project is “urgent”?
6. What are the criticisms Wiredu advances against Western anthropologists who focus on the “pre-scientific characteristics of African traditional thought” (p.39)? What are the problematic consequences of such thinking for the perception of Africans by the West, as well as the self-image of Africans themselves? Can you draw any connections between Wiredu’s remarks here and the effects of colonialism discussed by Césaire?
7. How does Wiredu’s contrast between African and Western traditions of thought serve to undermine the binary opposition between a rational modern West and an irrational superstitious Africa?
8. How do you interpret Wiredu’s conception of development as a “continuing world- historical process” (p.43) in which all peoples are engaged? What are the advantages of conceptualising development in this way?
9. Towards the end of Chapter 3, Wiredu seems to suggest that a written tradition is necessary for possessing a philosophical heritage. Do you think this is fair or it does it unfairly marginalise oral traditions of philosophy as being ‘folk wisdom’?

1. What are the four different uses of the term ‘imperialism’ that Smith distinguishes between? What is the main difference between the fourth use of imperialism and the first three? Why is this significant?
2. What are the two main strands of critique offered by indigenous scholarship on imperialism and colonialism? Why do discussions of globalisation and post-colonialism pose new challenges for the ways indigenous communities “think and talk about imperialism” (p.24)?
3. How does Smith conceptualise the struggle to assert and claim humanity? What do you think Smith means by her suggestion that, for indigenous peoples, fragmentation is not “a phenomenon of postmodernism” but rather “the consequence of imperialism (p.28)”? What connections can you draw betweenthe ideas articulated in this section and the writings of Césaire?
4. What are the 9 interconnected ideas that Smith suggests are central to Western conceptions of history? What is the critique of this kind of history raised by post-colonial and indigenous theorists alike? Do you find her critique convincing? If so, why? If not, why not?
5. If history in its modern/Western construction is predicated on a sense of Otherness that marginalises indigenous peoples, how and why is history important for decolonisation? In answering this question, think about how Smith conceptualises the relationship between history and power, as well as what Smith means by “coming to know the past” (p.34) and what this entails for decolonisation efforts.
6. On page 36, Smith writes “Writing can also be dangerous because we reinforce and maintain a style of discourse which is never innocent”. What are some of the dangers she talks about, and how have indigenous and post-colonial theorists attempted to resist and push back?
7. In drawing on the work of Cherryl Smith and Edward Said, Linda Tuhiwai Smith highlights the importance of “‘writing back’ and simultaneously writing to ourselves” (p.37). How do you interpret this idea and what implications do you think it has for both writing and interpreting academic texts? Does it make you rethink the assumptions in your writing? Or does it reinforce concerns you may already have?
8. How and why is theory important for indigenous communities? What kind of theory development is necessary for indigenous communities, and what does this process entail?

1. What are the four different uses of the term ‘imperialism’ that Smith distinguishes between? What is the main difference between the fourth use of imperialism and the first three? Why is this significant?
2. What are the two main strands of critique offered by indigenous scholarship on imperialism and colonialism? Why do discussions of globalisation and post-colonialism pose new challenges for the ways indigenous communities “think and talk about imperialism” (p.24)?
3. How does Smith conceptualise the struggle to assert and claim humanity? What do you think Smith means by her suggestion that, for indigenous peoples, fragmentation is not “a phenomenon of postmodernism” but rather “the consequence of imperialism (p.28)”? What connections can you draw betweenthe ideas articulated in this section and the writings of Césaire?
4. What are the 9 interconnected ideas that Smith suggests are central to Western conceptions of history? What is the critique of this kind of history raised by post-colonial and indigenous theorists alike? Do you find her critique convincing? If so, why? If not, why not?
5. If history in its modern/Western construction is predicated on a sense of Otherness that marginalises indigenous peoples, how and why is history important for decolonisation? In answering this question, think about how Smith conceptualises the relationship between history and power, as well as what Smith means by “coming to know the past” (p.34) and what this entails for decolonisation efforts.
6. On page 36, Smith writes “Writing can also be dangerous because we reinforce and maintain a style of discourse which is never innocent”. What are some of the dangers she talks about, and how have indigenous and post-colonial theorists attempted to resist and push back?
7. In drawing on the work of Cherryl Smith and Edward Said, Linda Tuhiwai Smith highlights the importance of “‘writing back’ and simultaneously writing to ourselves” (p.37). How do you interpret this idea and what implications do you think it has for both writing and interpreting academic texts? Does it make you rethink the assumptions in your writing? Or does it reinforce concerns you may already have?
8. How and why is theory important for indigenous communities? What kind of theory development is necessary for indigenous communities, and what does this process entail?

1. What is understood by ‘Europe’? Is it a geographical identity or a historical and ideological category?
2. Why does the author think that European thought is both ‘indispensable and inadequate’ for understanding political modernity in a non-European country like India?
3. What is the meaning of historicism implied in the text? How did it turn into a political prescription to non-European peoples?
   • What was the response of the anticolonial movements to such an idea?
   • With respect to India, what could be considered as a national gesture of rejecting Mill’s historicist prescription? What tension did the Indian political modernity run into for making that gesture? (pp. 6-11)
4. How does subaltern historiography extend the meaning of ‘political’ by critiquing the standard binaries of ‘political’ and ‘pre-political’? Discuss with reference to the debate between Eric Hobsbawm and Ranajit Guha. (pp.12-15)
   • How does the binary division of political and pre-political lead us to a ‘stagist’ reading of history, and to the assumption that capitalism brings with it bourgeois power relations?
5. What are two strands of modern European social science?
   • How does a Marxist reading of history ‘occlude’ questions pertaining to belonging and diversity, thus producing an insufficient tool to read history? (p.18)
   • Was Marx himself clear about questions pertaining to History 2? (Discussions in greater detail available in chapter 2)

