Added by: Björn Freter, Contributed by: Rebekah Humphreys
Abstract: The word ‘dignity’ may be used in a presentational sense, for example, one might say “she presents herself with dignity”, or in a social sense, for example, one might say “she fulfilled her duty with dignity, or honour.” However, in this paper I will not be using ‘dignity’ in either of these senses. Rather, the sense of dignity I will be concerned with is one that is related to ideas about the value or worth of a being. This latter sense of dignity has a long history, and tends to be a concept that is thought to be applicable to human animals only, and more specifically to human persons—moral agents, capable of rationality, of directing their own lives, and of formulating...
Comment: Critically analyses the concept of dignity and provide argumentation as to why the concept, contrary to traditional understandings, is applicable to animals and their lives.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Humphreys. Dignity and its violation examined within the context of animal ethics
2016, Ethics and the Environment 21 (2):143-162
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