Publisher's Note: This classic work, first published in France in 1955, profoundly influenced the generation of scholars and activists at the forefront of liberation struggles in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Nearly twenty years later, when published for the first time in English, Discourse on Colonialism inspired a new generation engaged in the Civil Rights, Black Power, and anti-war movements and has sold more than 75,000 copies to date.

Aimé Césaire eloquently describes the brutal impact of capitalism and colonialism on both the colonizer and colonized, exposing the contradictions and hypocrisy implicit in western notions of "progress" and "civilization" upon encountering the "savage," "uncultured," or "primitive." Here, Césaire reaffirms African values, identity, and culture, and their relevance, reminding us that "the relationship between consciousness and reality are extremely complex. . . . It is equally necessary to decolonize our minds, our inner life, at the same time that we decolonize society."

1. Throughout Discourse on Colonialism, Césaire uses images of decay to describe European or Western civilisation. In the sections you are reading, he talks about it as a “stricken” and “dying” civilisation (p.31) and likens every act of brutality perpetuated by Europeans to a “gangrene” that spreads throughout Western civilisation as a whole. What do you think Césaire means by this image? What effect does it have on the reader?
2. Césaire writes: “The colonialists may kill in Indochina, torture in Madagascar, and imprison in Black Africa, crack down in the West Indies. Henceforth the colonised know that they have an advantage over them. They know their temporary ‘masters’ are lying” (p.32). Why does Césaire suggest the colonialists are lying? Why does this give the colonised an “advantage over [the colonisers]”?
3. What connections does Césaire draw between Nazism and colonialism? Why does he suggest that every “humanistic … Christian bourgeois of the twentieth century … has a Hitler inside him” (p.36)?
4. What implications follow from Césaire’s claim that “no one colonises innocently” (p.39)? How might this change the way we examine the legacy of colonial practices today?
5. What is the “boomerang effect of colonisation” (p.41) that Césaire diagnoses?
6. What does Césaire mean by the phrase “Colonialism = thingification”? How does this relate to his discussion of the psychological effects of colonialism on both the coloniser and the colonised?
7. What values does Césaire suggest we can find in pre-colonial non-European civilizations? What role do you think these values play in his wider argument?
8. On the one hand, Césaire explicitly details the destructive power of Western colonialism, such that entire cultures and civilisations have been eradicated as a result of its On the other, Césaire defends the values of pre-colonial non-European civilisations (see p.44-46). Do you think this points to a tension within Césaire’s argument? If so, how might we resolve it? If not, why not?

1. Throughout Discourse on Colonialism, Césaire uses images of decay to describe European or Western civilisation. In the sections you are reading, he talks about it as a “stricken” and “dying” civilisation (p.31) and likens every act of brutality perpetuated by Europeans to a “gangrene” that spreads throughout Western civilisation as a whole. What do you think Césaire means by this image? What effect does it have on the reader?
2. Césaire writes: “The colonialists may kill in Indochina, torture in Madagascar, and imprison in Black Africa, crack down in the West Indies. Henceforth the colonised know that they have an advantage over them. They know their temporary ‘masters’ are lying” (p.32). Why does Césaire suggest the colonialists are lying? Why does this give the colonised an “advantage over [the colonisers]”?
3. What connections does Césaire draw between Nazism and colonialism? Why does he suggest that every “humanistic … Christian bourgeois of the twentieth century … has a Hitler inside him” (p.36)?
4. What implications follow from Césaire’s claim that “no one colonises innocently” (p.39)? How might this change the way we examine the legacy of colonial practices today?
5. What is the “boomerang effect of colonisation” (p.41) that Césaire diagnoses?
6. What does Césaire mean by the phrase “Colonialism = thingification”? How does this relate to his discussion of the psychological effects of colonialism on both the coloniser and the colonised?
7. What values does Césaire suggest we can find in pre-colonial non-European civilizations? What role do you think these values play in his wider argument?
8. On the one hand, Césaire explicitly details the destructive power of Western colonialism, such that entire cultures and civilisations have been eradicated as a result of its On the other, Césaire defends the values of pre-colonial non-European civilisations (see p.44-46). Do you think this points to a tension within Césaire’s argument? If so, how might we resolve it? If not, why not?

A national bestseller when it first appeared in 1963, The Fire Next Time galvanized the nation and gave passionate voice to the emerging civil rights movement. At once a powerful evocation of James Baldwin’s early life in Harlem and a disturbing examination of the consequences of racial injustice, the book is an intensely personal and provocative document. It consists of two “letters,” written on the occasion of the centennial of the Emancipation Proclamation, that exhort Americans, both black and white, to attack the terrible legacy of racism. Described by The New York Times Book Review as “sermon, ultimatum, confession, deposition, testament, and chronicle…all presented in searing, brilliant prose,” The Fire Next Time stands as a classic of our literature.

1. With respect to the religious journey of Baldwin:
   • What made him enter the ‘church racket’ (p.6) and get indoctrinated in Christianity?
   • What was his subsequent understanding of the historical role that Christianity played ‘in the realm of power and in the realm of morals’?
2. “The white God has not delivered them; perhaps the Black God ” (p.12). How would one describe Baldwin’s conception of God?
3. “…this leads, imperceptibly but inevitably, to a state of mind in which, having long ago learned to expect the worst, one finds it very easy to believe the worst”
   • Why does Baldwin consider not being able to believe ‘the humanity of white people is more real to them than their colour’ to be worst? What do we understand about Baldwin’s idea of love for people?
4. What was the initial impression Baldwin had of Elijah? Did the impression change? If yes then what was the revised impression of Elijah that Baldwin had?
5. “…the Negro has been formed by this nation…and does not belong to any other — not to Africa, and certainly not to Islam.” (p. 16)
   • Why does the identity of the Black Americans not belong to Africa and Islam?
   • Why does Baldwin claim that only a radical change in the constitution of American social and political structure can bring a real change in the life of a Black American? Do you believe that radical change in the social-political structure has occurred?
6. What is the definition of ‘tokenism’ (p.18) that we get in the text? What are its material causes and consequences?
   • Against the idea of tokenism, how does Baldwin envisage freedom?
7. “…a vast amount of the white anguish is rooted in the white man’s equally profound need to be seen as he is, to be released from the tyranny of his mirror.” (p.19)
   • What, according to the text, was Baldwin’s diagnosis of the problem in America? What does the idea of the mirror evoke?
   • “To create one nation has proved to be a hideously difficult task; there is certainly no need now to create two, one black and one ’ (p. 20) How does Baldwin envision the creation of a new America?

1. With respect to the religious journey of Baldwin:
   • What made him enter the ‘church racket’ (p.6) and get indoctrinated in Christianity?
   • What was his subsequent understanding of the historical role that Christianity played ‘in the realm of power and in the realm of morals’?
2. “The white God has not delivered them; perhaps the Black God ” (p.12). How would one describe Baldwin’s conception of God?
3. “…this leads, imperceptibly but inevitably, to a state of mind in which, having long ago learned to expect the worst, one finds it very easy to believe the worst”
   • Why does Baldwin consider not being able to believe ‘the humanity of white people is more real to them than their colour’ to be worst? What do we understand about Baldwin’s idea of love for people?
4. What was the initial impression Baldwin had of Elijah? Did the impression change? If yes then what was the revised impression of Elijah that Baldwin had?
5. “…the Negro has been formed by this nation…and does not belong to any other — not to Africa, and certainly not to Islam.” (p. 16)
   • Why does the identity of the Black Americans not belong to Africa and Islam?
   • Why does Baldwin claim that only a radical change in the constitution of American social and political structure can bring a real change in the life of a Black American? Do you believe that radical change in the social-political structure has occurred?
6. What is the definition of ‘tokenism’ (p.18) that we get in the text? What are its material causes and consequences?
   • Against the idea of tokenism, how does Baldwin envisage freedom?
7. “…a vast amount of the white anguish is rooted in the white man’s equally profound need to be seen as he is, to be released from the tyranny of his mirror.” (p.19)
   • What, according to the text, was Baldwin’s diagnosis of the problem in America? What does the idea of the mirror evoke?
   • “To create one nation has proved to be a hideously difficult task; there is certainly no need now to create two, one black and one ’ (p. 20) How does Baldwin envision the creation of a new America?

More than three decades after its first publication, Edward Said's groundbreaking critique of the West's historical, cultural, and political perceptions of the East has become a modern classic.
In this wide-ranging, intellectually vigorous study, Said traces the origins of "orientalism" to the centuries-long period during which Europe dominated the Middle and Near East and, from its position of power, defined "the orient" simply as "other than" the occident. This entrenched view continues to dominate western ideas and, because it does not allow the East to represent itself, prevents true understanding. Essential, and still eye-opening, Orientalism remains one of the most important books written about our divided world.

1. What is the relationship between Orientalism and imperialism?
2. What does Said mean when he says ‘producing the Orient, politically, sociologically, militarily…’ (p.3)?
3. What is the Gramscian distinction between civil and political society? Express your views on whether you find the distinction helpful. How does the concept of ‘hegemony’ figure in the discourse? Why is it an important tool to understand the cultural life of the West?
4. “Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors.” Discuss the relationship between the overarching ideology of Orientalism and the contribution of individual works. What position does Said take in the debate? Do you agree with his position? Give reasons for your answer.
5. What is Said’s opinion on the ‘liberal consensus’ (p.10) about true, ‘non-political’ knowledge? Can there be non-political, pure knowledge in human sciences? State reasons for your agreement/disagreement.
6. What does Said mean when he says orientalism is ‘premised on exteriority’ (p.20)? How does the Orient rest on representation? In relation to this discuss briefly the politics of ‘representation’. (Discussion in greater detail available in chapter 1)
7. What special significance does ‘Islamic Orient’ add to the study of Orientalism, given contemporary geopolitics?

1. What is the relationship between Orientalism and imperialism?
2. What does Said mean when he says ‘producing the Orient, politically, sociologically, militarily…’ (p.3)?
3. What is the Gramscian distinction between civil and political society? Express your views on whether you find the distinction helpful. How does the concept of ‘hegemony’ figure in the discourse? Why is it an important tool to understand the cultural life of the West?
4. “Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors.” Discuss the relationship between the overarching ideology of Orientalism and the contribution of individual works. What position does Said take in the debate? Do you agree with his position? Give reasons for your answer.
5. What is Said’s opinion on the ‘liberal consensus’ (p.10) about true, ‘non-political’ knowledge? Can there be non-political, pure knowledge in human sciences? State reasons for your agreement/disagreement.
6. What does Said mean when he says orientalism is ‘premised on exteriority’ (p.20)? How does the Orient rest on representation? In relation to this discuss briefly the politics of ‘representation’. (Discussion in greater detail available in chapter 1)
7. What special significance does ‘Islamic Orient’ add to the study of Orientalism, given contemporary geopolitics?

What can philosophy contribute to African culture? What can it draw from it? Could there be a truly African philosophy that goes beyond traditional folk thought? Kwasi Wiredu tries in these essays to define and demonstrate a role for contemporary African philosophers which is distinctive but by no means parochial. He shows how they can assimilate the advances of analytical philosophy and apply them to the general social and intellectual changes associated with 'modernisation' and the transition to new national identities. But we see too how they can exploit traditional resources and test the assumptions of Western philosophy against the intimations of their own language and culture. The volume as a whole presents some of the best non-technical work of a distinguished African philosopher, of importance equally to professional philosophers and to those with a more general interest in contemporary African thought and culture.

1. How does the comparison between African philosophy and African versions of other disciplines, such as engineering, illuminate the problem Wiredu is grappling with?
2. What is the difference between the universalist and nationalist conceptions of African philosophy? What, for Wiredu, are the limitations of the nationalist conception?
3. Why does Wiredu suggest that traditional African philosophies are “pre-scientific”? Is this a distinct problem for African philosophy? Does the pre-scientific nature of traditional African philosophy mean that it should not be made the subject of further study?
4. What is Wiredu’s conception of philosophy in a technical sense? Why does Wiredu think that this conception of philosophy is useful for contemporary African society?Can philosophy, in Wiredu’s sense, be universal and, if so, in what ways?
   • Similarly, how are cultural considerations relevant for philosophical thinking? In answering this question, refer to Wiredu’s comments about the relationship between language and philosophy.
   • What implications do you think follow from this relationship between language and philosophy?
5. What is the definition of African philosophy Wiredu offers at the end of Chapter 2? Why does he suggest that this project is “urgent”?
6. What are the criticisms Wiredu advances against Western anthropologists who focus on the “pre-scientific characteristics of African traditional thought” (p.39)? What are the problematic consequences of such thinking for the perception of Africans by the West, as well as the self-image of Africans themselves? Can you draw any connections between Wiredu’s remarks here and the effects of colonialism discussed by Césaire?
7. How does Wiredu’s contrast between African and Western traditions of thought serve to undermine the binary opposition between a rational modern West and an irrational superstitious Africa?
8. How do you interpret Wiredu’s conception of development as a “continuing world- historical process” (p.43) in which all peoples are engaged? What are the advantages of conceptualising development in this way?
9. Towards the end of Chapter 3, Wiredu seems to suggest that a written tradition is necessary for possessing a philosophical heritage. Do you think this is fair or it does it unfairly marginalise oral traditions of philosophy as being ‘folk wisdom’?