1. What is understood by ‘Europe’? Is it a geographical identity or a historical and ideological category?
2. Why does the author think that European thought is both ‘indispensable and inadequate’ for understanding political modernity in a non-European country like India?
3. What is the meaning of historicism implied in the text? How did it turn into a political prescription to non-European peoples?
   • What was the response of the anticolonial movements to such an idea?
   • With respect to India, what could be considered as a national gesture of rejecting Mill’s historicist prescription? What tension did the Indian political modernity run into for making that gesture? (pp. 6-11)
4. How does subaltern historiography extend the meaning of ‘political’ by critiquing the standard binaries of ‘political’ and ‘pre-political’? Discuss with reference to the debate between Eric Hobsbawm and Ranajit Guha. (pp.12-15)
   • How does the binary division of political and pre-political lead us to a ‘stagist’ reading of history, and to the assumption that capitalism brings with it bourgeois power relations?
5. What are two strands of modern European social science?
   • How does a Marxist reading of history ‘occlude’ questions pertaining to belonging and diversity, thus producing an insufficient tool to read history? (p.18)
   • Was Marx himself clear about questions pertaining to History 2? (Discussions in greater detail available in chapter 2)

Sylvia Wynter is a radical Jamaican theorist influenced, among others, by Frantz Fanon. This well known interview is often considered to be the best introduction to her thinking about the question of human in the aftermath of 1492 and the consequent racialisation of humanity.
Wynter rethinks dominant concepts of being human, arguing that they are based on a colonial and racialized model that divides the world into asymmetric categories such as "the selected and the dysselected", center and periphery, or colonizers and colonized. Against this Wynter proposes a new humanism. According to Katherine McKittrick Wynter develops a "counterhumanism", that breaks from the classification of humans in static, asymmetric categories.

1. At the bottom of page 174, Wynter says “I am suggesting that from the very origin of the modern world, of the Western world system, there were never simply ‘men’ and ‘women’. Rather there was, on the one hand Man, as invented in the sixteenth century by Europe, as Foucault notes, and then, on the other hand, Man’s human Others”. What do you think she means by this? What is the significance of this construction for Wynter’s argument?
2. In a similar vein, Wynter suggests that “at the beginning of the modern world, the only women were White and Western” (p.174). Why do you think Wynter specifically talks about the construction of women? What does this add to her analysis of the inherently exclusive conception of Man constructed by Western Europe in the modern period?
3. What is the dilemma that Wynter talks about confronting on page 175? How does ‘appreciating the West’s intellectual breakthroughs’ help to “transform their world”?
4. What is the relationship between “ethnoastronomies” and the ways in which old civilisations were ordered?
5. Wynter states that “Copernicus’s breakthrough could only have been made in the wake of the earlier humanists’ invention of a revalorized natural Man in the place of Christianity’s fallen creature” (p.176). What do you think Wynter means by this? How does a “revalorized natural Man” enable the scientific revolution driven by Copernicus? Why is this significant for the construction of human Others as the opposite of the West’s ‘rational Man’? Finally, how and why does this characterisation become “purely secular” (p.177) and biological?
6. Thinking back to Chakrabarty’s and Smith’s critiques of Western historicism, why does Wynter prefer to use the term “desupernaturalizing” or “de-godding” rather than “secular” to characterise the rising biological conception of Man?
7. Wynter argues that, in a medieval scholastic order of knowledge, “a lay intellectual … had to think in paradigms which served to confirm the hegemony of the church over the lay world” (p.178). What does this mean?
   • From this idea, Wynter draws on the writings of AiméCésaire and Jean-François Lyotard to suggest that the Human Other is conceptualised as “the name of what is evil”. How does this occur and why is this significant for Wynter’s argument?
   • How is the above related to Wynter’s suggestion that the current dominant paradigm of Man enabled the white Western world to see non-whites as racially inferior?
8. Does the change in the dominant conception of Man go directly from a theocentric religious conception to a biocentric one? Or is there a stage in between? If so, what is the in-between stage and how does it conceptualise the Human Other?
9. How does Wynter conceive the relationship between race and gender? How and why does Wynter see gender as an “emancipatory opening”? How do you think Wynter understands gender and how does it relate to her wider argument?

