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Raphals, Lisa Ann. A tripartite self: mind, body, and spirit in early China
2023, New York: Oxford University Press

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Added by: Xintong Wei
Abstract:
Chinese philosophy has long recognized the importance of the body and emotions in extensive and diverse self-cultivation traditions. Philosophical debates about the relationship between mind and body are often described in terms of mind-body dualism and its opposite, monism or some kind of "holism." Monist or holist views agree on the unity of mind and body, but with much debate about what kind, whereas mind-body dualists take body and mind to be metaphysically distinct entities. The question is important for several reasons. Several humanistic and scientific disciplines recognize embodiment as an important dimension of the human condition. One version, the problem of mind-body dualism, is central to the history of both philosophy and religion. Some account of relations between body and mind, spirit or soul is also central to any understanding of the self. Recent work in cognitive and neuroscience underscores the importance of our somatic experience for how we think and feel.

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Ren, Songyao. The Zhuangist views on emotions
2018, Asian Philosophy 28 (1):55-67

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Added by: Xintong Wei
Abstract:
In this article, I will look into the Zhuangist views on emotions. I will argue that the psychological state of the Zhuangist wise person is characterized by emotional equanimity accompanied by a general sense of calmness, ease, and joy. This psychological state is constitutive of and instrumental to leading a good life, one in which one wanders the world and explores the plurality of daos. To do so, I will first provide an overview of the scholarly debate on this issue and unveil the disconcerting disagreement that underlies it. Then, I will survey some passages in the Zhuangzi and sketch my interpretation of the Zhuangist views on emotions. Next, I will examine the theoretical foundation for this interpretation by referencing the Zhuangist pluralism and their conception of the good life. Finally, I will look into some potential objections to the Zhuangist views on emotions and attempt responses to them.

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Oh, Sangmu. Two Levels of Emotion and Well-Being in the Zhuangzi
2021, Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 20 (4):589-611

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Added by: Xintong Wei
Abstract:

Emotion is an essential component of human nature, and therefore it is necessary to explore the issue of a desirable emotional state if we want to properly discuss human well-being. This article examines the issue by advocating a new understanding of the Zhuangzi’s 莊子 ideas on emotion. In terms of the Zhuangzi’s ideas on the desirable emotional state, scholars have presented various interpretations to date, even arguing that the ideas themselves are mutually contradictory or inconsistent. This article shows that the Zhuangzi’s ideas about emotions are in fact consistent by dividing emotions into two types: “conventional knowledge-dependent emotions” and “true knowledge-dependent emotions.” It then examines the characteristics of a desirable emotional state and the conditions necessary to reach it and explores the implications of the Zhuangzi’s ideas for discussions on well-being in modern times.

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Liu, JeeLoo. An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism
2006, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell

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Added by: Xintong Wei
Abstract:
"An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy" unlocks the mystery of ancient Chinese philosophy and unravels the complexity of Chinese Buddhism by placing them in the contemporary context of discourse. Elucidates the central issues and debates in Chinese philosophy, its different schools of thought, and its major philosophers. Covers eight major philosophers in the ancient period, among them Confucius, Laozi, and Zhuangzi. Illuminates the links between different schools of philosophy. Opens the door to further study of the relationship between Chinese and Western philosophy.

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Li, Jingjing. Through the Mirror: The Account of Other Minds in Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism
2019, Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 18 (3):435-451

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Added by: Xintong Wei
Abstract:

This article proposes a new reading of the mirror analogy presented in the doctrine of Chinese Yogācāra Buddhism. Clerics, such as Xuanzang 玄奘 and his protégé Kuiji 窺基, articulated this analogy to describe our experience of other minds. In contrast with existing interpretations of this analogy as figurative ways of expressing ideas of projecting and reproducing, I argue that this mirroring experience should be understood as revealing, whereby we perceive other minds through the second-person perspective. This mirroring experience, in its allusion to the collectivity of consciousness, yields the metaphysical explication of mutual interdependence and the prescription of norms for compassionate actions.

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Liu, JeeLoo. The metaphysical as the ethical: a pragmatist reading of Wang Yangming’s “The Mind Is the Principle”
2024, Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-29

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Added by: Xintong Wei
Abstract:
This paper explores a late-Ming Chinese philosopher Wang Yangming’s (1472–1529) philosophical assertions showcasing the pivotal role that human mind plays in shaping our worldview. Wang Yangming’s view—especially his declaration that the Mind is the Principle—emphasizes that the human mind is the sole foundation of moral principles and that worldly affairs are identified with human ethical practices. This position has been contentious both in his times and among contemporary scholars. While some critics, notably Chen Lai, find Wang’s synthesis of the ethical and the metaphysical realm problematic, others like Wing-tsit Chan view Wang Yangming’s philosophy as verging on subjective idealism. Both Chen and Chan argue that Wang Yangming commits the fallacy of the conflation of fact and value. In this paper, I defend Wang Yangming’s ethics-oriented metaphysics against such criticisms. I will engage a comparative study between Wang Yangming’s perspective and pragmatist metaphysics—a modern philosophical stance which sees metaphysics as intertwining with human ethics and practices. Building upon this comparative study, this paper aims to highlight the intrinsic bond between metaphysics and ethics and to advocate for the centrality of ethics in shaping the very foundation of metaphysical thinking. The conclusion of this paper is that Wang Yangming’s metaphysics aligns with commonsense realism, rather than with subjective idealism. His metaphysics is not a confused worldview that conflates fact with value, nor is it subjective idealism. Instead, it is a metaphysics with the ethical grounding of human engagements and humanistic concerns.

