Introduction: I shall argue that the Knowledge Norm of Assertion is false. In particular, I shall show that there are cases in which a speaker asserts that p in the absence of knowing that p without being subject to criticism in any relevant sense, thereby showing that knowledge cannot be what is required for proper asser- tion. I shall then develop and defend an alternative norm of assertion – what I shall call the Reasonable to Believe Norm of Assertion – that not only avoids the problems afflicting the Knowledge Norm of Assertion but also more fully and co- herently accommodates our general intuitions about both asserters and their assertions.
Comment: This is an important paper on the norm of assertion, in which Lackey criticises the knowledge norm and argues for a reasonable-to-believe norm. It is a must-have teaching material for upper level undergraduate courses on epistemology or philosophy of language, sessions on assertion or epistemic norms.