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Steward, Helen. Agency Incompatibilism and Divine Agency
2015, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7(3): 67-78.
Added by: Emily Paul

Abstract: In this paper, I consider whether an argument for compatibilism about free will and determinism might be developed from the thought that God’s agency seems consistent with the rational determination of at least some divine actions by the True and the Good. I attempt to develop such an argument and then consider how to respond to it from the point of view of my own position, which I call Agency Incompatibilism. I argue that a crucial premise in the argument is ambiguous and offer responses to the argument on behalf of the Agency Incompatibilist, on each of the two disambiguations.

Comment: This article could be used in a number of ways: (i) in a course on the metaphysics of freedom - after all, even if one is an atheist, it's interesting to examine one's metaphysics of freedom when applied to the divine domain, and this paper does so in a way that also presents a fascinating version of incompatibilism; (ii) in a Philosophy of Religion course element on divine freedom (iii) as a secondary reading relating to both of the above.

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