1. How does the comparison between African philosophy and African versions of other disciplines, such as engineering, illuminate the problem Wiredu is grappling with?
2. What is the difference between the universalist and nationalist conceptions of African philosophy? What, for Wiredu, are the limitations of the nationalist conception?
3. Why does Wiredu suggest that traditional African philosophies are “pre-scientific”? Is this a distinct problem for African philosophy? Does the pre-scientific nature of traditional African philosophy mean that it should not be made the subject of further study?
4. What is Wiredu’s conception of philosophy in a technical sense? Why does Wiredu think that this conception of philosophy is useful for contemporary African society?Can philosophy, in Wiredu’s sense, be universal and, if so, in what ways?
   • Similarly, how are cultural considerations relevant for philosophical thinking? In answering this question, refer to Wiredu’s comments about the relationship between language and philosophy.
   • What implications do you think follow from this relationship between language and philosophy?
5. What is the definition of African philosophy Wiredu offers at the end of Chapter 2? Why does he suggest that this project is “urgent”?
6. What are the criticisms Wiredu advances against Western anthropologists who focus on the “pre-scientific characteristics of African traditional thought” (p.39)? What are the problematic consequences of such thinking for the perception of Africans by the West, as well as the self-image of Africans themselves? Can you draw any connections between Wiredu’s remarks here and the effects of colonialism discussed by Césaire?
7. How does Wiredu’s contrast between African and Western traditions of thought serve to undermine the binary opposition between a rational modern West and an irrational superstitious Africa?
8. How do you interpret Wiredu’s conception of development as a “continuing world- historical process” (p.43) in which all peoples are engaged? What are the advantages of conceptualising development in this way?
9. Towards the end of Chapter 3, Wiredu seems to suggest that a written tradition is necessary for possessing a philosophical heritage. Do you think this is fair or it does it unfairly marginalise oral traditions of philosophy as being ‘folk wisdom’?

1. What are the four different uses of the term ‘imperialism’ that Smith distinguishes between? What is the main difference between the fourth use of imperialism and the first three? Why is this significant?
2. What are the two main strands of critique offered by indigenous scholarship on imperialism and colonialism? Why do discussions of globalisation and post-colonialism pose new challenges for the ways indigenous communities “think and talk about imperialism” (p.24)?
3. How does Smith conceptualise the struggle to assert and claim humanity? What do you think Smith means by her suggestion that, for indigenous peoples, fragmentation is not “a phenomenon of postmodernism” but rather “the consequence of imperialism (p.28)”? What connections can you draw betweenthe ideas articulated in this section and the writings of Césaire?
4. What are the 9 interconnected ideas that Smith suggests are central to Western conceptions of history? What is the critique of this kind of history raised by post-colonial and indigenous theorists alike? Do you find her critique convincing? If so, why? If not, why not?
5. If history in its modern/Western construction is predicated on a sense of Otherness that marginalises indigenous peoples, how and why is history important for decolonisation? In answering this question, think about how Smith conceptualises the relationship between history and power, as well as what Smith means by “coming to know the past” (p.34) and what this entails for decolonisation efforts.
6. On page 36, Smith writes “Writing can also be dangerous because we reinforce and maintain a style of discourse which is never innocent”. What are some of the dangers she talks about, and how have indigenous and post-colonial theorists attempted to resist and push back?
7. In drawing on the work of Cherryl Smith and Edward Said, Linda Tuhiwai Smith highlights the importance of “‘writing back’ and simultaneously writing to ourselves” (p.37). How do you interpret this idea and what implications do you think it has for both writing and interpreting academic texts? Does it make you rethink the assumptions in your writing? Or does it reinforce concerns you may already have?
8. How and why is theory important for indigenous communities? What kind of theory development is necessary for indigenous communities, and what does this process entail?

1. What are the four different uses of the term ‘imperialism’ that Smith distinguishes between? What is the main difference between the fourth use of imperialism and the first three? Why is this significant?
2. What are the two main strands of critique offered by indigenous scholarship on imperialism and colonialism? Why do discussions of globalisation and post-colonialism pose new challenges for the ways indigenous communities “think and talk about imperialism” (p.24)?
3. How does Smith conceptualise the struggle to assert and claim humanity? What do you think Smith means by her suggestion that, for indigenous peoples, fragmentation is not “a phenomenon of postmodernism” but rather “the consequence of imperialism (p.28)”? What connections can you draw betweenthe ideas articulated in this section and the writings of Césaire?
4. What are the 9 interconnected ideas that Smith suggests are central to Western conceptions of history? What is the critique of this kind of history raised by post-colonial and indigenous theorists alike? Do you find her critique convincing? If so, why? If not, why not?
5. If history in its modern/Western construction is predicated on a sense of Otherness that marginalises indigenous peoples, how and why is history important for decolonisation? In answering this question, think about how Smith conceptualises the relationship between history and power, as well as what Smith means by “coming to know the past” (p.34) and what this entails for decolonisation efforts.
6. On page 36, Smith writes “Writing can also be dangerous because we reinforce and maintain a style of discourse which is never innocent”. What are some of the dangers she talks about, and how have indigenous and post-colonial theorists attempted to resist and push back?
7. In drawing on the work of Cherryl Smith and Edward Said, Linda Tuhiwai Smith highlights the importance of “‘writing back’ and simultaneously writing to ourselves” (p.37). How do you interpret this idea and what implications do you think it has for both writing and interpreting academic texts? Does it make you rethink the assumptions in your writing? Or does it reinforce concerns you may already have?
8. How and why is theory important for indigenous communities? What kind of theory development is necessary for indigenous communities, and what does this process entail?

1. What is understood by ‘Europe’? Is it a geographical identity or a historical and ideological category?
2. Why does the author think that European thought is both ‘indispensable and inadequate’ for understanding political modernity in a non-European country like India?
3. What is the meaning of historicism implied in the text? How did it turn into a political prescription to non-European peoples?
   • What was the response of the anticolonial movements to such an idea?
   • With respect to India, what could be considered as a national gesture of rejecting Mill’s historicist prescription? What tension did the Indian political modernity run into for making that gesture? (pp. 6-11)
4. How does subaltern historiography extend the meaning of ‘political’ by critiquing the standard binaries of ‘political’ and ‘pre-political’? Discuss with reference to the debate between Eric Hobsbawm and Ranajit Guha. (pp.12-15)
   • How does the binary division of political and pre-political lead us to a ‘stagist’ reading of history, and to the assumption that capitalism brings with it bourgeois power relations?
5. What are two strands of modern European social science?
   • How does a Marxist reading of history ‘occlude’ questions pertaining to belonging and diversity, thus producing an insufficient tool to read history? (p.18)
   • Was Marx himself clear about questions pertaining to History 2? (Discussions in greater detail available in chapter 2)

1. What is understood by ‘Europe’? Is it a geographical identity or a historical and ideological category?
2. Why does the author think that European thought is both ‘indispensable and inadequate’ for understanding political modernity in a non-European country like India?
3. What is the meaning of historicism implied in the text? How did it turn into a political prescription to non-European peoples?
   • What was the response of the anticolonial movements to such an idea?
   • With respect to India, what could be considered as a national gesture of rejecting Mill’s historicist prescription? What tension did the Indian political modernity run into for making that gesture? (pp. 6-11)
4. How does subaltern historiography extend the meaning of ‘political’ by critiquing the standard binaries of ‘political’ and ‘pre-political’? Discuss with reference to the debate between Eric Hobsbawm and Ranajit Guha. (pp.12-15)
   • How does the binary division of political and pre-political lead us to a ‘stagist’ reading of history, and to the assumption that capitalism brings with it bourgeois power relations?
5. What are two strands of modern European social science?
   • How does a Marxist reading of history ‘occlude’ questions pertaining to belonging and diversity, thus producing an insufficient tool to read history? (p.18)
   • Was Marx himself clear about questions pertaining to History 2? (Discussions in greater detail available in chapter 2)

Sylvia Wynter is a radical Jamaican theorist influenced, among others, by Frantz Fanon. This well known interview is often considered to be the best introduction to her thinking about the question of human in the aftermath of 1492 and the consequent racialisation of humanity.
Wynter rethinks dominant concepts of being human, arguing that they are based on a colonial and racialized model that divides the world into asymmetric categories such as "the selected and the dysselected", center and periphery, or colonizers and colonized. Against this Wynter proposes a new humanism. According to Katherine McKittrick Wynter develops a "counterhumanism", that breaks from the classification of humans in static, asymmetric categories.

1. At the bottom of page 174, Wynter says “I am suggesting that from the very origin of the modern world, of the Western world system, there were never simply ‘men’ and ‘women’. Rather there was, on the one hand Man, as invented in the sixteenth century by Europe, as Foucault notes, and then, on the other hand, Man’s human Others”. What do you think she means by this? What is the significance of this construction for Wynter’s argument?
2. In a similar vein, Wynter suggests that “at the beginning of the modern world, the only women were White and Western” (p.174). Why do you think Wynter specifically talks about the construction of women? What does this add to her analysis of the inherently exclusive conception of Man constructed by Western Europe in the modern period?
3. What is the dilemma that Wynter talks about confronting on page 175? How does ‘appreciating the West’s intellectual breakthroughs’ help to “transform their world”?
4. What is the relationship between “ethnoastronomies” and the ways in which old civilisations were ordered?
5. Wynter states that “Copernicus’s breakthrough could only have been made in the wake of the earlier humanists’ invention of a revalorized natural Man in the place of Christianity’s fallen creature” (p.176). What do you think Wynter means by this? How does a “revalorized natural Man” enable the scientific revolution driven by Copernicus? Why is this significant for the construction of human Others as the opposite of the West’s ‘rational Man’? Finally, how and why does this characterisation become “purely secular” (p.177) and biological?
6. Thinking back to Chakrabarty’s and Smith’s critiques of Western historicism, why does Wynter prefer to use the term “desupernaturalizing” or “de-godding” rather than “secular” to characterise the rising biological conception of Man?
7. Wynter argues that, in a medieval scholastic order of knowledge, “a lay intellectual … had to think in paradigms which served to confirm the hegemony of the church over the lay world” (p.178). What does this mean?
   • From this idea, Wynter draws on the writings of AiméCésaire and Jean-François Lyotard to suggest that the Human Other is conceptualised as “the name of what is evil”. How does this occur and why is this significant for Wynter’s argument?
   • How is the above related to Wynter’s suggestion that the current dominant paradigm of Man enabled the white Western world to see non-whites as racially inferior?
8. Does the change in the dominant conception of Man go directly from a theocentric religious conception to a biocentric one? Or is there a stage in between? If so, what is the in-between stage and how does it conceptualise the Human Other?
9. How does Wynter conceive the relationship between race and gender? How and why does Wynter see gender as an “emancipatory opening”? How do you think Wynter understands gender and how does it relate to her wider argument?

1. At the bottom of page 174, Wynter says “I am suggesting that from the very origin of the modern world, of the Western world system, there were never simply ‘men’ and ‘women’. Rather there was, on the one hand Man, as invented in the sixteenth century by Europe, as Foucault notes, and then, on the other hand, Man’s human Others”. What do you think she means by this? What is the significance of this construction for Wynter’s argument?
2. In a similar vein, Wynter suggests that “at the beginning of the modern world, the only women were White and Western” (p.174). Why do you think Wynter specifically talks about the construction of women? What does this add to her analysis of the inherently exclusive conception of Man constructed by Western Europe in the modern period?
3. What is the dilemma that Wynter talks about confronting on page 175? How does ‘appreciating the West’s intellectual breakthroughs’ help to “transform their world”?
4. What is the relationship between “ethnoastronomies” and the ways in which old civilisations were ordered?
5. Wynter states that “Copernicus’s breakthrough could only have been made in the wake of the earlier humanists’ invention of a revalorized natural Man in the place of Christianity’s fallen creature” (p.176). What do you think Wynter means by this? How does a “revalorized natural Man” enable the scientific revolution driven by Copernicus? Why is this significant for the construction of human Others as the opposite of the West’s ‘rational Man’? Finally, how and why does this characterisation become “purely secular” (p.177) and biological?
6. Thinking back to Chakrabarty’s and Smith’s critiques of Western historicism, why does Wynter prefer to use the term “desupernaturalizing” or “de-godding” rather than “secular” to characterise the rising biological conception of Man?
7. Wynter argues that, in a medieval scholastic order of knowledge, “a lay intellectual … had to think in paradigms which served to confirm the hegemony of the church over the lay world” (p.178). What does this mean?
   • From this idea, Wynter draws on the writings of AiméCésaire and Jean-François Lyotard to suggest that the Human Other is conceptualised as “the name of what is evil”. How does this occur and why is this significant for Wynter’s argument?
   • How is the above related to Wynter’s suggestion that the current dominant paradigm of Man enabled the white Western world to see non-whites as racially inferior?
8. Does the change in the dominant conception of Man go directly from a theocentric religious conception to a biocentric one? Or is there a stage in between? If so, what is the in-between stage and how does it conceptualise the Human Other?
9. How does Wynter conceive the relationship between race and gender? How and why does Wynter see gender as an “emancipatory opening”? How do you think Wynter understands gender and how does it relate to her wider argument?