1. At the bottom of page 174, Wynter says “I am suggesting that from the very origin of the modern world, of the Western world system, there were never simply ‘men’ and ‘women’. Rather there was, on the one hand Man, as invented in the sixteenth century by Europe, as Foucault notes, and then, on the other hand, Man’s human Others”. What do you think she means by this? What is the significance of this construction for Wynter’s argument?
2. In a similar vein, Wynter suggests that “at the beginning of the modern world, the only women were White and Western” (p.174). Why do you think Wynter specifically talks about the construction of women? What does this add to her analysis of the inherently exclusive conception of Man constructed by Western Europe in the modern period?
3. What is the dilemma that Wynter talks about confronting on page 175? How does ‘appreciating the West’s intellectual breakthroughs’ help to “transform their world”?
4. What is the relationship between “ethnoastronomies” and the ways in which old civilisations were ordered?
5. Wynter states that “Copernicus’s breakthrough could only have been made in the wake of the earlier humanists’ invention of a revalorized natural Man in the place of Christianity’s fallen creature” (p.176). What do you think Wynter means by this? How does a “revalorized natural Man” enable the scientific revolution driven by Copernicus? Why is this significant for the construction of human Others as the opposite of the West’s ‘rational Man’? Finally, how and why does this characterisation become “purely secular” (p.177) and biological?
6. Thinking back to Chakrabarty’s and Smith’s critiques of Western historicism, why does Wynter prefer to use the term “desupernaturalizing” or “de-godding” rather than “secular” to characterise the rising biological conception of Man?
7. Wynter argues that, in a medieval scholastic order of knowledge, “a lay intellectual … had to think in paradigms which served to confirm the hegemony of the church over the lay world” (p.178). What does this mean?
   • From this idea, Wynter draws on the writings of AiméCésaire and Jean-François Lyotard to suggest that the Human Other is conceptualised as “the name of what is evil”. How does this occur and why is this significant for Wynter’s argument?
   • How is the above related to Wynter’s suggestion that the current dominant paradigm of Man enabled the white Western world to see non-whites as racially inferior?
8. Does the change in the dominant conception of Man go directly from a theocentric religious conception to a biocentric one? Or is there a stage in between? If so, what is the in-between stage and how does it conceptualise the Human Other?
9. How does Wynter conceive the relationship between race and gender? How and why does Wynter see gender as an “emancipatory opening”? How do you think Wynter understands gender and how does it relate to her wider argument?

Centering his analysis in the dynamic forces of modern East Asian history, Kuan-Hsing Chen recasts cultural studies as a politically urgent global endeavor. He argues that the intellectual and subjective work of decolonization begun across East Asia after the Second World War was stalled by the cold war. At the same time, the work of deimperialization became impossible to imagine in imperial centers such as Japan and the United States. Chen contends that it is now necessary to resume those tasks, and that decolonization, deimperialization, and an intellectual undoing of the cold war must proceed simultaneously. Combining postcolonial studies, globalization studies, and the emerging field of “Asian studies in Asia,” he insists that those on both sides of the imperial divide must assess the conduct, motives, and consequences of imperial histories.

Chen is one of the most important intellectuals working in East Asia today; his writing has been influential in Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and mainland China for the past fifteen years. As a founding member of the Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Society and its journal, he has helped to initiate change in the dynamics and intellectual orientation of the region, building a network that has facilitated inter-Asian connections. Asia as Method encapsulates Chen’s vision and activities within the increasingly “inter-referencing” East Asian intellectual community and charts necessary new directions for cultural studies.

1. What is the potential of Asia as method? From the remarks Chen makes at the start of the chapter, what do you think Asia as method entails?
2. What are some of the problems associated with both the idea of Asia as method and the Inter-Asia project that inspired it?
3. Why does Chen suggest that “due to historical constraints and current local differences, the general mood does not justify using Asia” as an “emotional signifier to call for regional integration and solidarity” (p.213)?
4. What is the relationship between “anxiety over the meaning of Asia” and the “politics of representation” (p.215)? What are the implications of this relationship for Asia as method? Why is this significant for Chen’s argument?
5. What does Chen mean by an “imaginary West” and what role has it played in Asian nationalist discourses? Thinking back to some of the earlier readings, what is the relationship between the West and forms of knowledge production? Why is this a problem for Chen?
6. What are the four strategies of “dealing with the West” Chen considers and how does he critique each of them? Thinking back to your reading of Dipesh Chakrabarty, are you convinced by Chen’s critique? If so, why? If not, why not?
7. Chen diagnoses a particular “predicament of postcolonial discourse” (p.222). What do you think Chen means by this? How does he attempt to move beyond it?
8. What are the similarities between Partha Chatterjee’s writings and Chen’s experiences in Taiwan? What is Chen’s idea of “shifting [the] points of reference” (p.225) and how does this inform his engagement with Chatterjee? How does shifting the points of reference collapse the “division between researcher and native informant” (p.227)?
9. Are you convinced that Asia as method can meaningfully “deal with the West”? Do you think it entails similar ideas in other parts of the world, such as Africa as method or Latin America as method? If so, what implications follow for political philosophy and/or political science?

1. What is the potential of Asia as method? From the remarks Chen makes at the start of the chapter, what do you think Asia as method entails?
2. What are some of the problems associated with both the idea of Asia as method and the Inter-Asia project that inspired it?
3. Why does Chen suggest that “due to historical constraints and current local differences, the general mood does not justify using Asia” as an “emotional signifier to call for regional integration and solidarity” (p.213)?
4. What is the relationship between “anxiety over the meaning of Asia” and the “politics of representation” (p.215)? What are the implications of this relationship for Asia as method? Why is this significant for Chen’s argument?
5. What does Chen mean by an “imaginary West” and what role has it played in Asian nationalist discourses? Thinking back to some of the earlier readings, what is the relationship between the West and forms of knowledge production? Why is this a problem for Chen?
6. What are the four strategies of “dealing with the West” Chen considers and how does he critique each of them? Thinking back to your reading of Dipesh Chakrabarty, are you convinced by Chen’s critique? If so, why? If not, why not?
7. Chen diagnoses a particular “predicament of postcolonial discourse” (p.222). What do you think Chen means by this? How does he attempt to move beyond it?
8. What are the similarities between Partha Chatterjee’s writings and Chen’s experiences in Taiwan? What is Chen’s idea of “shifting [the] points of reference” (p.225) and how does this inform his engagement with Chatterjee? How does shifting the points of reference collapse the “division between researcher and native informant” (p.227)?
9. Are you convinced that Asia as method can meaningfully “deal with the West”? Do you think it entails similar ideas in other parts of the world, such as Africa as method or Latin America as method? If so, what implications follow for political philosophy and/or political science?

