Moss, Sarah. Epistemology Formalized
2013, Philosophical Review: 122(1): 1-43.
Added by: Jie Gao
Abstract: This paper argues that just as full beliefs can constitute knowledge, so can properties of your credence distribution. The resulting notion of probabilistic knowledge helps us give a natural account of knowledge ascriptions embedding language of subjective uncertainty, and a simple diagnosis of probabilistic analogs of Gettier cases. Just like propositional knowledge, probabilistic knowledge is factive, safe, and sensitive. And it helps us build knowledge-based norms of action without accepting implausible semantic assumptions or endorsing the claim that knowledge is interest-relative.
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Comment: Suitable for an upper-level undergraduate courses or master courses on epistemology or formal epistemology. It is good for teachings on topics of the relation between credence and knowledge, and pragmatic encroachment.