Centering his analysis in the dynamic forces of modern East Asian history, Kuan-Hsing Chen recasts cultural studies as a politically urgent global endeavor. He argues that the intellectual and subjective work of decolonization begun across East Asia after the Second World War was stalled by the cold war. At the same time, the work of deimperialization became impossible to imagine in imperial centers such as Japan and the United States. Chen contends that it is now necessary to resume those tasks, and that decolonization, deimperialization, and an intellectual undoing of the cold war must proceed simultaneously. Combining postcolonial studies, globalization studies, and the emerging field of “Asian studies in Asia,” he insists that those on both sides of the imperial divide must assess the conduct, motives, and consequences of imperial histories.

Chen is one of the most important intellectuals working in East Asia today; his writing has been influential in Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and mainland China for the past fifteen years. As a founding member of the Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Society and its journal, he has helped to initiate change in the dynamics and intellectual orientation of the region, building a network that has facilitated inter-Asian connections. Asia as Method encapsulates Chen’s vision and activities within the increasingly “inter-referencing” East Asian intellectual community and charts necessary new directions for cultural studies.

1. What is the potential of Asia as method? From the remarks Chen makes at the start of the chapter, what do you think Asia as method entails?
2. What are some of the problems associated with both the idea of Asia as method and the Inter-Asia project that inspired it?
3. Why does Chen suggest that “due to historical constraints and current local differences, the general mood does not justify using Asia” as an “emotional signifier to call for regional integration and solidarity” (p.213)?
4. What is the relationship between “anxiety over the meaning of Asia” and the “politics of representation” (p.215)? What are the implications of this relationship for Asia as method? Why is this significant for Chen’s argument?
5. What does Chen mean by an “imaginary West” and what role has it played in Asian nationalist discourses? Thinking back to some of the earlier readings, what is the relationship between the West and forms of knowledge production? Why is this a problem for Chen?
6. What are the four strategies of “dealing with the West” Chen considers and how does he critique each of them? Thinking back to your reading of Dipesh Chakrabarty, are you convinced by Chen’s critique? If so, why? If not, why not?
7. Chen diagnoses a particular “predicament of postcolonial discourse” (p.222). What do you think Chen means by this? How does he attempt to move beyond it?
8. What are the similarities between Partha Chatterjee’s writings and Chen’s experiences in Taiwan? What is Chen’s idea of “shifting [the] points of reference” (p.225) and how does this inform his engagement with Chatterjee? How does shifting the points of reference collapse the “division between researcher and native informant” (p.227)?
9. Are you convinced that Asia as method can meaningfully “deal with the West”? Do you think it entails similar ideas in other parts of the world, such as Africa as method or Latin America as method? If so, what implications follow for political philosophy and/or political science?

1. What is the potential of Asia as method? From the remarks Chen makes at the start of the chapter, what do you think Asia as method entails?
2. What are some of the problems associated with both the idea of Asia as method and the Inter-Asia project that inspired it?
3. Why does Chen suggest that “due to historical constraints and current local differences, the general mood does not justify using Asia” as an “emotional signifier to call for regional integration and solidarity” (p.213)?
4. What is the relationship between “anxiety over the meaning of Asia” and the “politics of representation” (p.215)? What are the implications of this relationship for Asia as method? Why is this significant for Chen’s argument?
5. What does Chen mean by an “imaginary West” and what role has it played in Asian nationalist discourses? Thinking back to some of the earlier readings, what is the relationship between the West and forms of knowledge production? Why is this a problem for Chen?
6. What are the four strategies of “dealing with the West” Chen considers and how does he critique each of them? Thinking back to your reading of Dipesh Chakrabarty, are you convinced by Chen’s critique? If so, why? If not, why not?
7. Chen diagnoses a particular “predicament of postcolonial discourse” (p.222). What do you think Chen means by this? How does he attempt to move beyond it?
8. What are the similarities between Partha Chatterjee’s writings and Chen’s experiences in Taiwan? What is Chen’s idea of “shifting [the] points of reference” (p.225) and how does this inform his engagement with Chatterjee? How does shifting the points of reference collapse the “division between researcher and native informant” (p.227)?
9. Are you convinced that Asia as method can meaningfully “deal with the West”? Do you think it entails similar ideas in other parts of the world, such as Africa as method or Latin America as method? If so, what implications follow for political philosophy and/or political science?

Decolonizing Universalism develops a genuinely anti-imperialist feminism. Against relativism/universalism debates that ask feminists to either reject normativity or reduce feminism to a Western conceit, Khader's nonideal universalism rediscovers the normative core of feminism in opposition to sexist oppression and reimagines the role of moral ideals in transnational feminist praxis.

1. The terms ‘Western’ and ‘Northern’ appear frequently in the text. (a) Do the words refer to the same idea? If not, then what is the difference? (pp. 16-17; pp.18-19)
   • Why does the author levy the charge of ethnocentrism against what they call ‘Western’ universalism?
   • What position does the author take against that brand of universalism? Is it relativism or is it any other conception of universalism?
2. “Anti- imperialist feminisms, in my view, contain substantive normative claims.” (p.3)
   • What is the substantive normative claim of the anti-imperialist feminism?
   • How is this normative claim different from that of the Enlightenment liberalist/ universalist claim of normativity?
3. “…according to the Enlightenment liberal retelling of history, moral progress means the erosion of community and tradition that the West has ostensibly already achieved.” (p.5)
   • Do Chakrabarty’s ideas of ‘historicism’ and the ‘imaginary waiting room of history’ shed some light on this understanding of history?
4. What are the ‘specific values’ that the author wishes to examine in the book? Discuss in brief how the author engages with the values. (pp. 7-10) State your views about the discussions. (Discussions in greater detail are available in chapters – 2, 3, 4)
5. With respect to feminist solidarity and praxis:
   • How does the author qualify the notion of ‘positive ideals’?
   • How must we understand the goods of human rights, and generally the universal indicators of advantage and disadvantage? (pp. 11-12)
6. The stated feminist position challenges the conventions and methodology of Anglo- American political philosophy in three distinct and important ways. Discuss briefly each of them and register your own response to those.
7. How does the stated feminist position interact with the notion of intersectionality of oppression? Do you agree that the expressed position is compatible with the intersectionality thesis or is the latter at odds with the former?

1. The terms ‘Western’ and ‘Northern’ appear frequently in the text. (a) Do the words refer to the same idea? If not, then what is the difference? (pp. 16-17; pp.18-19)
   • Why does the author levy the charge of ethnocentrism against what they call ‘Western’ universalism?
   • What position does the author take against that brand of universalism? Is it relativism or is it any other conception of universalism?
2. “Anti- imperialist feminisms, in my view, contain substantive normative claims.” (p.3)
   • What is the substantive normative claim of the anti-imperialist feminism?
   • How is this normative claim different from that of the Enlightenment liberalist/ universalist claim of normativity?
3. “…according to the Enlightenment liberal retelling of history, moral progress means the erosion of community and tradition that the West has ostensibly already achieved.” (p.5)
   • Do Chakrabarty’s ideas of ‘historicism’ and the ‘imaginary waiting room of history’ shed some light on this understanding of history?
4. What are the ‘specific values’ that the author wishes to examine in the book? Discuss in brief how the author engages with the values. (pp. 7-10) State your views about the discussions. (Discussions in greater detail are available in chapters – 2, 3, 4)
5. With respect to feminist solidarity and praxis:
   • How does the author qualify the notion of ‘positive ideals’?
   • How must we understand the goods of human rights, and generally the universal indicators of advantage and disadvantage? (pp. 11-12)
6. The stated feminist position challenges the conventions and methodology of Anglo- American political philosophy in three distinct and important ways. Discuss briefly each of them and register your own response to those.
7. How does the stated feminist position interact with the notion of intersectionality of oppression? Do you agree that the expressed position is compatible with the intersectionality thesis or is the latter at odds with the former?

The paper begins from a working definition of caste as a contentious form of social belonging and a consideration of casteism as a form of inferiorization. It takes anti-casteism as an ideological critique aimed at unmasking the unethical operations of caste, drawing upon B. R. Ambedkar’s notion of caste as ‘graded inequality’. The politico-legal context of the unfinished trajectory of instituting protection against caste discrimination in Britain provides the backdrop for thinking through the philosophical foundations of anti-casteism. The peculiar religio-discursive aspect of ‘emergent vulnerability’ is noted, which explains the recent introduction of the trope of ‘institutional casteism’ used as a shield by deniers of caste against accusations of casteism. The language of protest historically introduced by anti-racists is thus usurped and inverted in a simulated language of anti-colonialism. It is suggested that the stymieing of the UK legislation on caste is an effect of collective hypocrisies, the refusal to acknowledge caste privilege, and the continuity of an agonistic intellectual inheritance, exemplified in the deep differences between Ambedkar and Gandhi in the Indian nationalist discourse on caste. The paper argues that for a modern anti-casteism to develop, at stake is the possibility of an ethical social solidarity. Following Ambedkar, this expansive solidarity can only be found through our willingness to subject received opinions and traditions to critical scrutiny. Since opposed groups ‘make sense’ of their worlds in ways that might generate collective hypocrisies of denial of caste effects, anti-casteism must be geared to expose the lie that caste as the system of graded inequality is benign and seamlessly self-perpetuating, when it is everywhere enforced through penalties for transgression of local caste norms with the complicity of the privileged castes. The ideal for modern anti-casteism is Maitri formed through praxis, eschewing birth-ascribed caste status and loyalties.

1. What is caste? Is a perfect definition possible? If not, what are ways to identify caste and the practice of casteism or caste discrimination? Does the notion of caste interact with the notion of class? If so, how?
2. What is the connection between Colonialism and Casteism? Take into consideration viewpoints of deniers of caste discrimination as well as that of anti-casteists.
3. Discuss the nature of relationship between the supposedly ‘amoral’ capitalist market and caste norms. Has the market been able to dissolve caste or is it entrenching caste divisions?
4. What do we understand about Gandhi’s idea of caste and casteism?
   • What contradiction does Gandhi run into while describing the caste system?
5. What is the notion of morality, inspired from Buddhism, that Ambedkar endorses?
   • What is ‘anti-social morality’ and how is it different from the morality that Ambedkar propounds?
   • Express your opinions on the two conceptions of morality.
6. How does caste and casteism figure in the rubric of Britain’s ‘multi-ethnic’ politics and specifically in its legal discourse?

1. What is caste? Is a perfect definition possible? If not, what are ways to identify caste and the practice of casteism or caste discrimination? Does the notion of caste interact with the notion of class? If so, how?
2. What is the connection between Colonialism and Casteism? Take into consideration viewpoints of deniers of caste discrimination as well as that of anti-casteists.
3. Discuss the nature of relationship between the supposedly ‘amoral’ capitalist market and caste norms. Has the market been able to dissolve caste or is it entrenching caste divisions?
4. What do we understand about Gandhi’s idea of caste and casteism?
   • What contradiction does Gandhi run into while describing the caste system?
5. What is the notion of morality, inspired from Buddhism, that Ambedkar endorses?
   • What is ‘anti-social morality’ and how is it different from the morality that Ambedkar propounds?
   • Express your opinions on the two conceptions of morality.
6. How does caste and casteism figure in the rubric of Britain’s ‘multi-ethnic’ politics and specifically in its legal discourse?

1. How does racial hierarchy function in different Latin American contexts, according to Quijano?
2. How does whiteness function in different Latin American contexts
3. How does racial hierarchy in Latin America compare to the Anglo-American context?
4. Might mestizaje be better understood not in a strict racial sense, as mere racial mixing, but in a cultural sense, as a transculturation characteristic of Latin American identities?
5. Would a cultural understanding of mestizaje avoid the risks of homogenization under whiteness?
6. Given Quijano’s analysis of the coloniality of power, how might cultural appropriation look like in Latin American contexts?

1. How does racial hierarchy function in different Latin American contexts, according to Quijano?
2. How does whiteness function in different Latin American contexts
3. How does racial hierarchy in Latin America compare to the Anglo-American context?
4. Might mestizaje be better understood not in a strict racial sense, as mere racial mixing, but in a cultural sense, as a transculturation characteristic of Latin American identities?
5. Would a cultural understanding of mestizaje avoid the risks of homogenization under whiteness?
6. Given Quijano’s analysis of the coloniality of power, how might cultural appropriation look like in Latin American contexts?

1. How is taste racialized in Vasconcelos’ ideal of mestizo culture
2. Vasconcelos’ mestizaje assumes racial essentialism. Can mestizaje avoid being construed on racial essentialism?
3. Can a reading of Vasconcelos’ mestizaje as cultural integration avoid the issues?
4. How might Vasconcelos’ understanding of mestizaje and race hinder, rather than promote, racial justice?
5. Vasconcelos partly aims at unifying Latin American identity. Is it unproblematic to talk about a Latin American culture characterized by mestizaje?
   

1. How is taste racialized in Vasconcelos’ ideal of mestizo culture
2. Vasconcelos’ mestizaje assumes racial essentialism. Can mestizaje avoid being construed on racial essentialism?
3. Can a reading of Vasconcelos’ mestizaje as cultural integration avoid the issues?
4. How might Vasconcelos’ understanding of mestizaje and race hinder, rather than promote, racial justice?
5. Vasconcelos partly aims at unifying Latin American identity. Is it unproblematic to talk about a Latin American culture characterized by mestizaje?
   

