- Added by: Nick Novelli, Contributed by:
Abstract: Philosophers of experiment have acknowledged that experiments are often more than mere hypothesis-tests, once thought to be an experiment’s exclusive calling. Drawing on examples from contemporary biology, I make an additional amendment to our understanding of experiment by examining the way that `wide’ instrumentation can, for reasons of efficiency, lead scientists away from traditional hypothesis-directed methods of experimentation and towards exploratory methods.
Comment: Good exploration of the role of experiments, challenging the idea that they are solely useful for testing clearly defined hypotheses. Uses many practical examples, but is very concise and clear. Suitable for undergraduate teaching in an examination of scientific methods in a philosophy of science course.[This is a stub entry. Please add your comments to help us expand it]Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format
- Added by: Laura Jimenez, Contributed by:
Summary: It is customary to distinguish experimental from purely observational sciences. The former include physics and molecular biology, the latter astronomy and palaeontology. Surprisingly, mainstream philosophy of science has had rather little to say about the observational/experimental distinction. For example, discussions of confirmation usually invoke a notion of ‘evidence’, to be contrasted with ‘theory’ or ‘hypothesis’; the aim is to understand how the evidence bears on the hypothesis. But whether this ‘evidence’ comes from observation or experiment generally plays no role in the discussion; this is true of both traditional and modern confirmation theories, Bayesian and non-Bayesian. In this article, the author sketches one possible explanation, by suggesting that observation and experiment will often differ in their confirmatory power. Based on a simple Bayesian analysis of confirmation, Okasha argues that universal generalizations (or ‘laws’) are typically easier to confirm by experimental intervention than by pure observation. This is not to say that observational confirmation of a law is impossible, which would be flatly untrue. But there is a general reason why confirmation will accrue more easily from experimental data, based on a simple though oft-neglected feature of Bayesian conditionalization.
Comment: Previous knowledge of Bayesian conditioning might be needed. The article is suitable for postgraduate courses in philosophy of science focusing in the distinction between observational and experimental science.[This is a stub entry. Please add your comments to help us expand it]Export citation in BibTeX formatExport text citationView this text on PhilPapersExport citation in Reference Manager formatExport citation in EndNote formatExport citation in Zotero format