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Abstract: This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright’s notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialist should characterize epistemic rationality.
Comment: This paper critically examines Wright's notion of entitlement, therefore it is natural to use it as a further disucssion material on Wright's paper (On epistemic entitlement: Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free?), 2004). Suitable for a senior undergraduate course on epistemology for topics on entitlement and epistemic rationality.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Jenkins, Carrie. Entitlement and rationality
2007, Synthese 157 (1): 25-45.
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