Decolonizing Universalism develops a genuinely anti-imperialist feminism. Against relativism/universalism debates that ask feminists to either reject normativity or reduce feminism to a Western conceit, Khader's nonideal universalism rediscovers the normative core of feminism in opposition to sexist oppression and reimagines the role of moral ideals in transnational feminist praxis.

1. The terms ‘Western’ and ‘Northern’ appear frequently in the text. (a) Do the words refer to the same idea? If not, then what is the difference? (pp. 16-17; pp.18-19)
   • Why does the author levy the charge of ethnocentrism against what they call ‘Western’ universalism?
   • What position does the author take against that brand of universalism? Is it relativism or is it any other conception of universalism?
2. “Anti- imperialist feminisms, in my view, contain substantive normative claims.” (p.3)
   • What is the substantive normative claim of the anti-imperialist feminism?
   • How is this normative claim different from that of the Enlightenment liberalist/ universalist claim of normativity?
3. “…according to the Enlightenment liberal retelling of history, moral progress means the erosion of community and tradition that the West has ostensibly already achieved.” (p.5)
   • Do Chakrabarty’s ideas of ‘historicism’ and the ‘imaginary waiting room of history’ shed some light on this understanding of history?
4. What are the ‘specific values’ that the author wishes to examine in the book? Discuss in brief how the author engages with the values. (pp. 7-10) State your views about the discussions. (Discussions in greater detail are available in chapters – 2, 3, 4)
5. With respect to feminist solidarity and praxis:
   • How does the author qualify the notion of ‘positive ideals’?
   • How must we understand the goods of human rights, and generally the universal indicators of advantage and disadvantage? (pp. 11-12)
6. The stated feminist position challenges the conventions and methodology of Anglo- American political philosophy in three distinct and important ways. Discuss briefly each of them and register your own response to those.
7. How does the stated feminist position interact with the notion of intersectionality of oppression? Do you agree that the expressed position is compatible with the intersectionality thesis or is the latter at odds with the former?

1. The terms ‘Western’ and ‘Northern’ appear frequently in the text. (a) Do the words refer to the same idea? If not, then what is the difference? (pp. 16-17; pp.18-19)
   • Why does the author levy the charge of ethnocentrism against what they call ‘Western’ universalism?
   • What position does the author take against that brand of universalism? Is it relativism or is it any other conception of universalism?
2. “Anti- imperialist feminisms, in my view, contain substantive normative claims.” (p.3)
   • What is the substantive normative claim of the anti-imperialist feminism?
   • How is this normative claim different from that of the Enlightenment liberalist/ universalist claim of normativity?
3. “…according to the Enlightenment liberal retelling of history, moral progress means the erosion of community and tradition that the West has ostensibly already achieved.” (p.5)
   • Do Chakrabarty’s ideas of ‘historicism’ and the ‘imaginary waiting room of history’ shed some light on this understanding of history?
4. What are the ‘specific values’ that the author wishes to examine in the book? Discuss in brief how the author engages with the values. (pp. 7-10) State your views about the discussions. (Discussions in greater detail are available in chapters – 2, 3, 4)
5. With respect to feminist solidarity and praxis:
   • How does the author qualify the notion of ‘positive ideals’?
   • How must we understand the goods of human rights, and generally the universal indicators of advantage and disadvantage? (pp. 11-12)
6. The stated feminist position challenges the conventions and methodology of Anglo- American political philosophy in three distinct and important ways. Discuss briefly each of them and register your own response to those.
7. How does the stated feminist position interact with the notion of intersectionality of oppression? Do you agree that the expressed position is compatible with the intersectionality thesis or is the latter at odds with the former?

The paper begins from a working definition of caste as a contentious form of social belonging and a consideration of casteism as a form of inferiorization. It takes anti-casteism as an ideological critique aimed at unmasking the unethical operations of caste, drawing upon B. R. Ambedkar’s notion of caste as ‘graded inequality’. The politico-legal context of the unfinished trajectory of instituting protection against caste discrimination in Britain provides the backdrop for thinking through the philosophical foundations of anti-casteism. The peculiar religio-discursive aspect of ‘emergent vulnerability’ is noted, which explains the recent introduction of the trope of ‘institutional casteism’ used as a shield by deniers of caste against accusations of casteism. The language of protest historically introduced by anti-racists is thus usurped and inverted in a simulated language of anti-colonialism. It is suggested that the stymieing of the UK legislation on caste is an effect of collective hypocrisies, the refusal to acknowledge caste privilege, and the continuity of an agonistic intellectual inheritance, exemplified in the deep differences between Ambedkar and Gandhi in the Indian nationalist discourse on caste. The paper argues that for a modern anti-casteism to develop, at stake is the possibility of an ethical social solidarity. Following Ambedkar, this expansive solidarity can only be found through our willingness to subject received opinions and traditions to critical scrutiny. Since opposed groups ‘make sense’ of their worlds in ways that might generate collective hypocrisies of denial of caste effects, anti-casteism must be geared to expose the lie that caste as the system of graded inequality is benign and seamlessly self-perpetuating, when it is everywhere enforced through penalties for transgression of local caste norms with the complicity of the privileged castes. The ideal for modern anti-casteism is Maitri formed through praxis, eschewing birth-ascribed caste status and loyalties.

