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Kantymir, Lori, Carolyn McLeod. Justification for Conscience Exemptions in Health Care
2013, Bioethics 28 (1): 16-23.
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Added by: Rochelle DuFord
Abstract: Some bioethicists argue that conscientious objectors in health care should have to justify themselves, just as objectors in the military do. They should have to provide reasons that explain why they should be exempt from offering the services that they find offensive. There are two versions of this view in the literature, each giving different standards of justification. We show these views are each either too permissive (i.e. would result in problematic exemptions based on conscience) or too restrictive (i.e. would produce problematic denials of exemption). We then develop a middle ground position that we believe better combines respect for the conscience of healthcare professionals with concern for the duties that they owe to patients. Our claim, in short, is that insofar as objectors should have to justify themselves, they should have to do it according to the standard that we defend rather than according to the standards that others have developed.

Comment: This text responds to two proposals for justifying concientious objection in the provision of health care services: genuineness and reasonableness. It would fit well within a course on medical ethics or bioethics. It also would fit well within a more general course on professional ethics, as it concerns the question of when a professional is able to justify the omission of an action that they are bound by professional duty to complete.

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Korsmeyer, Carolyn. Real Old Things
2016, Journal of Aesthetics 56(3): 219-31.
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Added by: Erich Hatala Matthes
Summary: Korsmeyer argues that although genuineness (or authenticity) is not a perceptual property, it is still an aesthetically relevant property for cultural artifacts, an argument that she locates in the relationship between age and the sense of touch. She thus offers a potential explanation for a common ntuition about the nature and value of authenticity in the Western tradition.

Comment: This is the most recent in a series of articles by Korsmeyer on the aesthetics of age and genuineness. It builds on the previous work and focuses on cultural artifacts in particular, but instructors interested in, for instance, the moral significance of authentic artifacts associated with historical injusitces might prefer some of the earlier articles in this series (such as her "Staying in Touch"). Her account also raises questions about how attributions of authenticity might affect aesthetic experience, with potential implications for discussion of authenticity in appropriation debates, though these are not explicitly explored in the article.

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