1. The dialectical process described by Villoro centres the mestizo. What does this mean for Indigenous identities?
2. What role do aesthetic practices play in the presumed revalorization of Indigenous identities by Indigenismo?
3. What do Indigenista aesthetic practices look like?
4. Should integration be the aim of multicultural States?
5. Is integration consistent with anti-racist commitments that seek to achieve justice for Indigenous peoples?
6. If integration of Indigenous peoples cannot be done without marginalizing them, how can mestizos construct their identity? What alternatives are there?
7. Could an understanding of mestizo identity as being in-between rather than as including and overcoming Indigenous identities avoid the issues? Mexican existentialist Emilio Uranga, for example, uses the Nahuatl concept of Nepantla to designate the sense of being in-between characteristic of mestizo identities.
   

1. The dialectical process described by Villoro centres the mestizo. What does this mean for Indigenous identities?
2. What role do aesthetic practices play in the presumed revalorization of Indigenous identities by Indigenismo?
3. What do Indigenista aesthetic practices look like?
4. Should integration be the aim of multicultural States?
5. Is integration consistent with anti-racist commitments that seek to achieve justice for Indigenous peoples?
6. If integration of Indigenous peoples cannot be done without marginalizing them, how can mestizos construct their identity? What alternatives are there?
7. Could an understanding of mestizo identity as being in-between rather than as including and overcoming Indigenous identities avoid the issues? Mexican existentialist Emilio Uranga, for example, uses the Nahuatl concept of Nepantla to designate the sense of being in-between characteristic of mestizo identities.
   

1. How does Castellanos’ Indigenismo fit within the dialectical process identified by Villoro?
2. What characterises the in-betweenness of mestizas in Castellanos’ Indigenismo?
3. Does the emphasis on solitude in Tarica’s analysis of Castellano’s protagonist avoid the problems of certain versions of Indigenismo?
4. What can this analysis illuminate about the situation of mestizas, and women more generally, in the coloniality of power?
5. What can this analysis illuminate about the situation of Indigenous women in particular in Latin American societies?

1. How does Castellanos’ Indigenismo fit within the dialectical process identified by Villoro?
2. What characterises the in-betweenness of mestizas in Castellanos’ Indigenismo?
3. Does the emphasis on solitude in Tarica’s analysis of Castellano’s protagonist avoid the problems of certain versions of Indigenismo?
4. What can this analysis illuminate about the situation of mestizas, and women more generally, in the coloniality of power?
5. What can this analysis illuminate about the situation of Indigenous women in particular in Latin American societies?

1. In what sense are aesthetics and politics interlinked in Mariátegui’s criticism of literature?
2. What is his criticism of critical hegemony behind the Latin American literary canon?
3. How might the process of formation of Peruvian literature relate to Villoro’s description of the three moments of Indigenismo in Mexico?
4. How is the white-Eurocentric mestizaje reflected in the different periods of Peruvian literature identified by Mariátegui?
5. In what sense does César Vallejo embody “genuine Americanism”, according to Mariátegui?
6. How does Mariátegui understand Indigenismo?
7. How might Quijano’s coloniality of power explain Mariátegui’s anti-Black attitudes?

1. In what sense are aesthetics and politics interlinked in Mariátegui’s criticism of literature?
2. What is his criticism of critical hegemony behind the Latin American literary canon?
3. How might the process of formation of Peruvian literature relate to Villoro’s description of the three moments of Indigenismo in Mexico?
4. How is the white-Eurocentric mestizaje reflected in the different periods of Peruvian literature identified by Mariátegui?
5. In what sense does César Vallejo embody “genuine Americanism”, according to Mariátegui?
6. How does Mariátegui understand Indigenismo?
7. How might Quijano’s coloniality of power explain Mariátegui’s anti-Black attitudes?

1. How can Quijano’s coloniality of power help explain the lack of recognition of Afro-Latin communities as distinct cultural groups?
2. What role does the lack of recognition of Black aesthetics in Latin America play in this erasure?
3. If Latin American aesthetic practices have recognizable roots in the African diaspora, what has driven the difference in the role Blackness and Indigenous identities play in the constitution of mestizo identity?
4. How does the lack of recognition of Black aesthetics in Latin America contribute to the invisibility of Afro-Latin communities both in Latin American countries and in Latinx communities in the U.S.?
5. Given the cultural diversity of the African diaspora, how should we interpret this call for recognition of distinct Afro-Latin groups? Should it be interpreted as a call for recognizing a pan-Afro-Latin identity, similar to some understandings of mestizo identity (like Vasconcelos’)?

1. How can Quijano’s coloniality of power help explain the lack of recognition of Afro-Latin communities as distinct cultural groups?
2. What role does the lack of recognition of Black aesthetics in Latin America play in this erasure?
3. If Latin American aesthetic practices have recognizable roots in the African diaspora, what has driven the difference in the role Blackness and Indigenous identities play in the constitution of mestizo identity?
4. How does the lack of recognition of Black aesthetics in Latin America contribute to the invisibility of Afro-Latin communities both in Latin American countries and in Latinx communities in the U.S.?
5. Given the cultural diversity of the African diaspora, how should we interpret this call for recognition of distinct Afro-Latin groups? Should it be interpreted as a call for recognizing a pan-Afro-Latin identity, similar to some understandings of mestizo identity (like Vasconcelos’)?

1. In what sense do we find in negrista poetry anti-Black attitudes? How have they evolved?
2. Does the representation of Afro-Latin women involve racist attitudes directed specifically at Black women? Has this representation evolved in Latin American poetry?
3. Contrast representations of Indigenous peoples in Indigenismo with representations of Afro-Latin communities in mestizo identity. What is the difference?
4. Mestizo identity is characterised as displaced insofar as it emerges in between Spanish and Indigenous cultures. Is Afro-Latin identity also characteristically displaced in the same way?
5. Isn’t there a tension between Hooker’s claim that Afro-Latin communities are not recognised as distinct cultural groups, and the exoticization of Afro-Latin communities in/through art as examined by Carter? How can these claims be consistent?

1. In what sense do we find in negrista poetry anti-Black attitudes? How have they evolved?
2. Does the representation of Afro-Latin women involve racist attitudes directed specifically at Black women? Has this representation evolved in Latin American poetry?
3. Contrast representations of Indigenous peoples in Indigenismo with representations of Afro-Latin communities in mestizo identity. What is the difference?
4. Mestizo identity is characterised as displaced insofar as it emerges in between Spanish and Indigenous cultures. Is Afro-Latin identity also characteristically displaced in the same way?
5. Isn’t there a tension between Hooker’s claim that Afro-Latin communities are not recognised as distinct cultural groups, and the exoticization of Afro-Latin communities in/through art as examined by Carter? How can these claims be consistent?

1. How might we analyse the erasure of Latin America’s third root in light of the coloniality of power?
2. How do issues related to the African diaspora in Latin America relate to issues that emerge from Indigenismo?
3. How can mestizo culture acknowledge its African heritage without engaging in appropriation that contributes to the marginalization of Afro-Latin communities?
4. Could Vasconcelos’ cosmic race be rehabilitated to counteract a notion of mestizaje that leaves out the contributions of the African diaspora to analyse mestizo identity merely in light of Spanish and Indigenous cultures?
5. How does the notion of mestizaje look like once Afro-Latin cultures are acknowledged?
6. Should we speak of mestizo consciousness as being in-between three different identities?
7. What would that mean for Afro-Latin identities?

1. How might we analyse the erasure of Latin America’s third root in light of the coloniality of power?
2. How do issues related to the African diaspora in Latin America relate to issues that emerge from Indigenismo?
3. How can mestizo culture acknowledge its African heritage without engaging in appropriation that contributes to the marginalization of Afro-Latin communities?
4. Could Vasconcelos’ cosmic race be rehabilitated to counteract a notion of mestizaje that leaves out the contributions of the African diaspora to analyse mestizo identity merely in light of Spanish and Indigenous cultures?
5. How does the notion of mestizaje look like once Afro-Latin cultures are acknowledged?
6. Should we speak of mestizo consciousness as being in-between three different identities?
7. What would that mean for Afro-Latin identities?

1. By displacing Vasconcelos’ ideal of mestizaje from the Latin American context that is constituted by the coloniality of power, and by using it to analyse the situation of Latinx populations in USA, can Anzaldúa overcome the criticisms faced by Vasconcelos’ cosmic race?
2. Can Anzaldúa’s nueva mestiza preserve a distinction between mestizo, Indigenous, and Afro Latin identities? Should it?
3. How does Anzaldúa’s intersectional analysis of mestiza culture relate to Castellanos’ protagonist who is doubly displaced?
4. Given that Anzaldúa’s nueva mestiza is not only in-between in the sense of not being Indigenous, nor Black, nor white, but in the sense of being Mexican-American, should we identify in the nueva mestiza a third displacement?
5. Given the different dimensions of displacement of mestizas in the U.S. context and in the Latin American context, should we treat them as a different kind of mestizo consciousness?
6. What can they illuminate about each other?

1. By displacing Vasconcelos’ ideal of mestizaje from the Latin American context that is constituted by the coloniality of power, and by using it to analyse the situation of Latinx populations in USA, can Anzaldúa overcome the criticisms faced by Vasconcelos’ cosmic race?
2. Can Anzaldúa’s nueva mestiza preserve a distinction between mestizo, Indigenous, and Afro Latin identities? Should it?
3. How does Anzaldúa’s intersectional analysis of mestiza culture relate to Castellanos’ protagonist who is doubly displaced?
4. Given that Anzaldúa’s nueva mestiza is not only in-between in the sense of not being Indigenous, nor Black, nor white, but in the sense of being Mexican-American, should we identify in the nueva mestiza a third displacement?
5. Given the different dimensions of displacement of mestizas in the U.S. context and in the Latin American context, should we treat them as a different kind of mestizo consciousness?
6. What can they illuminate about each other?

1. How might the Chicana/o movement’s emphasis on mestizaje contribute to the invisibility of Afro-Latinxs in the U.S.?
2. Chicana artists and writers posit mestiza consciousness in opposition to a dominant culture: white Americans. This might be helpful when examining Latinx identities in the U.S. But how can their analysis translate to Latin American societies in which mestizaje was partly conceived (either implicitly or explicitly) as being at the service of whiteness and as helping sustain the coloniality of power?
3. Can Chicana’s nueva mestiza help rehabilitate mestizaje in a way that serves Indigenous and Afro-Latin communities?
4. Why does Pérez place special attention to the spiritual dimension of the work by Chicana writers and artists?
5. Does this emphasis on spirituality risk appropriating Indigenous cultures by non-Indigenous Mexican-Americans?
6. How can it avoid falling trap to the excesses of Indigenismo?

1. How might the Chicana/o movement’s emphasis on mestizaje contribute to the invisibility of Afro-Latinxs in the U.S.?
2. Chicana artists and writers posit mestiza consciousness in opposition to a dominant culture: white Americans. This might be helpful when examining Latinx identities in the U.S. But how can their analysis translate to Latin American societies in which mestizaje was partly conceived (either implicitly or explicitly) as being at the service of whiteness and as helping sustain the coloniality of power?
3. Can Chicana’s nueva mestiza help rehabilitate mestizaje in a way that serves Indigenous and Afro-Latin communities?
4. Why does Pérez place special attention to the spiritual dimension of the work by Chicana writers and artists?
5. Does this emphasis on spirituality risk appropriating Indigenous cultures by non-Indigenous Mexican-Americans?
6. How can it avoid falling trap to the excesses of Indigenismo?

Abstract: This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge out of a complex dynamic feedback system at the subpersonal level. Moreover reflection on the role of eye movements in visual perception establishes a further sense in which a distinction between sensorimotor behaviour and cognition cannot be sustained. The sensorimotor theory has recently come under critical fire (see e.g. Block, J Philos CII(5):259–272, 2005; Prinz, Psyche, 12(1):1–19, 2006; Aizawa, J Philos CIV(1), 2007) for mistaking a merely causal contribution of action to perception for a constitutive contribution. We further argue that the sensorimotor theory is particularly vulnerable to this objection in a way that Hurley’s active perception theory is not. This presents an additional reason for preferring Hurley’s theory as providing a conceptual framework for the enactive programme.

Historically, almost all psychological theories of emotion have proposed that emotional reactions are constituted by the body in some fashion, but those theories utilized a common metaphor that the body and mind are separate and independent forces in an emotional episode. Current embodiment theories of the mind challenge this assumption, however, by suggesting that the body helps to constitute the mind in shaping an emotional response. We briefly review new theories of embodied cognition in light of accumulating findings from emotion research, to lay the foundation for novel hypotheses about how the conceptual system for emotion is constituted and used. Finally, we discuss how an embodied perspective can help to usher in a paradigm shift in scientific approaches to what emotions are and how they work

From the introduction: This paper seeks to begin to fill a gap that thus exists both in existential phenomenology and feminist theory. It traces in a provisional way some of the basic modalities of feminine body comportment, manner of moving, and relation in space. It brings intelligibility and significance to certain observable and rather ordinary ways in which women in our society typically comport themselves and move differently from the ways that men do. In accordance with the existentialist concern with the situatedness of human experience, I make no claim to the universality of this typicality of the bodily comportment of women and the phenonemological description based on it. The account developed here claims only to describe the modalities of feminine bodily existence for women situated in contemporary advanced industrial, urban, and commercial society. Elements of the account developed here may or may not apply to the situation of woman in other societies and other epoch, but it is not the concern of this paper to determine to which, if any, other social circumstances this account applies.