1. What is caste? Is a perfect definition possible? If not, what are ways to identify caste and the practice of casteism or caste discrimination? Does the notion of caste interact with the notion of class? If so, how?
2. What is the connection between Colonialism and Casteism? Take into consideration viewpoints of deniers of caste discrimination as well as that of anti-casteists.
3. Discuss the nature of relationship between the supposedly ‘amoral’ capitalist market and caste norms. Has the market been able to dissolve caste or is it entrenching caste divisions?
4. What do we understand about Gandhi’s idea of caste and casteism?
   • What contradiction does Gandhi run into while describing the caste system?
5. What is the notion of morality, inspired from Buddhism, that Ambedkar endorses?
   • What is ‘anti-social morality’ and how is it different from the morality that Ambedkar propounds?
   • Express your opinions on the two conceptions of morality.
6. How does caste and casteism figure in the rubric of Britain’s ‘multi-ethnic’ politics and specifically in its legal discourse?

1. What is caste? Is a perfect definition possible? If not, what are ways to identify caste and the practice of casteism or caste discrimination? Does the notion of caste interact with the notion of class? If so, how?
2. What is the connection between Colonialism and Casteism? Take into consideration viewpoints of deniers of caste discrimination as well as that of anti-casteists.
3. Discuss the nature of relationship between the supposedly ‘amoral’ capitalist market and caste norms. Has the market been able to dissolve caste or is it entrenching caste divisions?
4. What do we understand about Gandhi’s idea of caste and casteism?
   • What contradiction does Gandhi run into while describing the caste system?
5. What is the notion of morality, inspired from Buddhism, that Ambedkar endorses?
   • What is ‘anti-social morality’ and how is it different from the morality that Ambedkar propounds?
   • Express your opinions on the two conceptions of morality.
6. How does caste and casteism figure in the rubric of Britain’s ‘multi-ethnic’ politics and specifically in its legal discourse?

From: Sophie Oluwole: Celebrating the Radical Spirit of African Philosophy, By Tunji Olaopa

In Philosophy and Oral Tradition (1997), Sophie Oluwole urges us to return to Africa’s oral tradition as the source of excavating an authentic foundation of Africa’s intellectual culture which the West has tried so hard to undermine and destroy. One argument that underlies the relevance of Africa’s oral tradition is that the traditional and cultural practices of the past must have been guided by some form of logic and rational principles which not only predate the Western scientific canon, but which cannot also be subsumed totally under it. 

A source of tension between Philosophers of Mathematics and Mathematicians is the fact that each group feels ignored by the other; daily mathematical practice seems barely affected by the questions the Philosophers are considering. In this talk I will describe an issue that does have an impact on mathematical practice, and a philosophical stance on mathematics that is detectable in the work of practising mathematicians. No doubt controversially, I will call this issue ‘morality’, but the term is not of my coining: there are mathematicians across the world who use the word ‘morally’ to great effect in private, and I propose that there should be a public theory of what they mean by this. The issue arises because proofs, despite being revered as the backbone of mathematical truth, often contribute very little to a mathematician’s understanding. ‘Moral’ considerations, however, contribute a great deal. I will first describe what these ‘moral’ considerations might be, and why mathematicians have appropriated the word ‘morality’ for this notion. However, not all mathematicians are concerned with such notions, and I will give a characterisation of ‘moralist’ mathematics and ‘moralist’ mathematicians, and discuss the development of ‘morality’ in individuals and in mathematics as a whole. Finally, I will propose a theory for standardising or universalising a system of mathematical morality, and discuss how this might help in the development of good mathematics.

1. Cheng complains about philosophy of mathematics having no relevance to mathematical practice, and even gives a short dialogue featuring an obstinate philosopher. What do you think the impact of philosophy of mathematics on mathematics should be?
2. What is Cheng’s notion of “mathematical moral truth”? Do you think it picks out a robust phenomenon?
3. Cheng says morality is about “how mathematics ought to behave”. What kind of normativity do you think she has in mind?
4. What is the connection between expertise and feelings of mathematical morality?
5. Should/would a mathematician on a desert island do mathematics differently?

1. Cheng complains about philosophy of mathematics having no relevance to mathematical practice, and even gives a short dialogue featuring an obstinate philosopher. What do you think the impact of philosophy of mathematics on mathematics should be?
2. What is Cheng’s notion of “mathematical moral truth”? Do you think it picks out a robust phenomenon?
3. Cheng says morality is about “how mathematics ought to behave”. What kind of normativity do you think she has in mind?
4. What is the connection between expertise and feelings of mathematical morality?
5. Should/would a mathematician on a desert island do mathematics differently?

1. Which of the listed qualities of good mathematics would benefit most from philosophical analysis?
2. Are some qualities of good mathematics more important than others?
3. Do you think mathematicians would agree on how to apply the various qualities? For example, would they agree on what counts as: rigorous maths? good pedagogy? mathematical beauty? good taste?
4. Do you agree with Tao that the standards of good mathematics in a field should be constantly debated and updated? Or do there exist eternal standards of good mathematics?

1. Which of the listed qualities of good mathematics would benefit most from philosophical analysis?
2. Are some qualities of good mathematics more important than others?
3. Do you think mathematicians would agree on how to apply the various qualities? For example, would they agree on what counts as: rigorous maths? good pedagogy? mathematical beauty? good taste?
4. Do you agree with Tao that the standards of good mathematics in a field should be constantly debated and updated? Or do there exist eternal standards of good mathematics?

