In his post-Tractatus work on natural language use, Wittgenstein defended the notion of what he dubbed the autonomy of grammar. According to this thought, grammar - or semantics, in a more recent idiom - is essentially autonomous from metaphysical considerations, and is not answerable to the nature of things. The argument has several related incarnations in Wittgenstein's post-Tractatus writings, and has given rise to a number of important insights, both critical and constructive. In this paper I will argue for a potential connection between Wittgenstein's autonomy argument and some more recent internalist arguments for the autonomy of semantics. My main motivation for establishing this connection comes from the fact that the later Wittgenstein's comments on grammar and meaning stand in opposition to some of the core assumptions of semantic externalism. 

This paper aims to defuse the hysteria over value-laden inquiry by showing how it is based on a misapprehension of the arguments of the most careful advocates of such inquiry, an impoverished understanding of the goals of science, a mistaken model of the interaction of normative and evidential considerations in science, and a singular inattention to the empirical facts about how responsible inquirers go about their business.

A French Jew born in Algeria, philosopher and novelist Cixous (b. 1937) blends and bends the categories of theory. Originally written for a journal issue on Beauvoir, this essay tries to map out a strategy against the alienation of women through the re-apropriation of their own identity, via written work. A literary interpretation of feminism, it articulates the idea of écriture féminine (feminine writing), a type of writing particular to women. This is Cixous' strategic essentialism: according to her, the difference in women's expression should be underlined, and thus women should write in a specific style allowing for a reclamation and a reinvention of their identities, against the patriarchal system. This literary strategy is heavily embodied, and relies on representations as much as lived, practical experiences to criticize a male-centered system. However, Cixous remains a structuralist: identity is not given, but built within discourse in complex relation with other poles, and feminine writing can be found in men through sexual subversion (Genet is one example). This essay marks a specific period in both French feminism and post-structuralism, providing a perfect example of the philosophical, political and artistic questions of the period.

Published in French in 1949, it is usually considered the foundational book of second wave feminism, characterized by a shift from the conquering of political rights of first wave feminism (franchise, basic emancipation) to a concern for general equality, at home, in the workplace, etc. Beauvoir's (1908–1986) first question is the very definition of a woman, and her core ideas draw from phenomenology. She elaborates an existential account of being a woman: womanhood does not consist of fixed characteristics, but is a project carried out by a free agent in a material, collective situation, creating meaning through action in a given context. Understanding the category of woman as a collective construction and the result of a series of actions and representations allows for the re-actualization of the Marxist notion of alienation, where women are stranger to themselves, operating on values imposed by men rather than found in a lived practice. In two volumes, Beauvoir seeks to highlight both the cultural, historical and economical background of genders ("Facts and Myths") and the "Lived Experience" resulting from it. Through a reading of Hegel, she rethinks gender categories as a dynamic and unequal process, and from there traces the possibility of a liberation from the perceived secondary character of women. Groundbreaking in feminist and continental philosophy, placed on the catholic Index of forbidden books, it remains a revolutionary work until today.

This article questions fundamental concepts in political philosophy and political theory, as well as the method of political philosophy and philosophy more generally. While acknowledging that concepts such as contract, higher self, or organism do not refer within political theories to anything real but function as metaphors, MacDonald nonetheless emphasizes the importance of reflecting on the reasons for and the effects of their use. This way of thinking can constitute an essential part of philosophical method.

MacDonald’s thesis is that such concepts arise in response to puzzles of social life, among which the most fundamental is perhaps the question, “Why should human beings live with others of their own kind at all?” According to MacDonald, however, there is no general answer to these puzzles that could be applied to all social situations and that would entail political obligations normative for every context. This constitutes an important implicit critique of classical political theories.

As MacDonald argues, “as rational and responsible citizens we can never hope to know once and for all what our political duties are. And so we can never go to sleep.” The impossibility of offering a universal theory of political duties thus implies the requirement of constant ethical and political vigilance.

The most sustained and innovative recent work on metaphor has occurred in cognitive science and psychology. Psycholinguistic investigation suggests that novel, poetic metaphors are processed differently than literal speech, while relatively conventionalized and contextually salient metaphors are processed more like literal speech. This conflicts with the view of “cognitive linguists” like George Lakoff that all or nearly all thought is essentially metaphorical. There are currently four main cognitive models of metaphor comprehension: juxtaposition, category-transfer, feature-matching, and structural alignment. Structural alignment deals best with the widest range of examples; but it still fails to account for the complexity and richness of fairly novel, poetic metaphors.

Academic and activist feminist inquiry has repeatedly tried to come to terms with the question of what we might mean by the curious and inescapable term "objectivity." We have used a lot of toxic ink and trees processed into paper decrying what they have meant and how it hurts us. The imagined "they" constitute a kind of invisible conspiracy of masculinist scientists and philosophers replete with grants and laboratories. The imagined "we" are the embodied others, who are not allowed not to have a body, a finite point of view, and so an inevitably disqualifying and polluting bias in any discussion of consequence outside our own little circles, where a "mass"-subscription journal might reach a few thousand
readers composed mostly of science haters.

The aim of natural language ontology is to uncover the ontological categories and structures that are implicit in the use of natural language, that is, that a speaker accepts when using a language. This article aims to clarify what exactly the subject matter of natural language ontology is, what sorts of linguistic data it should take into account, how natural language ontology relates to other branches of metaphysics, in what ways natural language ontology is important, and what may be distinctive of the ontological categories and structures reflected in natural language.

Since the early 1980s, feminist epistemology has developed into a vibrant area of inquiry which challenges many of the taken-for-granted assumptions of traditional, mainstream theories of knowledge to work towards developing theories and practices that close a persistent gap between theories of knowledge and knowledge that matters to people in real situations. Here I will examine some of the more startling recent developments in feminist epistemology, where—perhaps improbably—epistemologies of ignorance and questions about epistemic injustice have made significant contributions to feminist knowledge projects. Together and separately, they expose the extent to which knowing is a political activity, while maintaining that it can avow its political involvement without dissolving into facile assertions that ‘might is right’.