A source of tension between Philosophers of Mathematics and Mathematicians is the fact that each group feels ignored by the other; daily mathematical practice seems barely affected by the questions the Philosophers are considering. In this talk I will describe an issue that does have an impact on mathematical practice, and a philosophical stance on mathematics that is detectable in the work of practising mathematicians. No doubt controversially, I will call this issue ‘morality’, but the term is not of my coining: there are mathematicians across the world who use the word ‘morally’ to great effect in private, and I propose that there should be a public theory of what they mean by this. The issue arises because proofs, despite being revered as the backbone of mathematical truth, often contribute very little to a mathematician’s understanding. ‘Moral’ considerations, however, contribute a great deal. I will first describe what these ‘moral’ considerations might be, and why mathematicians have appropriated the word ‘morality’ for this notion. However, not all mathematicians are concerned with such notions, and I will give a characterisation of ‘moralist’ mathematics and ‘moralist’ mathematicians, and discuss the development of ‘morality’ in individuals and in mathematics as a whole. Finally, I will propose a theory for standardising or universalising a system of mathematical morality, and discuss how this might help in the development of good mathematics.

1. Cheng complains about philosophy of mathematics having no relevance to mathematical practice, and even gives a short dialogue featuring an obstinate philosopher. What do you think the impact of philosophy of mathematics on mathematics should be?
2. What is Cheng’s notion of “mathematical moral truth”? Do you think it picks out a robust phenomenon?
3. Cheng says morality is about “how mathematics ought to behave”. What kind of normativity do you think she has in mind?
4. What is the connection between expertise and feelings of mathematical morality?
5. Should/would a mathematician on a desert island do mathematics differently?

1. Cheng complains about philosophy of mathematics having no relevance to mathematical practice, and even gives a short dialogue featuring an obstinate philosopher. What do you think the impact of philosophy of mathematics on mathematics should be?
2. What is Cheng’s notion of “mathematical moral truth”? Do you think it picks out a robust phenomenon?
3. Cheng says morality is about “how mathematics ought to behave”. What kind of normativity do you think she has in mind?
4. What is the connection between expertise and feelings of mathematical morality?
5. Should/would a mathematician on a desert island do mathematics differently?

1. Which of the listed qualities of good mathematics would benefit most from philosophical analysis?
2. Are some qualities of good mathematics more important than others?
3. Do you think mathematicians would agree on how to apply the various qualities? For example, would they agree on what counts as: rigorous maths? good pedagogy? mathematical beauty? good taste?
4. Do you agree with Tao that the standards of good mathematics in a field should be constantly debated and updated? Or do there exist eternal standards of good mathematics?

1. Which of the listed qualities of good mathematics would benefit most from philosophical analysis?
2. Are some qualities of good mathematics more important than others?
3. Do you think mathematicians would agree on how to apply the various qualities? For example, would they agree on what counts as: rigorous maths? good pedagogy? mathematical beauty? good taste?
4. Do you agree with Tao that the standards of good mathematics in a field should be constantly debated and updated? Or do there exist eternal standards of good mathematics?

1. People often talk of proofs giving an unusual sense of certainty in what they prove, that it can be no other way. Can this be reconciled with De Toffoli’s fallibilist account?
2. Do you think proofs should be shareable?
3. De Toffoli says an argument that is convincing for aliens might not be shareable with humans. How do you think alien proofs might be different from human ones?
4. Is having a simil-proof enough to justify a mathematical belief?
5. Will what counts as a proof change over time? What about what counts as a simil-proof?

1. People often talk of proofs giving an unusual sense of certainty in what they prove, that it can be no other way. Can this be reconciled with De Toffoli’s fallibilist account?
2. Do you think proofs should be shareable?
3. De Toffoli says an argument that is convincing for aliens might not be shareable with humans. How do you think alien proofs might be different from human ones?
4. Is having a simil-proof enough to justify a mathematical belief?
5. Will what counts as a proof change over time? What about what counts as a simil-proof?

We investigate the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions for the case of mathematical knowledge. The availability of a formalizable mathematical proof appears to be a natural criterion:

(*) X knows that p is true iff X has available a formalizable proof of p.

Yet, formalizability plays no major role in actual mathematical practice. We present results of an empirical study, which suggest that certain readings of (*) are not necessarily employed by mathematicians when ascribing knowledge. Further, we argue that the concept of mathematical knowledge underlying the actual use of “to know” in mathematical practice is compatible with certain philosophical intuitions, but seems to differ from philosophical knowledge conceptions underlying (*).

1. Why do you think mathematicians might say they believe one thing, while applying different standards in practice?
2. How surprising are the findings?
3. What do Müller-Hill’s results mean for the nature of mathematical knowledge?
   

1. Why do you think mathematicians might say they believe one thing, while applying different standards in practice?
2. How surprising are the findings?
3. What do Müller-Hill’s results mean for the nature of mathematical knowledge?
   

1. What are some of the ways that expertise is important in mathematics? What might it mean to be an expert mathematician?
2. How important is it for maths papers to go through peer review?
3. Should mathematicians rely on testimony? When is it acceptable to do so?
4. Should mathematicians be epistemically autonomous? Under what circumstances?
5. What reasons can you think of that someone might claim to have checked a proof when they actually haven’t?

1. What are some of the ways that expertise is important in mathematics? What might it mean to be an expert mathematician?
2. How important is it for maths papers to go through peer review?
3. Should mathematicians rely on testimony? When is it acceptable to do so?
4. Should mathematicians be epistemically autonomous? Under what circumstances?
5. What reasons can you think of that someone might claim to have checked a proof when they actually haven’t?

1. Do mathematicians have a special level of agreement?
2. These results do not fit well with the general view that a piece of reasoning is either a proof or it isn’t. What do these results mean for the nature of proof?

1. Do mathematicians have a special level of agreement?
2. These results do not fit well with the general view that a piece of reasoning is either a proof or it isn’t. What do these results mean for the nature of proof?

1. Easwaran discusses mathematical discovery, from students solving homework questions to mathematicians working on open problems, as a process of defeasible reasoning. Can we ever get certainty from mathematics on this picture?
2. Should proofs be transferable? Should they be convertible? What reasons might there be to reject this?
3. Easwaran links his notion of transferability to the intellectual virtue of epistemic autonomy (like Andersen et al. did above). What other intellectual virtues might it link to?
4. If convertibility is incompatible with relying on testimony in mathematics, is one of them more important than the other? Which would you rather give up?
5. In what ways can mistaken proofs still be valuable?
   

1. Easwaran discusses mathematical discovery, from students solving homework questions to mathematicians working on open problems, as a process of defeasible reasoning. Can we ever get certainty from mathematics on this picture?
2. Should proofs be transferable? Should they be convertible? What reasons might there be to reject this?
3. Easwaran links his notion of transferability to the intellectual virtue of epistemic autonomy (like Andersen et al. did above). What other intellectual virtues might it link to?
4. If convertibility is incompatible with relying on testimony in mathematics, is one of them more important than the other? Which would you rather give up?
5. In what ways can mistaken proofs still be valuable?
   

We present a case study of how mathematicians write for mathematicians. We have conducted interviews with two research mathematicians, the talented PhD student Adam and his experienced supervisor Thomas, about a research paper they wrote together. Over the course of 2 years, Adam and Thomas revised Adam’s very detailed first draft. At the beginning of this collaboration, Adam was very knowledgeable about the subject of the paper and had good presentational skills but, as a new PhD student, did not yet have experience writing research papers for mathematicians. Thus, one main purpose of revising the paper was to make it take into account the intended audience. For this reason, the changes made to the initial draft and the authors’ purpose in making them provide a window for viewing how mathematicians write for mathematicians. We examined how their paper attracts the interest of the reader and prepares their proofs for validation by the reader. Among other findings, we found that their paper prepares the proofs for two types of validation that the reader can easily switch between.

1. What are the two levels that a mathematical article is arguing at? How are they related?
2. How much does of the writing process described by Andersen et al. tracks making the paper’s proofs more transferable in Easwaran’s sense?
3. To what extent should telling a coherent story about the mathematics affect how it is validated?
4. What does the collaboration between supervisor and student tell us about mathematical collaboration?
5. What does the way a paper is best written in maths tell us about how mathematicians pass knowledge from one to another?

1. What are the two levels that a mathematical article is arguing at? How are they related?
2. How much does of the writing process described by Andersen et al. tracks making the paper’s proofs more transferable in Easwaran’s sense?
3. To what extent should telling a coherent story about the mathematics affect how it is validated?
4. What does the collaboration between supervisor and student tell us about mathematical collaboration?
5. What does the way a paper is best written in maths tell us about how mathematicians pass knowledge from one to another?

1. It is fairly unusual for an amateur to make important discoveries in maths. How could it be made more open to this kind of contribution? Should it?

1. It is fairly unusual for an amateur to make important discoveries in maths. How could it be made more open to this kind of contribution? Should it?

1. What social mechanisms were used to exclude women from professional mathematical practices?
2. One common theme is that the work of women mathematicians has been obscured to the historical record in various ways. How do you think this perpetuates stereotypes today?
3. To what extent were supposedly objective judgements of mathematics used to make biased assessments of women’s work?
4. Why is it valuable to research the history of mathematics?
   

1. What social mechanisms were used to exclude women from professional mathematical practices?
2. One common theme is that the work of women mathematicians has been obscured to the historical record in various ways. How do you think this perpetuates stereotypes today?
3. To what extent were supposedly objective judgements of mathematics used to make biased assessments of women’s work?
4. Why is it valuable to research the history of mathematics?
   

1. How has the gender gap in mathematics continued in present day mathematics?
2. How objective is mathematical peer review?
   

1. How has the gender gap in mathematics continued in present day mathematics?
2. How objective is mathematical peer review?
   

1. Does the 4CT represent a significant change to mathematical practice
2. Does a computer proof like that of the 4CT lack certain virtues that we would want from a proof?
3. Can mathematics have empirical elements? Should maths use experiments?
4. Are computer proofs more or less fallible than human proofs?
5. Returning to the questions of week 1 above about the relation between philosophy and mathematics, who gets to decide whether the computer proof of the 4CT is properly part of mathematics?
6. How does surveyability and the “easy reproduction of a proof” relate to the notions of shareability, transferability and convertibility seen in previous readings?
   

1. Does the 4CT represent a significant change to mathematical practice
2. Does a computer proof like that of the 4CT lack certain virtues that we would want from a proof?
3. Can mathematics have empirical elements? Should maths use experiments?
4. Are computer proofs more or less fallible than human proofs?
5. Returning to the questions of week 1 above about the relation between philosophy and mathematics, who gets to decide whether the computer proof of the 4CT is properly part of mathematics?
6. How does surveyability and the “easy reproduction of a proof” relate to the notions of shareability, transferability and convertibility seen in previous readings?
   

1. How can collaborating with a computer affect how one does mathematics?
2. Is working with a computer different to collaborating with another human mathematician? Will this change what the “negotiations” are?
   

1. How can collaborating with a computer affect how one does mathematics?
2. Is working with a computer different to collaborating with another human mathematician? Will this change what the “negotiations” are?
   

1. Many traditional approaches to proof rule out diagrams as an extraneous part of proofs that cannot play an essential role. How well does that stand up to De Toffoli & Giardino’s case study?
2. What is the role of manipulative imagination in mathematical reasoning in topology?
3. How much do you think being able to “see” topological transformations depends on being an experienced topologist? Does intuition have to be trained?
4. What is the relationship between a normal topology proof and a formalisation of it? What does a formalisation capture? What might it miss?
5. Is a subcommunity of mathematics free to choose any criteria of validity they like for proofs?

1. Many traditional approaches to proof rule out diagrams as an extraneous part of proofs that cannot play an essential role. How well does that stand up to De Toffoli & Giardino’s case study?
2. What is the role of manipulative imagination in mathematical reasoning in topology?
3. How much do you think being able to “see” topological transformations depends on being an experienced topologist? Does intuition have to be trained?
4. What is the relationship between a normal topology proof and a formalisation of it? What does a formalisation capture? What might it miss?
5. Is a subcommunity of mathematics free to choose any criteria of validity they like for proofs?

1. How might the active presentation of a diagram aid the audience’s manipulative imagination?
2. How important are the physical materials of mathematics?
3. I was once subjected to a training day in which a Pro-Dean of Research declared they wanted to remove all blackboards from the maths department. Would this make a difference to the mathematical practices? What about to the mathematics produced?
   

1. How might the active presentation of a diagram aid the audience’s manipulative imagination?
2. How important are the physical materials of mathematics?
3. I was once subjected to a training day in which a Pro-Dean of Research declared they wanted to remove all blackboards from the maths department. Would this make a difference to the mathematical practices? What about to the mathematics produced?
   