1. People often talk of proofs giving an unusual sense of certainty in what they prove, that it can be no other way. Can this be reconciled with De Toffoli’s fallibilist account?
2. Do you think proofs should be shareable?
3. De Toffoli says an argument that is convincing for aliens might not be shareable with humans. How do you think alien proofs might be different from human ones?
4. Is having a simil-proof enough to justify a mathematical belief?
5. Will what counts as a proof change over time? What about what counts as a simil-proof?

1. People often talk of proofs giving an unusual sense of certainty in what they prove, that it can be no other way. Can this be reconciled with De Toffoli’s fallibilist account?
2. Do you think proofs should be shareable?
3. De Toffoli says an argument that is convincing for aliens might not be shareable with humans. How do you think alien proofs might be different from human ones?
4. Is having a simil-proof enough to justify a mathematical belief?
5. Will what counts as a proof change over time? What about what counts as a simil-proof?

We investigate the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions for the case of mathematical knowledge. The availability of a formalizable mathematical proof appears to be a natural criterion:

(*) X knows that p is true iff X has available a formalizable proof of p.

Yet, formalizability plays no major role in actual mathematical practice. We present results of an empirical study, which suggest that certain readings of (*) are not necessarily employed by mathematicians when ascribing knowledge. Further, we argue that the concept of mathematical knowledge underlying the actual use of “to know” in mathematical practice is compatible with certain philosophical intuitions, but seems to differ from philosophical knowledge conceptions underlying (*).

1. Why do you think mathematicians might say they believe one thing, while applying different standards in practice?
2. How surprising are the findings?
3. What do Müller-Hill’s results mean for the nature of mathematical knowledge?
   

1. Why do you think mathematicians might say they believe one thing, while applying different standards in practice?
2. How surprising are the findings?
3. What do Müller-Hill’s results mean for the nature of mathematical knowledge?
   

1. What are some of the ways that expertise is important in mathematics? What might it mean to be an expert mathematician?
2. How important is it for maths papers to go through peer review?
3. Should mathematicians rely on testimony? When is it acceptable to do so?
4. Should mathematicians be epistemically autonomous? Under what circumstances?
5. What reasons can you think of that someone might claim to have checked a proof when they actually haven’t?

1. What are some of the ways that expertise is important in mathematics? What might it mean to be an expert mathematician?
2. How important is it for maths papers to go through peer review?
3. Should mathematicians rely on testimony? When is it acceptable to do so?
4. Should mathematicians be epistemically autonomous? Under what circumstances?
5. What reasons can you think of that someone might claim to have checked a proof when they actually haven’t?

1. Do mathematicians have a special level of agreement?
2. These results do not fit well with the general view that a piece of reasoning is either a proof or it isn’t. What do these results mean for the nature of proof?

1. Do mathematicians have a special level of agreement?
2. These results do not fit well with the general view that a piece of reasoning is either a proof or it isn’t. What do these results mean for the nature of proof?

1. Easwaran discusses mathematical discovery, from students solving homework questions to mathematicians working on open problems, as a process of defeasible reasoning. Can we ever get certainty from mathematics on this picture?
2. Should proofs be transferable? Should they be convertible? What reasons might there be to reject this?
3. Easwaran links his notion of transferability to the intellectual virtue of epistemic autonomy (like Andersen et al. did above). What other intellectual virtues might it link to?
4. If convertibility is incompatible with relying on testimony in mathematics, is one of them more important than the other? Which would you rather give up?
5. In what ways can mistaken proofs still be valuable?
   

1. Easwaran discusses mathematical discovery, from students solving homework questions to mathematicians working on open problems, as a process of defeasible reasoning. Can we ever get certainty from mathematics on this picture?
2. Should proofs be transferable? Should they be convertible? What reasons might there be to reject this?
3. Easwaran links his notion of transferability to the intellectual virtue of epistemic autonomy (like Andersen et al. did above). What other intellectual virtues might it link to?
4. If convertibility is incompatible with relying on testimony in mathematics, is one of them more important than the other? Which would you rather give up?
5. In what ways can mistaken proofs still be valuable?
   

We present a case study of how mathematicians write for mathematicians. We have conducted interviews with two research mathematicians, the talented PhD student Adam and his experienced supervisor Thomas, about a research paper they wrote together. Over the course of 2 years, Adam and Thomas revised Adam’s very detailed first draft. At the beginning of this collaboration, Adam was very knowledgeable about the subject of the paper and had good presentational skills but, as a new PhD student, did not yet have experience writing research papers for mathematicians. Thus, one main purpose of revising the paper was to make it take into account the intended audience. For this reason, the changes made to the initial draft and the authors’ purpose in making them provide a window for viewing how mathematicians write for mathematicians. We examined how their paper attracts the interest of the reader and prepares their proofs for validation by the reader. Among other findings, we found that their paper prepares the proofs for two types of validation that the reader can easily switch between.

1. What are the two levels that a mathematical article is arguing at? How are they related?
2. How much does of the writing process described by Andersen et al. tracks making the paper’s proofs more transferable in Easwaran’s sense?
3. To what extent should telling a coherent story about the mathematics affect how it is validated?
4. What does the collaboration between supervisor and student tell us about mathematical collaboration?
5. What does the way a paper is best written in maths tell us about how mathematicians pass knowledge from one to another?

