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Abstract: In this paper, the author argues (i) that there are certain methodological practices that are epistemically significant, and (ii) that we can test for the success of these practices empirically by examining case-studies in the history of science. Analysing a particular episode from the history of medicine, she explains how this can help us resolve specific cases of underdetermination. She concludes that, while the anti-realist is (more or less legitimately) able to construct underdetermination scenarios on a case-by-case basis, he will have to abandon the strategy of using algorithms to do so, thus losing the much needed guarantee that there will always be rival cases of the required kind.
Comment: Using the case study of the origin and pathology of cholera, this article argues for an expanded conception of epistemic criteria besides the empirical evidence. A really useful reading for studying realism and under-determination. It is suitable for both postgraduate and undergraduate courses in philosophy of science.Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
Tulodziecki, Dana. Underdetermination, methodological practices, and realism
2013, Synthese 190(17): 3731-3750.
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