1. Do you think it is important that diagrams are dispensable in a mathematical proof?
2. What are the two senses of visualisation that Carter discusses? Are the two related?
3. In what sense are the diagrams Carter considers essential to the discovery of proofs and definitions?
4. How do you think a mathematician might read a paper in which the diagrams have been omitted? Would they reconstruct them to gain understanding?
5. Compare Carter’s claims with those of De Toffoli & Giardino before. In one case the focus is on the context of discovery, while the other is on the context of justification. How separate are these contexts? Are the claims in these papers in tension?
   

1. Do you think it is important that diagrams are dispensable in a mathematical proof?
2. What are the two senses of visualisation that Carter discusses? Are the two related?
3. In what sense are the diagrams Carter considers essential to the discovery of proofs and definitions?
4. How do you think a mathematician might read a paper in which the diagrams have been omitted? Would they reconstruct them to gain understanding?
5. Compare Carter’s claims with those of De Toffoli & Giardino before. In one case the focus is on the context of discovery, while the other is on the context of justification. How separate are these contexts? Are the claims in these papers in tension?
   

1. What makes a practice like string-figure making or sand-drawing mathematical?
2. What is the relationship between mathematics and culture?
3. How are the sand-drawing practices similar to Carter’s diagram case studies? How are they different?
   

1. What makes a practice like string-figure making or sand-drawing mathematical?
2. What is the relationship between mathematics and culture?
3. How are the sand-drawing practices similar to Carter’s diagram case studies? How are they different?
   

1. Is “massively” collaborative mathematics possible?
2. In their analysis of the mini-polymath, Martin & Pease found a large number of examples being used. What is the role of examples in coming to understand a problem?
3. Are collaborative proofs more reliable?
4. Do you think online mathematics leads to the emergence of its own mathematical culture?
5. Is online mathematics a social machine? Has research mathematics always been a social machine, or is this a radical change in mathematics?
6. Can a social machine “think like a mathematician”? Can it do even better?

1. Is “massively” collaborative mathematics possible?
2. In their analysis of the mini-polymath, Martin & Pease found a large number of examples being used. What is the role of examples in coming to understand a problem?
3. Are collaborative proofs more reliable?
4. Do you think online mathematics leads to the emergence of its own mathematical culture?
5. Is online mathematics a social machine? Has research mathematics always been a social machine, or is this a radical change in mathematics?
6. Can a social machine “think like a mathematician”? Can it do even better?

1. Does it challenge the traditional conception of mathematical knowledge if no mathematician individually knows all of the pieces of the proof of the Classification Theorem?
2. Steingart claims that the circulation of knowledge and adjudication cannot be separated. Is this a necessary feature of mathematical knowledge, or is it a problem for its reliability? Or both/neither?
3. Does this case make us rethink the role of testimony in mathematics?
4. What does the danger of the theorem being “uninvented” mean for the idea that mathematical knowledge is cumulative and eternal?
5. Should the group theorists really be confident that there are only fixable, local errors in the proof, and not a more major error?

1. Does it challenge the traditional conception of mathematical knowledge if no mathematician individually knows all of the pieces of the proof of the Classification Theorem?
2. Steingart claims that the circulation of knowledge and adjudication cannot be separated. Is this a necessary feature of mathematical knowledge, or is it a problem for its reliability? Or both/neither?
3. Does this case make us rethink the role of testimony in mathematics?
4. What does the danger of the theorem being “uninvented” mean for the idea that mathematical knowledge is cumulative and eternal?
5. Should the group theorists really be confident that there are only fixable, local errors in the proof, and not a more major error?

1. Is it okay for proofs to contain errors, so long as they are “fixable”
2. What does it mean to “know a proof”?
3. Who knows the proof of the classification theorem?
4. Should the group theorists really be confident there are no more finite simple groups they’ve missed?
   

1. Is it okay for proofs to contain errors, so long as they are “fixable”
2. What does it mean to “know a proof”?
3. Who knows the proof of the classification theorem?
4. Should the group theorists really be confident there are no more finite simple groups they’ve missed?
   

1. What is the difference between a proof and a proof presentation?
2. Is the peer review process like a dialogue between author and referee? In what ways might it be different?
3. Is mathematics a collaboratively adversarial enterprise?
4. One trouble with the controversy about Mochizuki’s proposed proof of the abc conjecture is the disagreement over who counts as a relevant expert. Who do you think should count?
5. Dutilh Novaes lists a number of different functions of proofs. How well do the various unusual proofs (e.g. probabilistic, computer, diagrammatic, collaborative etc.) we have seen in previous weeks match the different functions?
   

1. What is the difference between a proof and a proof presentation?
2. Is the peer review process like a dialogue between author and referee? In what ways might it be different?
3. Is mathematics a collaboratively adversarial enterprise?
4. One trouble with the controversy about Mochizuki’s proposed proof of the abc conjecture is the disagreement over who counts as a relevant expert. Who do you think should count?
5. Dutilh Novaes lists a number of different functions of proofs. How well do the various unusual proofs (e.g. probabilistic, computer, diagrammatic, collaborative etc.) we have seen in previous weeks match the different functions?
   

1. What does it mean to be intellectually generous?
2. Does being generous make you a better mathematician?
3. What is the relationship between the intellectual virtues of individuals and the state of a subfield of mathematics?
4. Are theorem-credits a good reward system for maths?
5. Will the priority rule always make sure the first person to prove something gets the credit? In what ways might this go wrong?
   

1. What does it mean to be intellectually generous?
2. Does being generous make you a better mathematician?
3. What is the relationship between the intellectual virtues of individuals and the state of a subfield of mathematics?
4. Are theorem-credits a good reward system for maths?
5. Will the priority rule always make sure the first person to prove something gets the credit? In what ways might this go wrong?
   

1. What, according to Tsai, are “state-sponsored symbols”? And what does the example of renaming of the “War Department” to “Department of Defense” try to show?
2. In what sense do political symbols bypass our rational scrutiny? And why is this a problem?
3. What is justice in contrast to legitimacy? And how do these two notions relate to the state’s expressive power?
4. Which noncoercive modes of state influence require special justification? And which do not? (And why is “for your own good” an insufficient justification?)
5. When, if ever, according to Tsai, can nonrational political symbolism be justified? (Keywords to look for include “respecting autonomy” “democratic procedures” “transparency” “publicity” etc.)

1. What, according to Tsai, are “state-sponsored symbols”? And what does the example of renaming of the “War Department” to “Department of Defense” try to show?
2. In what sense do political symbols bypass our rational scrutiny? And why is this a problem?
3. What is justice in contrast to legitimacy? And how do these two notions relate to the state’s expressive power?
4. Which noncoercive modes of state influence require special justification? And which do not? (And why is “for your own good” an insufficient justification?)
5. When, if ever, according to Tsai, can nonrational political symbolism be justified? (Keywords to look for include “respecting autonomy” “democratic procedures” “transparency” “publicity” etc.)

1. What is an ideology? And what is the relation between ideology and social practices? (And it is worth trying to find another example of an ideology that fits the definition in this paper)
2. What, according to Burch-Brown, are the harms of colonialist, racist, or white supremacist symbols? (And do you think these harms are real? Or what would you say to someone who believes that these harms are unreal?)
3. What does it mean to say some monument of an unjust figure is “inert”? And do you think monuments central to current debates are inert?
4. What is the duty of non-erasure (or the duty to of sanitizing history)? And how can it be fulfilled?
5. What, if anything, is problematic about judging historical figures by contemporary moral standards?
6. Is it reasonable to interpret the removal of some symbols as an attack on one’s identity? (And is the social tension that comes with removal bad?)

1. What is an ideology? And what is the relation between ideology and social practices? (And it is worth trying to find another example of an ideology that fits the definition in this paper)
2. What, according to Burch-Brown, are the harms of colonialist, racist, or white supremacist symbols? (And do you think these harms are real? Or what would you say to someone who believes that these harms are unreal?)
3. What does it mean to say some monument of an unjust figure is “inert”? And do you think monuments central to current debates are inert?
4. What is the duty of non-erasure (or the duty to of sanitizing history)? And how can it be fulfilled?
5. What, if anything, is problematic about judging historical figures by contemporary moral standards?
6. Is it reasonable to interpret the removal of some symbols as an attack on one’s identity? (And is the social tension that comes with removal bad?)

1. In what sense do public statues (normally) express positive evaluative attitude towards the figures they represent? (Contrast this to the mere historical importance view and the historical record view. Also consider the claim that statues honour someone as a whole.)
2. What is the difference between participation in a wrongful practice and committing serious rights violation? And why does this distinction matter? (Consider the implications of statue removal according to Frowe’s account if we have different answers to this question.)
3. What is the difference between condemnation and repudiation? And what’s the difference between a state having a duty to condemn and a duty to repudiate? Furthermore, what actions are required of the state when they have such duties?
4. Why may it be wrong to honour someone despite their wrongdoing? (In contrast to merely “because” of their wrongdoing?)
5. Should we confront statues of wrongdoers of the distant past?
6. Consider the lesser evil justification of preserving statues of wrongdoers. Do you think it is plausible?

1. In what sense do public statues (normally) express positive evaluative attitude towards the figures they represent? (Contrast this to the mere historical importance view and the historical record view. Also consider the claim that statues honour someone as a whole.)
2. What is the difference between participation in a wrongful practice and committing serious rights violation? And why does this distinction matter? (Consider the implications of statue removal according to Frowe’s account if we have different answers to this question.)
3. What is the difference between condemnation and repudiation? And what’s the difference between a state having a duty to condemn and a duty to repudiate? Furthermore, what actions are required of the state when they have such duties?
4. Why may it be wrong to honour someone despite their wrongdoing? (In contrast to merely “because” of their wrongdoing?)
5. Should we confront statues of wrongdoers of the distant past?
6. Consider the lesser evil justification of preserving statues of wrongdoers. Do you think it is plausible?

1. What do “degrade” and “alienate” mean?
2. Why doesn’t Lim believe that “counter commemorations” suffice?
3. What are a) the publicity requirement and b) the incorporation requirement?
4. Why does vandalism have a bad reputation? How does Lim address this?
5. Do you think vandalising and preserving is a feasible policy proposal?

1. What do “degrade” and “alienate” mean?
2. Why doesn’t Lim believe that “counter commemorations” suffice?
3. What are a) the publicity requirement and b) the incorporation requirement?
4. Why does vandalism have a bad reputation? How does Lim address this?
5. Do you think vandalising and preserving is a feasible policy proposal?

1. What is derogatory pedestalling? And what does it mean to say that some harmful message is “indirect?”
2. Why, according to Lai, are state-sponsored symbols more harmful than private speech?
3. What are felicity conditions? And how can they be undermined by “counter-speech?” (And why is counter-speech sometimes difficult?)
4. What is the necessity condition? And can the vandalism of tainted symbols ever meet this condition?
5. Is the vandalism of problematic symbols intolerant?

1. What is derogatory pedestalling? And what does it mean to say that some harmful message is “indirect?”
2. Why, according to Lai, are state-sponsored symbols more harmful than private speech?
3. What are felicity conditions? And how can they be undermined by “counter-speech?” (And why is counter-speech sometimes difficult?)
4. What is the necessity condition? And can the vandalism of tainted symbols ever meet this condition?
5. Is the vandalism of problematic symbols intolerant?

1. Why does Shahvisi hold that removal can educate us about history better than letting monuments stand as they are?
2. In what sense can speech acts be performed by objects? (What are speech acts? And in what sense can objects communicate messages?) and what are the illocutionary and perlucutionary acts typical of monuments and statues?
3. What do slurs do? And in what sense are certain monuments similar to slurs?
4. Why may museums not be the best place to display problematic monuments? And can the problem raised regarding museums be overcome?
5. Why is in situ contextualisation often insufficient?

1. Why does Shahvisi hold that removal can educate us about history better than letting monuments stand as they are?
2. In what sense can speech acts be performed by objects? (What are speech acts? And in what sense can objects communicate messages?) and what are the illocutionary and perlucutionary acts typical of monuments and statues?
3. What do slurs do? And in what sense are certain monuments similar to slurs?
4. Why may museums not be the best place to display problematic monuments? And can the problem raised regarding museums be overcome?
5. Why is in situ contextualisation often insufficient?

1. What are “cold” monuments? And what does it mean for a commemoration to become “hot?”
2. How can objectivity be “abused” regarding monuments? (And how can this abuse prevent critically examining history?)
3. What does it mean to say that “history is put into service to the living? What sorts of services can be provided?
4. Why, according to Miranda, is “greatness” not the best criterion?
5. How can political vandalism be a form of critical engagement with history?

1. What are “cold” monuments? And what does it mean for a commemoration to become “hot?”
2. How can objectivity be “abused” regarding monuments? (And how can this abuse prevent critically examining history?)
3. What does it mean to say that “history is put into service to the living? What sorts of services can be provided?
4. Why, according to Miranda, is “greatness” not the best criterion?
5. How can political vandalism be a form of critical engagement with history?

1. How can a piece of art be adopted to represent a group’s attitude?
2. What does it mean to say that a piece of art is addressed to a group?
3. What are robustly shared values?
4. How can art engage with, e.g. challenge or propose, joint commitments?
5. Can the persistent of street art evidence community’s approval? (Please consider alternative explanations to the persistence.)
6. Consider the publicity and subtlety of art with regard to (group) emotions, and art’s advantage over propositional statements.