1. What are the two levels that a mathematical article is arguing at? How are they related?
2. How much does of the writing process described by Andersen et al. tracks making the paper’s proofs more transferable in Easwaran’s sense?
3. To what extent should telling a coherent story about the mathematics affect how it is validated?
4. What does the collaboration between supervisor and student tell us about mathematical collaboration?
5. What does the way a paper is best written in maths tell us about how mathematicians pass knowledge from one to another?

1. It is fairly unusual for an amateur to make important discoveries in maths. How could it be made more open to this kind of contribution? Should it?

1. It is fairly unusual for an amateur to make important discoveries in maths. How could it be made more open to this kind of contribution? Should it?

1. What social mechanisms were used to exclude women from professional mathematical practices?
2. One common theme is that the work of women mathematicians has been obscured to the historical record in various ways. How do you think this perpetuates stereotypes today?
3. To what extent were supposedly objective judgements of mathematics used to make biased assessments of women’s work?
4. Why is it valuable to research the history of mathematics?
   

1. What social mechanisms were used to exclude women from professional mathematical practices?
2. One common theme is that the work of women mathematicians has been obscured to the historical record in various ways. How do you think this perpetuates stereotypes today?
3. To what extent were supposedly objective judgements of mathematics used to make biased assessments of women’s work?
4. Why is it valuable to research the history of mathematics?
   

1. How has the gender gap in mathematics continued in present day mathematics?
2. How objective is mathematical peer review?
   

1. How has the gender gap in mathematics continued in present day mathematics?
2. How objective is mathematical peer review?
   

1. Does the 4CT represent a significant change to mathematical practice
2. Does a computer proof like that of the 4CT lack certain virtues that we would want from a proof?
3. Can mathematics have empirical elements? Should maths use experiments?
4. Are computer proofs more or less fallible than human proofs?
5. Returning to the questions of week 1 above about the relation between philosophy and mathematics, who gets to decide whether the computer proof of the 4CT is properly part of mathematics?
6. How does surveyability and the “easy reproduction of a proof” relate to the notions of shareability, transferability and convertibility seen in previous readings?
   

1. Does the 4CT represent a significant change to mathematical practice
2. Does a computer proof like that of the 4CT lack certain virtues that we would want from a proof?
3. Can mathematics have empirical elements? Should maths use experiments?
4. Are computer proofs more or less fallible than human proofs?
5. Returning to the questions of week 1 above about the relation between philosophy and mathematics, who gets to decide whether the computer proof of the 4CT is properly part of mathematics?
6. How does surveyability and the “easy reproduction of a proof” relate to the notions of shareability, transferability and convertibility seen in previous readings?
   

1. How can collaborating with a computer affect how one does mathematics?
2. Is working with a computer different to collaborating with another human mathematician? Will this change what the “negotiations” are?
   

1. How can collaborating with a computer affect how one does mathematics?
2. Is working with a computer different to collaborating with another human mathematician? Will this change what the “negotiations” are?
   

1. Many traditional approaches to proof rule out diagrams as an extraneous part of proofs that cannot play an essential role. How well does that stand up to De Toffoli & Giardino’s case study?
2. What is the role of manipulative imagination in mathematical reasoning in topology?
3. How much do you think being able to “see” topological transformations depends on being an experienced topologist? Does intuition have to be trained?
4. What is the relationship between a normal topology proof and a formalisation of it? What does a formalisation capture? What might it miss?
5. Is a subcommunity of mathematics free to choose any criteria of validity they like for proofs?

1. Many traditional approaches to proof rule out diagrams as an extraneous part of proofs that cannot play an essential role. How well does that stand up to De Toffoli & Giardino’s case study?
2. What is the role of manipulative imagination in mathematical reasoning in topology?
3. How much do you think being able to “see” topological transformations depends on being an experienced topologist? Does intuition have to be trained?
4. What is the relationship between a normal topology proof and a formalisation of it? What does a formalisation capture? What might it miss?
5. Is a subcommunity of mathematics free to choose any criteria of validity they like for proofs?

1. How might the active presentation of a diagram aid the audience’s manipulative imagination?
2. How important are the physical materials of mathematics?
3. I was once subjected to a training day in which a Pro-Dean of Research declared they wanted to remove all blackboards from the maths department. Would this make a difference to the mathematical practices? What about to the mathematics produced?
   

1. How might the active presentation of a diagram aid the audience’s manipulative imagination?
2. How important are the physical materials of mathematics?
3. I was once subjected to a training day in which a Pro-Dean of Research declared they wanted to remove all blackboards from the maths department. Would this make a difference to the mathematical practices? What about to the mathematics produced?
   

1. Do you think it is important that diagrams are dispensable in a mathematical proof?
2. What are the two senses of visualisation that Carter discusses? Are the two related?
3. In what sense are the diagrams Carter considers essential to the discovery of proofs and definitions?
4. How do you think a mathematician might read a paper in which the diagrams have been omitted? Would they reconstruct them to gain understanding?
5. Compare Carter’s claims with those of De Toffoli & Giardino before. In one case the focus is on the context of discovery, while the other is on the context of justification. How separate are these contexts? Are the claims in these papers in tension?
   

1. Do you think it is important that diagrams are dispensable in a mathematical proof?
2. What are the two senses of visualisation that Carter discusses? Are the two related?
3. In what sense are the diagrams Carter considers essential to the discovery of proofs and definitions?
4. How do you think a mathematician might read a paper in which the diagrams have been omitted? Would they reconstruct them to gain understanding?
5. Compare Carter’s claims with those of De Toffoli & Giardino before. In one case the focus is on the context of discovery, while the other is on the context of justification. How separate are these contexts? Are the claims in these papers in tension?
   

