Diversity Reading List

Comment (from this Blueprint): Radden's paper introduces the reader to broad concerns with the dominant medical model of disorder from a feminist perspective, highlighting the tension with a naturalistic, reductionist approach with the situated and ecological approach of Radden's feminism. This article touches on topics mentioned in other readings (such as enactive concpetions of mind and epistemic injustice) but contextualises them within the field of philosophy of psychiatry. As such, this article is a fruitful springboard for critically considering the nature of medicine and psychiatry from multiple angles. This chapter would be complimented by the further reading of Russell's (2023) paper on Enactive Psychiatry.

Comment (from this Blueprint): Rudder Baker's chapter on the first-person perspective and gender identity is a great starting place to begin thinking about what it means to experience the world through the lens of gender. Rudder Baker's chapter also poses interesting thought experiements, such as whether a disembodied being would have a gender idetity (she argues "no") or whether it is possible to live in a gender-less society. The chapter also introduces the reader to the necessary conditons by which we might want to say that someone has a gender identity andso is a fruitful springboard for further and deeper discussions about not only gender, but language and personal identity more broadly.

Comment (from this Blueprint): In this article, James argues for a deeply embodied account of personal identity. James claims that current psychological theories on personal identity, tend to overlook the role of the body in maintaining psychological continuity. Mainstream thought experiments used by those theories, for instance, examples of body swap, undermine the extent to which psychological traits of a person depend on a body. James claims that the body is constitutive for developing one's identity and character. Additionally, she offers an analysis of the role of gender on personal identity by examining how patriarchal structures promote the idea that the mind can be independent of the body.

Comment (from this Blueprint): Butler draws together muitple themes in this paper to talk about how fascets of our identity (gender, sexuality and even our national/ethnic idetitiy) are strongly determined by external strctures, even when we try to subvert those structures. While sexuality is a key theme in this paper, Butlet discusses the theme of recognition, subjecthood and precarity from multiple angles, making it a cornerstone for multiple themes in this blueprint. The discussion on assimilation and translation is also highly relevant to Ahmed's discussions both in Queer Phenomenology and "A phenomenology of whiteness".

Comment (from this Blueprint): This chapter should be read as a complimentary to McWeeny and Maitra's as further food for thought on how feminist thought can be applied to different areas of philosophy. Additionally, the authors introduce the notion of "intersectionality" and argue for a revision of the history of philosophy that considers the impact of discrimination in the promotion of different forms of thought. This text can also be a useful starting point or complimentary text for the readings of week 5.

Comment (from this Blueprint): McWeeny provides a novel examination of the attribution question by looking into what might be considered one of the most inclusive theories about the mind: panpsychism. According to Panpsychism, "mentality is ubiquitous in nature". Thus, we should expect panpsychism to hold an equal attribution across all bodies, and assert that all bodies have minds, without discrimination. McWeeny shows us, upon further examination, how mainstream panpsychist views (Russelian or physicalist panpsychism) fail to do so. McWeeny provides a detailed analysis of how Cavendishian Panpsychism is more well-placed to give a feminist perspective on the attribution question.

Comment (from this Blueprint): Díaz-León's paper is an approachable entry point into the literature on defining sexual orientation. This paper works well without background reading on the wider debate and is especially approachable for those already familiar with behaviourism and its issues. Díaz-León also demonstrates the different feminist projects we may take up within the literature on the mind: the descriptive and the political. Both of which provide fertile ground for discussion and debate.

Comment (from this Blueprint): This is the introductory chapter to the anthology "Feminist Philosophy of Mind" (OUP). In here, McWeeny and Maitra (the editors) offer one of the first definitons "feminist philosophy of mind" as a subdiscipline and as a methodology to the study of the mind. They argue that current methods and theoretical work in philosophy of mind has highly overseen the role of the body and society in our understanding of the mind. This text works as a prompt to intitiate the blueprint and to consider how the study of the mind could benefit from the application of tools from feminist philosophy.

Comment (from this Blueprint): Butnor and MacKenzie apply a specific paradigm - the enactive model of cogniton - to the understanding of gender identity in this chapter. This chapter is thus a useful introduction to the enactive framework, but is also an important reading for those already familiar with the literature as it both tries to consider how gender can be 'natural' but also deeply social and political. As such, Butnor and MacKenzie straddle the line between the scientific and the political by provising a non-reductive, natural account of gender that does liberatory work. This reading is also highly relevant to feminists who are critical of essentialist views of gender and poses to them the question of whether we can have our naturalist cake and eat it too.

Comment (from this Blueprint): This article would be a good pairing to support the reading of James' "The Question on Personal Identity" (2002). In this article, Gonzalez-Arnal presents a compelling counter-example to James' argument that her theory should be preferred over psychological theories on personal identity given the role of embodiment on personal identity. According to James, mainstream thought experiments involving body swaps rarely discuss cases involving two bodies of different gender because they, intuitively, do not bring us to believe that Person A would survive a body swap with a Person B of different gender. Gonzalez-Arnal challenges James' argumentation by presenting the example of transsexuality by showing that their personal identity is preserved even though significant changes in their body take place.