1. How can a piece of art be adopted to represent a group’s attitude?
2. What does it mean to say that a piece of art is addressed to a group?
3. What are robustly shared values?
4. How can art engage with, e.g. challenge or propose, joint commitments?
5. Can the persistent of street art evidence community’s approval? (Please consider alternative explanations to the persistence.)
6. Consider the publicity and subtlety of art with regard to (group) emotions, and art’s advantage over propositional statements.

1. What does it mean to “answer” wrong?
2. What is wrong, according to Bell, with the “harm-based argument”?
3. What is contempt? And when is contempt “apt”? (And what are “vices of superiority”?)
4. What are the four primary reasons methods of dehonouring is super to simple removal?
5. What, if anything, is wrong with taking pleasure in confronting racism?

1. What does it mean to “answer” wrong?
2. What is wrong, according to Bell, with the “harm-based argument”?
3. What is contempt? And when is contempt “apt”? (And what are “vices of superiority”?)
4. What are the four primary reasons methods of dehonouring is super to simple removal?
5. What, if anything, is wrong with taking pleasure in confronting racism?

1. What is simple preservationism and why is it implausible? (Consider the strengths recontextualised preservationism has over simple preservationism.)
2. In what sense do some objectionable commemorations totally fail to connect to the past? And why, according to Lai, do those that seem to connect to the past also sometimes hinder connecting to the past?
3. Consider when and why vandalised or defaced commemorations may present better opportunities to than learning in schools, museums, through documentaries etc.
4. What is repudiatory honouring? And how does it help to connect to the past or contribute to learning historical lessons?
5. Do you think repudiatory honouring captures all the purported historical values of vandalised or defaced objectionable commemorations?

1. What is simple preservationism and why is it implausible? (Consider the strengths recontextualised preservationism has over simple preservationism.)
2. In what sense do some objectionable commemorations totally fail to connect to the past? And why, according to Lai, do those that seem to connect to the past also sometimes hinder connecting to the past?
3. Consider when and why vandalised or defaced commemorations may present better opportunities to than learning in schools, museums, through documentaries etc.
4. What is repudiatory honouring? And how does it help to connect to the past or contribute to learning historical lessons?
5. Do you think repudiatory honouring captures all the purported historical values of vandalised or defaced objectionable commemorations?

1. Why does the author think that talking about “good cases” is (also) important? (Note that questions of this sort lead us to understand why a paper makes a contribution to the literature.
2. What is “naïve admiration” and why is it difficult to uphold through time?
3. Action cannot be easily separated from a person’s intention, reasons, and motivations. What problem does this create for our admiration practices? (Please consider in light of the appropriateness problem and the rationality problem.)
4. What is de facto eliminativism and why isn’t it something we should accept according to Berninger? (Reflecting upon Helen Frowe’s paper would be interesting.)
5. Try to iterate with your own words what the fictionalism Berninger proposes is. Try also to consider whether some form of fictionalism is something we really do when engaging in commemorative practices. And before moving onto section 5, try to think why it avoids the appropriateness problem and rationality problem, and consider why some may find this position unacceptable.
6. If fictionalism is correct, can we still discover historical facts that lead us to stop commemorating certain figures?

1. Why does the author think that talking about “good cases” is (also) important? (Note that questions of this sort lead us to understand why a paper makes a contribution to the literature.
2. What is “naïve admiration” and why is it difficult to uphold through time?
3. Action cannot be easily separated from a person’s intention, reasons, and motivations. What problem does this create for our admiration practices? (Please consider in light of the appropriateness problem and the rationality problem.)
4. What is de facto eliminativism and why isn’t it something we should accept according to Berninger? (Reflecting upon Helen Frowe’s paper would be interesting.)
5. Try to iterate with your own words what the fictionalism Berninger proposes is. Try also to consider whether some form of fictionalism is something we really do when engaging in commemorative practices. And before moving onto section 5, try to think why it avoids the appropriateness problem and rationality problem, and consider why some may find this position unacceptable.
6. If fictionalism is correct, can we still discover historical facts that lead us to stop commemorating certain figures?

1. Why does Fabre believe that collective shame and pride don’t constitute sufficient reason to commemorate wars of the community’s past?
2. When, if ever, should we be grateful to those who have participated in wars that benefited us and/or contributed to our existence?
3. How can commemorating wars be exclusionary? (i.e., further marginalises the marginalised)
4. Fabre holds that “as a participant in a political relationship” one may have reasons to commemorate certain wars. How different is this from the collective shame/pride consideration?
5. What are the appropriate emotions felt towards war (and the specific events that happened during war)?

1. Why does Fabre believe that collective shame and pride don’t constitute sufficient reason to commemorate wars of the community’s past?
2. When, if ever, should we be grateful to those who have participated in wars that benefited us and/or contributed to our existence?
3. How can commemorating wars be exclusionary? (i.e., further marginalises the marginalised)
4. Fabre holds that “as a participant in a political relationship” one may have reasons to commemorate certain wars. How different is this from the collective shame/pride consideration?
5. What are the appropriate emotions felt towards war (and the specific events that happened during war)?

The history of Analytic Philosophy we are familiar with is a story about men. It begins with Frege, Russell, Moore. Wittgenstein appears twice, once as the author of the Tractatus and then again later as the author of the Philosophical Investigations. Between Wittgenstein’s first and second appearance are Carnap and Ayer and the all-male Vienna Circle. Then come the post-second-world war Ordinary Language Philosophers – Ryle, and Austin. After that Strawson and Grice, Quine and Davidson.

The male dominance is not just in the names of the ‘star’ players. Michael Beaney’s 2013 Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy begins by listing the 150 most important analytic philosophers. 146 of them are men. For women who wish to join in this conversation, the odds seem formidably against one.

Today we will be speaking about two of the four women who warrant an entry in Beaney’s list – Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot. We will be talking about them alongside two other women Iris Murdoch and Mary Midgley. We think they should also be in the top 150, but our broader aims are more ambitious than increasing the proportion of important women from 2.7% to 4%.

Questions by Annie McCallion

1. Do you think Mary Midgley, Philippa Foot, Elizabeth Anscombe and Iris Murdoch would have become a philosophical school if the men at Oxford had not gone off to war?
2. How different, if at all, do you think your own philosophical educations would have been if the men of today were at war?
3. Do you think you would be more or less inclined to pursue philosophy as a career after your degree (or become a member of your own philosophical school)?
4. To what extent, if at all, do you think the task of the philosopher is distinct from that of the scientist?
5. Is the separation between philosophy and science an important one? If so, why? If not why not?
6. “Man is a creature who creates pictures of himself then comes to resemble those pictures”: What pictures do you think are prominent within our contemporary culture and in what way do you think we resemble them?
7. Do you think consequentialist moral reasoning corrupts us?
8. How prominent do you think the picture of the philosopher as an enlightenment hero is today? To what extent has this influenced the way you have been taught to approach philosophy?
9. What does doing philosophy collaboratively mean to you?
10. What are some practical ways in which we could create a collaborative environment within this reading group?

Questions by Annie McCallion

1. Do you think Mary Midgley, Philippa Foot, Elizabeth Anscombe and Iris Murdoch would have become a philosophical school if the men at Oxford had not gone off to war?
2. How different, if at all, do you think your own philosophical educations would have been if the men of today were at war?
3. Do you think you would be more or less inclined to pursue philosophy as a career after your degree (or become a member of your own philosophical school)?
4. To what extent, if at all, do you think the task of the philosopher is distinct from that of the scientist?
5. Is the separation between philosophy and science an important one? If so, why? If not why not?
6. “Man is a creature who creates pictures of himself then comes to resemble those pictures”: What pictures do you think are prominent within our contemporary culture and in what way do you think we resemble them?
7. Do you think consequentialist moral reasoning corrupts us?
8. How prominent do you think the picture of the philosopher as an enlightenment hero is today? To what extent has this influenced the way you have been taught to approach philosophy?
9. What does doing philosophy collaboratively mean to you?
10. What are some practical ways in which we could create a collaborative environment within this reading group?

Introduction: Is philosophy like plumbing? I have made this comparison a number of times when I have wanted to stress that philosophising is not just grand and elegant and difficult, but is also needed. It is not optional. The idea has caused mild surprise, and has sometimes been thought rather undignified. The question of dignity is a very interesting one, and I shall come back to it at the end of this article. But first, I would like to work the comparison out a bit more fully.

Questions by Ellie Robson

1. What do you make of Midgley’s analogy between plumbing and philosophy? Is it centrally a methodological comparison that she is trying to make?
   • Why you think the analytic philosopher would describe the philosophical plumber as ‘undignified’
   • Midgley claims ‘when trouble arises, specialized skill is needed if there is to be any hope of locating it and putting it right.’ (139) Do conceptual problems need professional/trained philosophers, just like plumbing needs trained plumbers?
2. What does Midgley suggest is the key role of (philosophical) creativity, (or ‘the poet’) in the myth of philosophical plumbing?
   • (Hint.) Consider the claim that ‘these new suggestions usually come in part from sages who are not full-time philosophers, notably from poetry and the other arts. Shelley was indeed right to say that poets are among the unacknowledged legislators of mankind. They can show us the new vision.’ (140)
3. ‘Great philosophers, then, need a combination of gifts that is extremely rare. They must be lawyers as well as poets. (141)
   • Do you think the roles of the ‘lawyer’ and ‘the poet’ may be combined to make the philosophical plumber? What traits does Midgley suggest we ought to take from both?
4. Midgley claims ‘philosophising is not just grand and elegant and difficult but is also needed. It is not optional’ (139). And ‘It can spoil the lives even of people with little interest in thinking, and its pressure can be vaguely felt by anyone who tries to think at all. (140).
   • To what extent do you think human beings are naturally philosophical beings?
   • Do you think philosophy and human life are necessarily/inherently intertwined with one another?
5. Do you think an overly ‘lawyerly’ approach to philosophy is combative? And if so, is this approach to philosophy is counterproductive to philosophical progress?
6. Can you think of any examples of large-scale issues that have begun to work badly, resulting in a blockage in our thinking?
   • (Hint.) Think of some contemporary problems. What about dualisms of sexuality and its effects on transgender individuals?
7. ‘The specialized scientists who claim that nothing counts as ‘science’ except the negative results of control-experiments performed inside laboratories, and the specialized historians who insist that only value-free, non-interpreted bits of information can count as history.’ (141)
   • Can you think of any examples of these kind of thinkers?
8. What do you think of the broader analogy between water and thought that runs throughout this paper?
   • (Hint.) Consider the quote ‘The conceptual schemes used in every study are not stagnant ponds; they are streams that are fed from our everyday thinking, are altered by the learned, and eventually flow back into it and influence our lives.’ (141). And ‘Useful and familiar though water is, it is not really tame stuff. It is life-giving and it is wild.’ (149)

Questions by Ellie Robson

1. What do you make of Midgley’s analogy between plumbing and philosophy? Is it centrally a methodological comparison that she is trying to make?
   • Why you think the analytic philosopher would describe the philosophical plumber as ‘undignified’
   • Midgley claims ‘when trouble arises, specialized skill is needed if there is to be any hope of locating it and putting it right.’ (139) Do conceptual problems need professional/trained philosophers, just like plumbing needs trained plumbers?
2. What does Midgley suggest is the key role of (philosophical) creativity, (or ‘the poet’) in the myth of philosophical plumbing?
   • (Hint.) Consider the claim that ‘these new suggestions usually come in part from sages who are not full-time philosophers, notably from poetry and the other arts. Shelley was indeed right to say that poets are among the unacknowledged legislators of mankind. They can show us the new vision.’ (140)
3. ‘Great philosophers, then, need a combination of gifts that is extremely rare. They must be lawyers as well as poets. (141)
   • Do you think the roles of the ‘lawyer’ and ‘the poet’ may be combined to make the philosophical plumber? What traits does Midgley suggest we ought to take from both?
4. Midgley claims ‘philosophising is not just grand and elegant and difficult but is also needed. It is not optional’ (139). And ‘It can spoil the lives even of people with little interest in thinking, and its pressure can be vaguely felt by anyone who tries to think at all. (140).
   • To what extent do you think human beings are naturally philosophical beings?
   • Do you think philosophy and human life are necessarily/inherently intertwined with one another?
5. Do you think an overly ‘lawyerly’ approach to philosophy is combative? And if so, is this approach to philosophy is counterproductive to philosophical progress?
6. Can you think of any examples of large-scale issues that have begun to work badly, resulting in a blockage in our thinking?
   • (Hint.) Think of some contemporary problems. What about dualisms of sexuality and its effects on transgender individuals?
7. ‘The specialized scientists who claim that nothing counts as ‘science’ except the negative results of control-experiments performed inside laboratories, and the specialized historians who insist that only value-free, non-interpreted bits of information can count as history.’ (141)
   • Can you think of any examples of these kind of thinkers?
8. What do you think of the broader analogy between water and thought that runs throughout this paper?
   • (Hint.) Consider the quote ‘The conceptual schemes used in every study are not stagnant ponds; they are streams that are fed from our everyday thinking, are altered by the learned, and eventually flow back into it and influence our lives.’ (141). And ‘Useful and familiar though water is, it is not really tame stuff. It is life-giving and it is wild.’ (149)

Introduction: Every age has its pet contradictions. Thirty years ago, we used to accept Marx and Freud together, and then wonder, like the chameleon on the tartan, why life was so confusing. Today there is similar trouble over the question whether there is, or is not, something called Human Nature. On the one hand, there has been an explosion of animal behaviour studies, and comparisons between animals and men have become immensely popular. People use evidence from animals to decide whether man is naturally aggressive, or naturally territorial; even whether he has an Aggressive or Territorial Instinct. On the other hand, many sociologists and psychologists still seem to hold the Behaviourist view that man is a creature entirely without instincts, and so do existentialist philosophers. If so, all comparison with animals must be irrelevant. On that view, man is entirely the product of his culture. He starts off infinitely plastic, and is formed completely by the society in which he grows up.