1. What makes a practice like string-figure making or sand-drawing mathematical?
2. What is the relationship between mathematics and culture?
3. How are the sand-drawing practices similar to Carter’s diagram case studies? How are they different?
   

1. What makes a practice like string-figure making or sand-drawing mathematical?
2. What is the relationship between mathematics and culture?
3. How are the sand-drawing practices similar to Carter’s diagram case studies? How are they different?
   

1. Is “massively” collaborative mathematics possible?
2. In their analysis of the mini-polymath, Martin & Pease found a large number of examples being used. What is the role of examples in coming to understand a problem?
3. Are collaborative proofs more reliable?
4. Do you think online mathematics leads to the emergence of its own mathematical culture?
5. Is online mathematics a social machine? Has research mathematics always been a social machine, or is this a radical change in mathematics?
6. Can a social machine “think like a mathematician”? Can it do even better?

1. Is “massively” collaborative mathematics possible?
2. In their analysis of the mini-polymath, Martin & Pease found a large number of examples being used. What is the role of examples in coming to understand a problem?
3. Are collaborative proofs more reliable?
4. Do you think online mathematics leads to the emergence of its own mathematical culture?
5. Is online mathematics a social machine? Has research mathematics always been a social machine, or is this a radical change in mathematics?
6. Can a social machine “think like a mathematician”? Can it do even better?

1. Does it challenge the traditional conception of mathematical knowledge if no mathematician individually knows all of the pieces of the proof of the Classification Theorem?
2. Steingart claims that the circulation of knowledge and adjudication cannot be separated. Is this a necessary feature of mathematical knowledge, or is it a problem for its reliability? Or both/neither?
3. Does this case make us rethink the role of testimony in mathematics?
4. What does the danger of the theorem being “uninvented” mean for the idea that mathematical knowledge is cumulative and eternal?
5. Should the group theorists really be confident that there are only fixable, local errors in the proof, and not a more major error?

1. Does it challenge the traditional conception of mathematical knowledge if no mathematician individually knows all of the pieces of the proof of the Classification Theorem?
2. Steingart claims that the circulation of knowledge and adjudication cannot be separated. Is this a necessary feature of mathematical knowledge, or is it a problem for its reliability? Or both/neither?
3. Does this case make us rethink the role of testimony in mathematics?
4. What does the danger of the theorem being “uninvented” mean for the idea that mathematical knowledge is cumulative and eternal?
5. Should the group theorists really be confident that there are only fixable, local errors in the proof, and not a more major error?

1. Is it okay for proofs to contain errors, so long as they are “fixable”
2. What does it mean to “know a proof”?
3. Who knows the proof of the classification theorem?
4. Should the group theorists really be confident there are no more finite simple groups they’ve missed?
   

1. Is it okay for proofs to contain errors, so long as they are “fixable”
2. What does it mean to “know a proof”?
3. Who knows the proof of the classification theorem?
4. Should the group theorists really be confident there are no more finite simple groups they’ve missed?
   

1. What is the difference between a proof and a proof presentation?
2. Is the peer review process like a dialogue between author and referee? In what ways might it be different?
3. Is mathematics a collaboratively adversarial enterprise?
4. One trouble with the controversy about Mochizuki’s proposed proof of the abc conjecture is the disagreement over who counts as a relevant expert. Who do you think should count?
5. Dutilh Novaes lists a number of different functions of proofs. How well do the various unusual proofs (e.g. probabilistic, computer, diagrammatic, collaborative etc.) we have seen in previous weeks match the different functions?
   

1. What is the difference between a proof and a proof presentation?
2. Is the peer review process like a dialogue between author and referee? In what ways might it be different?
3. Is mathematics a collaboratively adversarial enterprise?
4. One trouble with the controversy about Mochizuki’s proposed proof of the abc conjecture is the disagreement over who counts as a relevant expert. Who do you think should count?
5. Dutilh Novaes lists a number of different functions of proofs. How well do the various unusual proofs (e.g. probabilistic, computer, diagrammatic, collaborative etc.) we have seen in previous weeks match the different functions?
   

1. What does it mean to be intellectually generous?
2. Does being generous make you a better mathematician?
3. What is the relationship between the intellectual virtues of individuals and the state of a subfield of mathematics?
4. Are theorem-credits a good reward system for maths?
5. Will the priority rule always make sure the first person to prove something gets the credit? In what ways might this go wrong?
   

1. What does it mean to be intellectually generous?
2. Does being generous make you a better mathematician?
3. What is the relationship between the intellectual virtues of individuals and the state of a subfield of mathematics?
4. Are theorem-credits a good reward system for maths?
5. Will the priority rule always make sure the first person to prove something gets the credit? In what ways might this go wrong?
   

Abstract: This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge out of a complex dynamic feedback system at the subpersonal level. Moreover reflection on the role of eye movements in visual perception establishes a further sense in which a distinction between sensorimotor behaviour and cognition cannot be sustained. The sensorimotor theory has recently come under critical fire (see e.g. Block, J Philos CII(5):259–272, 2005; Prinz, Psyche, 12(1):1–19, 2006; Aizawa, J Philos CIV(1), 2007) for mistaking a merely causal contribution of action to perception for a constitutive contribution. We further argue that the sensorimotor theory is particularly vulnerable to this objection in a way that Hurley’s active perception theory is not. This presents an additional reason for preferring Hurley’s theory as providing a conceptual framework for the enactive programme.