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Wang, Kaili. On self-deception: from the perspective of Zhu Xi’s moral psychology
2021, Asian Philosophy 31 (4):414-429

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Added by: Xintong Wei
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In order to construct a satisfactory theory of cheng-yi 誠意, Zhu Xi 朱熹 develops an account of how self-deception is possible—a profound problem that has puzzled many philosophers. In Zhu’s opinion, zhi 知 can be divided into two categories: a priori knowing and empirical knowing. The further division of empirical knowing defines three sorts of self-deception: the self-deception caused by one’s ignorance, the self-deception caused by one’s superficial knowing, and the self-deception that may occur when one acquires genuine knowledge. In this paper, I will construct a theoretical model of self-deception that follows Zhu’s criterial definition of self-deception in Daxue Zhangju 大學章句, thereby accounting for the possibility of these three sorts of self-deception. Better understanding of Zhu’s conception of self-deception could, moreover, open fruitful avenues for further work on his metaphysics and moral psychology.

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Liu, JeeLoo. Neo-Confucianism: Metaphysics, Mind, and Morality
2017, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons

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Added by: Xintong Wei
Abstract:
Solidly grounded in Chinese primary sources, Neo Confucianism: Metaphysics, Mind, and Morality engages the latest global scholarship to provide an innovative, rigorous, and clear articulation of neo-Confucianism and its application to Western philosophy. Contextualizes neo-Confucianism for contemporary analytic philosophy by engaging with today’s philosophical questions and debates Based on the most recent and influential scholarship on neo-Confucianism, and supported by primary texts in Chinese and cross-cultural secondary literature Presents a cohesive analysis of neo-Confucianism by investigating the metaphysical foundations of neo-Confucian perspectives on the relationship between human nature, human mind, and morality Offers innovative interpretations of neo-Confucian terminology and examines the ideas of eight major philosophers, from Zhou Dunyi and Cheng-Zhu to Zhang Zai and Wang Fuzhi Approaches neo-Confucian concepts in an penetrating yet accessible way

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Olberding, Amy. “The feel of not to feel it”: Lucretius’ remedy for death anxiety
2005, Philosophy and Literature 29 (1):114-129

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Added by: Deryn Mair Thomas
Abstract:

Do Lucretius’ vivid evocations of pain and suffering render impotent his therapy for fear of death? Lucretius’ readers have long noted the discord between his avowed aim to provide a rational foundation for cool detachment from death and his impassioned and acute attention to nature’s often cruel brutality. I argue that Lucretius does have a viable remedy for death anxiety but that this remedy significantly departs from Epicurus’ original counsel. Lucretius’ remedy confesses its origins in a heightened, rather than benumbed, sensitivity to the affective and somatic features of human experience, culminating in “the feel of not to feel it.”

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Olberding, Amy. Etiquette: A Confucian Contribution to Moral Philosophy
2016, Ethics 126 (2):422-446

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Added by: Deryn Mair Thomas
Abstract:

The early Confucians recognize that the exchanges and experiences of quotidian life profoundly shape moral attitudes, moral self-understanding, and our prospects for robust moral community. Confucian etiquette aims to provide a form of moral training that can render learners equal to the moral work of ordinary life, inculcating appropriate cognitive-emotional dispositions, as well as honing social perception and bodily expression. In both their astute attention to prosaic behavior and the techniques they suggest for managing it, I argue, the Confucians afford a model useful for appropriation in contemporary efforts to address small but potent moral harms such as microinequities

Comment: This paper explores the bearing of etiquette on moral sensibility, action, and character, through the philosophy of Confucianism and its concept of 'li 禮'. The author draws attention to the fact that early Confucianism placed an uncharacteristic emphasis on the development of good etiquette as a core component of the development of a moral character. She highlights this feature of Confucian ethics, in part, because it runs counter to much of traditional ethical theory in western philosohpy - where manners and etiquette, as mere social norms, are treated as 'notoriously fallible,' imperfect and often arbitrary: not principles on which we would think to base guidelines for moral development. Olberding, however, argues in their favor: that these rules 'arise in sensitivity to human need', and that robust adherence to them cultivates not only our actions but our character when it comes to interacting with other. The argument is especially straightforward and clear, and does not require any advanced or previous exposure to Confucian ethics, making it accessible to a wide range of ability levels. It would make an interesting addition to any introductory course in ethics, but could also be used to augment a more advanced discussion about contemporary ethical debates. (There are notable connections to the work of other contemporary philosophers discussing sociality and need, including Kimberley Brownlee, Soran Reader, and Anca Gheaus.)

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