Questions by Sasha Lawson-Frost

1. Why does Midgley bring up examples from ethology in discussing the concept of beastliness? What is she trying to show?
2. Why is it significant for Midgley that “most cosmogonies postulate strife in Heaven, and bloodshed is taken for granted as much in the Book of Judges as in the Iliad or the Sagas” (p115)? Is she right in taking this to be saying something important about human nature?
3. Do you think Midgley is right that “man has always been unwilling to admit his own ferocity, and has tried to deflect attention from it by making animals out more ferocious than they are”(p117)? Do you think you’re willing to admit your own ferocity?
4. Why would it be more natural to say “the beast within us gives us partial order; the business of conceptual thought will only be to complete it” (p118)?
5. What does Midgley mean by the “pre-rational”? Is this a concept which other philosophers/thinkers use as well? (p119)
6. Why is it significant for Midgley that the Gods are used as “scapegoats” in the Iliad (p120)? Is she right in taking this to be saying something important about human nature?

Questions by Sasha Lawson-Frost

1. Why does Midgley bring up examples from ethology in discussing the concept of beastliness? What is she trying to show?
2. Why is it significant for Midgley that “most cosmogonies postulate strife in Heaven, and bloodshed is taken for granted as much in the Book of Judges as in the Iliad or the Sagas” (p115)? Is she right in taking this to be saying something important about human nature?
3. Do you think Midgley is right that “man has always been unwilling to admit his own ferocity, and has tried to deflect attention from it by making animals out more ferocious than they are”(p117)? Do you think you’re willing to admit your own ferocity?
4. Why would it be more natural to say “the beast within us gives us partial order; the business of conceptual thought will only be to complete it” (p118)?
5. What does Midgley mean by the “pre-rational”? Is this a concept which other philosophers/thinkers use as well? (p119)
6. Why is it significant for Midgley that the Gods are used as “scapegoats” in the Iliad (p120)? Is she right in taking this to be saying something important about human nature?

Abstract: The idea of Gaia—of life on earth as a self-sustaining natural system—is not a gratuitous, semi-mystical fantasy. It is a really useful idea, a cure for distortions that spoil our current world-view. Its most obvious use is, of course, in suggesting practical solutions to environmental problems. But, more widely, it also attacks deeper tangles which now block our thinking. Some of these are puzzles about the reasons why the fate of our planet should concern us. We are bewildered by the thought that we might have a duty to something so clearly non-human. But more centrally, too, we are puzzled about how we should view ourselves. Current ways of thought still tend to trap us in the narrow, atomistic, seventeenth-century image of social life which grounds today's crude and arid individualism, though there are currently signs that we are beginning to move away from it. A more realistic view of the earth can give us a more realistic view of ourselves as its inhabitants.

Questions by Amber Donovan

1. What do you think about Midgley’s writing style – in particular her use of metaphor and general emotive language?
2. What do you think is meant by a ‘conceptual emergency’ and do you think the ‘right idea’ is all we need in the way of a cure for such things?
3. Do you agree with Midgley’s characterisation of our current situation (with respect to climate change) as a ‘conceptual emergency’? Why or why not?
4. Why do you think Midgley says that science is not ‘an inert store of neutral facts’? In light of this, do you agree that the moral implications of scientific theories must be considered when we are deciding what to accept as true?
5. Why do you think Midgley says that we need Gaia in our social and personal thinking? Do you agree and can you see how this idea could/would influence these spheres?
6. How and why do you think science and imagination do/can/should fit together (if at all)?
7. Midgley contends that our moral, psychological and political ideas have been ‘armed against holism’. Have they? Do you think more holistic thinking is key and if so, what do you think this would look like?
8. Do you think adopting the Gaian framework alone would be sufficient to achieve more holistic thinking – especially within academia – or do we need more than this?
9. What do you make of Midgley’s aquarium metaphor?
10. Why does Midgley think there can be no grand unifying theory of everything? Do you agree?
11. Do you think that Gaia is intended to be a grand unifying theory of everything or is a set of windows looking in on the aquarium?

Questions by Amber Donovan

1. What do you think about Midgley’s writing style – in particular her use of metaphor and general emotive language?
2. What do you think is meant by a ‘conceptual emergency’ and do you think the ‘right idea’ is all we need in the way of a cure for such things?
3. Do you agree with Midgley’s characterisation of our current situation (with respect to climate change) as a ‘conceptual emergency’? Why or why not?
4. Why do you think Midgley says that science is not ‘an inert store of neutral facts’? In light of this, do you agree that the moral implications of scientific theories must be considered when we are deciding what to accept as true?
5. Why do you think Midgley says that we need Gaia in our social and personal thinking? Do you agree and can you see how this idea could/would influence these spheres?
6. How and why do you think science and imagination do/can/should fit together (if at all)?
7. Midgley contends that our moral, psychological and political ideas have been ‘armed against holism’. Have they? Do you think more holistic thinking is key and if so, what do you think this would look like?
8. Do you think adopting the Gaian framework alone would be sufficient to achieve more holistic thinking – especially within academia – or do we need more than this?
9. What do you make of Midgley’s aquarium metaphor?
10. Why does Midgley think there can be no grand unifying theory of everything? Do you agree?
11. Do you think that Gaia is intended to be a grand unifying theory of everything or is a set of windows looking in on the aquarium?

Publisher's Note: Philippa Foot has for many years been one of the most distinctive and influential thinkers in moral philosophy. Long dissatisfied with the moral theories of her contemporaries, she has gradually evolved a theory of her own that is radically opposed not only to emotivism and prescriptivism but also to the whole subjectivist, anti-naturalist movement deriving from David Hume. Dissatisfied with both Kantian and utilitarian ethics, she claims to have isolated a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect only to living things considered as such; she finds this form of evaluation in moral judgements. Her vivid discussion covers topics such as practical rationality, erring conscience, and the relation between virtue and happiness, ending with a critique of Nietzsche's immoralism. This long-awaited book exposes a highly original approach to moral philosophy and represents a fundamental break from the assumptions of recent debates. Foot challenges many prominent philosophical arguments and attitudes; but hers is a work full of life and feeling, written for anyone intrigued by the deepest questions about goodness and human.

Questions by By Ellie Robson

1. In her introduction, she states that she is rejecting the non-cognitivisms of her analytic counterparts such as R.M Hare and A.J Ayer.
   • In what ways do you think these thinkers make up an analytic school?
   • And if they do, how do they differ from Foot’s thought?
   • (Hint.) Consider: ‘Meaning was thus to be explained in terms of a speaker’s attitude, intentions, or state of mind’ and ‘thus it seemed that fact, complementary to assertion, had been distinguished from value, complementary to the expression of feeling, attitude, or commitment to action.’ (6)
2. What it is for a moral judgement to be action-guiding? Must this be inherently practical?
   • (Foot regards the will as operating in action – in the actions we choose.)
3. Three types of practical rationality are discussed by Foot. She talks about preconceived ideas of practical rationality such as the view that ‘rationality is the following of ‘perceived self‐interest; alternatively, that it is the pursuit, careful and cognizant, of the maximum satisfaction of present desires’ (13)
   • Foot claims we must not think in this preconceived manner – and that a composite conception of practical rationality arises by looking at certain action in humans.
   • What do you think of this idea?
   • This appears to be a methodological point – do you think it is representative of a wider difference between traditional analytic philosophy and Foot’s alternative approach?
4. An implication of Foot’s theory is that the traditional distinction between the moral and the non-moral must disappear. What difference does it make if we remove the distinction between the moral and the non-moral?
5. Foot suggests that ‘Life will be at the centre of my discussion, and the fact that a human action or disposition is good of its kind will be taken to be simply a fact about a given feature of a certain kind of living thing.’
   • However, she does not go into our human treatment of nonanimals, is this a mere oversight of her theory? Or do you think she retains an austere/narrowly human approach towards the animate world?
   • (Hint.) consider: ‘the fact that moral action is rational action, and in the fact that human beings are creatures with the power to recognize reasons for action and to act on them. (24) – does this make the moral action exclusively human action?
6. ‘These ‘Aristotelian necessities’ depend on what the particular species of plants and animals need, on their natural habitat, and the ways of making out that are in their repertoire. These things together determine what it is for members of a particular species to be as they should be, and to do that which they should do. (15)
   • To what extent/how does this imply a union of fact and value?
   • Does the precept of something ‘living’ provide a good ground for this union?

Questions by By Ellie Robson

1. In her introduction, she states that she is rejecting the non-cognitivisms of her analytic counterparts such as R.M Hare and A.J Ayer.
   • In what ways do you think these thinkers make up an analytic school?
   • And if they do, how do they differ from Foot’s thought?
   • (Hint.) Consider: ‘Meaning was thus to be explained in terms of a speaker’s attitude, intentions, or state of mind’ and ‘thus it seemed that fact, complementary to assertion, had been distinguished from value, complementary to the expression of feeling, attitude, or commitment to action.’ (6)
2. What it is for a moral judgement to be action-guiding? Must this be inherently practical?
   • (Foot regards the will as operating in action – in the actions we choose.)
3. Three types of practical rationality are discussed by Foot. She talks about preconceived ideas of practical rationality such as the view that ‘rationality is the following of ‘perceived self‐interest; alternatively, that it is the pursuit, careful and cognizant, of the maximum satisfaction of present desires’ (13)
   • Foot claims we must not think in this preconceived manner – and that a composite conception of practical rationality arises by looking at certain action in humans.
   • What do you think of this idea?
   • This appears to be a methodological point – do you think it is representative of a wider difference between traditional analytic philosophy and Foot’s alternative approach?
4. An implication of Foot’s theory is that the traditional distinction between the moral and the non-moral must disappear. What difference does it make if we remove the distinction between the moral and the non-moral?
5. Foot suggests that ‘Life will be at the centre of my discussion, and the fact that a human action or disposition is good of its kind will be taken to be simply a fact about a given feature of a certain kind of living thing.’
   • However, she does not go into our human treatment of nonanimals, is this a mere oversight of her theory? Or do you think she retains an austere/narrowly human approach towards the animate world?
   • (Hint.) consider: ‘the fact that moral action is rational action, and in the fact that human beings are creatures with the power to recognize reasons for action and to act on them. (24) – does this make the moral action exclusively human action?
6. ‘These ‘Aristotelian necessities’ depend on what the particular species of plants and animals need, on their natural habitat, and the ways of making out that are in their repertoire. These things together determine what it is for members of a particular species to be as they should be, and to do that which they should do. (15)
   • To what extent/how does this imply a union of fact and value?
   • Does the precept of something ‘living’ provide a good ground for this union?

Introduction: Philosophers are often asked whether they can provide a defence against hostile theories which are said to be “undermining the foundations of morality,” and they often try to do so. But before anything of this kind is attempted we should surely ask whether morality could be threatened in this way. If what people have in mind is simply that the spread of certain doctrines leads to the growth of indifference about right and wrong there is no philosophical problem involved. So long as we treat the matter as a case of cause and effect it will belong rather to the psychologist than the philosopher, and we have no reason for questioning that correlations of this kind may exist. But this is not the assumption, or not the only one, for people undoubtedly do think that if certain doctrines could be proved then moral judgment would have been shown to be “nonsensical,” “meaningless,” or “invalid,” so that thereafter it would be not merely difficult but positively irrational to formulate and attempt to follow moral principles. It would be simple enough if the attack was supposed to be against some particular moral code, for there are recognized ways of arguing that a thing is not right but wrong. But when it is morality in general which is to be disproved or discredited it is difficult to see what this means or how it could be done. What would have to be shown is not that this or that is not right, but that nothing is—or not in the old sense so that attacking moral judgment is not like attacking a theory but more like attacking theorizing itself, which shows where the difficulty lies. If something is stated it can be denied or disproved, but a moral judgment does not contain statements except about what in particular is right or wrong. Yet many people, though they would probably reject a request for a justification of morality in the form of some argument as to why we should do our duty, feel that morality would be in a positive sense unjustifiable if certain supporting truths were knocked away from the structure. This may indeed be so, but we are unable to show that it is, or to explain the matter by appealing to “presuppositions” of morality, which besides being far too vague would too easily include much that was linked merely psychologically to the recognition of obligation. I propose, therefore, to look at some specific arguments which are supposed by those who resist them to constitute a threat to morality, and to ask whether this supposition is justified.